ASN Report 2018

Competencies of the main civil nuclear activity regulatory Authorities* COUNTRY/ REGULATORY AUTHORITY STATUS ACTIVITIES ADMINIS- TRATION GOVERNMENT AGENCY INDEPENDENT AGENCY SAFETY OF CIVIL INSTALLATIONS RADIATION PROTECTION SECURITY (PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS ACTS) SAFETY OF TRANSPORT LARGE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OUTSIDE BNIS PATIENTS SOURCES NUCLEAR MATERIALS Europe Germany/ BMUB + Länder ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Belgium/AFCN ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Spain/CSN ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Finland/ STÜK ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ France/ASN ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■*** ■ United Kingdom/ONR ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Sweden/SSM ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Switzerland/ ENSIi ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Other Countries Canada/CNSC ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ China/NNSA ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Korea/NSSC ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ United States/ NRC ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■** India/ AERB ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Japan/ NRA ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Russia/ Rostekhnadzor ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Ukraine/ SNRIU ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ * Schematic, simplified representation of the main areas of competence of the entities (administration, independent agencies within government or independent agencies outside government) responsible for regulating nuclear activities in the world’s nuclear countries. ** National transports only. *** Responsibility for source security was given to ASN by the Ordinance of 10 February 2016. This provision came into force on 1 July 2017. 5.2  ̶  ASN bilateral assistance ASN responds to these approaches by means of bilateral actions with the safety regulator of the country concerned, in addition to the instruments, both European (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and international (IAEA’s Regulatory Cooperation Forum – RCF). The purpose of this cooperation is to enable the beneficiary countries to acquire the safety and transparency culture that is essential for a national system of nuclear safety and radiation protection oversight. Nuclear safety oversight must be based on national competence and ASN consequently only provides support for the establishment of an adequate national framework and advises the national safety regulator, which must retain full responsibility for its oversight of the nuclear facilities. It pays particular attention to countries acquiring technologies of which it has experience in France. ASN considers that developing an appropriate safety infrastructure takes at least fifteen years before operation of a nuclear power reactor can begin in good conditions. For these countries, the goal is to set up a legislative framework and an independent and competent safety regulator with the financial and human resources it needs to perform its duties and to develop competence in terms of safety, safety and regulatory culture and management of radiological emergency situations. China In 2018 , ASN continued with its coordination of a three- year European assistance project aiming to reinforce the development of the Chinese regulator, the NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) and its technical support organisation, the NSC (Nuclear Safety Center) on the following topics: management of radioactive waste, decommissioning, preparedness for emergency situations, radioactive material transports, fuel reprocessing, seismic evaluation and development of nuclear safety R&D skills. This is the second INSC cooperation programme with China, which started in February 2017 for a period of three years. Vietnam In 2018 , ASN continued to manage the second assistance programme for Vietnam under the INSC, in order to develop the safety, safety culture and regulatory capabilities of the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS). 198  ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018 06 – INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS