ASN Report 2018

completion of the work done as a result of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. ASN also observes that the pooled emergency organisation and management resources now make it possible to manage an emergency situation, whichever facility is affected. The presence of a local intervention force, its organisation, the means at its disposal and the quality of the intervention are a real asset in the emergency response organisation on the Tricastin platform, where the facilities operated entail the risk of accidents that can develop rapidly. Radioactive substance transports, which are now centrally organised, are managed satisfactorily. ASN considers that for the Tricastin site, follow-up of the undertakings made to ASN and monitoring of the contractors needs to be improved, notably to ensure the conformity of the subcontracted work. CEA ASN considers that the safety of the facilities operated by CEA remains on thewhole satisfactory, despite aworrying budgetary context. Safety concerns surround the continued operation of facilities designed according to old safety standards. Themain challenge for CEA is however to ensure thedecommissioningof facilities that havebeen finally shut down, to recover andpackage legacywaste and tomanage its radioactive waste andmaterials with no identified use. CEA operates a large number of facilities of varying types and safety implications, such as research reactors and laboratories conducting experiments on behalf of the nuclear industry (NPPs, fuel cycle, waste management), along with storage facilities. Some of these facilities, built to support the French NPP fleet in the 60s and 70s, are in operation, others are shut down and preparing for decommissioning, while others are currently undergoing decommissioning. The Jules Horowitz research reactor, which was authorised in 2009, is currently under construction. The facilities in operation are today old and the future projects designed to replace some of them are uncertain (Mosaïc, Zephyr). Their postponement could lead CEA to try to continue with the operation of ageing facilities for which it would be hard to ensure compliance with current safety standards. ASN could thus be required to restrict the operating conditions, or even request the shutdown of certain facilities. CEA will be required to define and present a medium/long-term strategy for its civil nuclear research experimental facilities, with particular vigilance with regard to the credibility of the timelines and the financial resources. ASN considers that, at all levels within the organisation of CEA, responsibility for safety must be borne by the persons with the necessary resources, skills and authority. It also considers that CEA must be attentive to preserving the resources and attractiveness of the positions dealing with safety. ASN considers that CEA must reinforce its monitoring and its management of the activities carried out by the outside contractors and subcontractors. This is particularly important for facilities managing waste, effluents, or storage. On this subject, it would be a good idea for the best practices observed in certain facilities to be extended to all the others. ASN recalls the need to rapidly notify it of any significant events that occur in the facilities. It also considers that the analysis of notified events should be carried out in greater depth, on the one hand to identify the relevant corrective measures and on the other to foster the sharing of experience. With regard to the periodic safety reviews, ASN observes that 16 review reports were transmitted with no delay at the end of 2017, which represents a considerable workload for CEA. On the basis of the inspections carried out on this topic, ASN found that CEA has now better assimilated the problems relating to the review, thanks to the implementation on each site of a transverse organisation specifically devoted to these processes. ASN will be attentive to the correct performance of the works identified in the periodic safety reviews. It thus observes that CEA makes undertakings for each dossier, although sometimes without being able to ensure that the human or financial resources are actually available. This can subsequently lead to certain undertakings not being met. ASN thus observed delays in the availability of new emergency management buildings, designed to take account of the lessons learned from Fukushima, for the Saclay and Cadarache centres. The compensatory measures proposed by CEA will need to be rapidly operational. ASN remains vigilant with respect to compliance with CEA’s schedule of commitments, the completeness of the dossiers transmitted, the quality of the answers to requests and compliance with the requirements. With respect to the scope of the delays found in CEA’s decommissioning and waste management projects, ASN and ASND asked CEA, in July 2015, to conduct an overall review of its strategy for decommissioning, radioactive materials and waste management, its prioritisation of operations, human resources and the efficiency of its organisation, as well as the pertinence of the amount of the financial resources allocated to these operations. CEA has implemented a new organisation, which represents significant progress. This progress will have to be confirmed in the medium-term through compliance with the highest priority project timelines. ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018  11