ASN Report 2018

The Flamanville EPR reactor under construction ASN considers that the organisation put into place for the preparation for Flamanville EPR operations is on thewhole satisfactory. EDFmust however further adapt its practices regarding equipment qualification and the performance of start-up tests, so that they are carried out in the planned conditions and so that their actual representativeness is correctly documented. The deviations found on the main steam letdown pipes revealed a lack of rigorousness in the welding operations and a breakdown in EDF monitoring of its contractors. ASN therefore asked that the review of the quality of the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor equipment be extended to include a broader scope of equipment and subcontractors, while adapting the depth of the review to the specific implications concerned. The licensee proposed an approach for dealing with the anomalies detected. It is currently being examined. ASN will issue its opinion on the acceptability of this approach in 2019. EDF must be vigilant in ensuring that the necessary repairs are carried out and the worksite completed, with priority being given to the quality of the work done. NPPs being decommissioned and waste management facilities ASNisconcernedbythedelaysinthemaindecommissioning operations for all the Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCR) and for the Brennilis reactor, as well as in the commissioning of the radioactivewastemanagement facilities such as Iceda. ASN considers that waiting for complete decommissioning of one GCR reactor before beginning to decommission the others, which means that the decommissioning of these reactors would then be postponed by several decades, is unacceptable if not justified by industrial experience feedback, and it asked EDF to examine possible ways of optimising the GCR decommissioning schedule. The nuclear safety of EDF’s facilities being decommissioned remains on the whole satisfactory. Progress with the decommissioning of the Chooz A and Superphénix reactors is in line with the schedules in their decrees. Following internal contamination events affecting workers on the Saint-Laurent A site in 2016 and Chooz A in 2017, EDF implemented an action plan for improved management of the risks linked to the presence of radionuclides emitting “alpha” radiation, which is one of the main decommissioning challenges. ASN observes that the technical dialogue with the teams in charge of the plants being decommissioned and of waste management is sometimes difficult. Generally speaking, ASN considers that EDF’s files are either insufficiently detailed (for example, the general operating rules for waste management), or incomplete (for example, the environmental assessments are missing from the reviews). ASN asks that EDF provide technical data enabling the risks to be assessed and operational conclusions to be reached more rapidly. ASN also observes that the EDF three-yearly reports on the long-term costs of decommissioning of facilities contain very little detail when compared with those from the other licensees. Orano Cycle ASN considers that the level of safety in the facilities operated by Orano Cycle is on the whole satisfactory, with the context being less worrying following the group’s recapitalisation and reorganisation. The facilities operated by Orano Cycle are located on the La Hague and Tricastin sites and the issues involved are both chemical and radiological. ASN considers that the level of safety of the facilities in operation on the La Hague site is on the whole satisfactory. In a very short period of time, Orano Cycle designed and implemented new means to deal with extreme situations in their facilities, notably new emergency buildings that are robust to extreme hazards, plus water make-up resources. However, progress is still required in terms of the traceability of the inspections performed, the training of workers in charge of these inspections, the skills of the new contractors carrying out maintenance work and their familiarity with the facilities, as well as their monitoring by Orano Cycle. ASN considers that Orano Cycle must continue the actions undertaken to improve the follow-up and processing of deviations and the corresponding operating experience feedback from the La Hague site. It considers that Orano Cycle must take better account of organisational and human factors in its modifications or in the implementation of the group’s baseline safety requirements. Finally, ASN notes that Orano Cycle must improve the way its fire risk management measures interface and interact with the measures adopted for physical protection of the nuclear materials on the La Hague site. ASN considers that ageing management, in a context of faster than expected corrosion of the fission product evaporator-concentrators and of other equipment in the La Hague plant, is a priority issue. Orano Cycle has developed an approach involving the selection of equipment for which ageing is to be monitored. The principles of this approach are acceptable but its effective implementation in the field and its traceability need to be improved. With regard to the various Legacy Waste Repackaging (RCD) and decommissioning projects, which have major safety implications at La Hague, ASN observes significant delays in their implementation. Some delays are linked to Orano Cycle giving priority to its plants in operation, to changes in scenarios and to the need to modify design studies, which is sometimes identified only belatedly. ASN asked Orano Cycle to reinforce its project management capabilities in order to advance the RCD and decommissioning operations successfully. ASN considers that the safety level of the facilities on the Tricastin site has progressed, notably thanks to the gradual shutdown of the oldest facilities, the commissioning of facilities with reassessed safety standards and the 10  ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018