ASN Report 2018

• Phase 3 (as of 2019) This phase will supplement phase 2, notably to be able to deal with external hazards. The most important measures are: ∙ ∙ addition of a new makeup pump to the primary system; ∙ ∙ completion of the fixed connection systems for the SG backup feedwater supply, the PTR cooling water tank and the spent fuel pit; ∙ ∙ installation of an ultimate instrumentation & control system and the definitive instrumentation of the “hardened safety core”; ∙ ∙ installation of a reactor containment ultimate cooling system that does not require opening of the containment venting- filtration system in the event of a severe accident; ∙ ∙ the installation of a corium flooding solution which would be installed in the reactor pit, to prevent basemat melt-through in the event of core melt. With a view to the implementation of the “hardened safety core” and in particular the provisions of phases 2 and 3, ASN is examining the design hypotheses of the material provisions and is checking that the solutions proposed by EDF are able to meet the safety targets set. On the basis of the files transmitted by EDF and the studies carried out, ASN asked its Advisory Committee for Reactors (GPR) to submit its opinion on the more important points of these files. To date, three meetings of the GPR have been held: ∙ ∙ the GPR was consulted on 28 January and 10 February 2016 concerning the definition and justification of the natural hazard levels adopted by EDF for the “hardened safety core”. This review allowed the definition of the hazard levels to be considered for the design of the “hardened safety core” and, on certain points, led ASN to ask EDF for clarification; ∙ ∙ the session of 7 July 2016 concerned the new provisions proposed by EDF to mitigate the short and long term consequences of a core melt accident. This review enabled ASN to validate the principle of the new measures proposed by EDF in order to mitigate the consequences of a core-melt accident. On certain points, ASN asked EDF for clarifications and additional studies; ∙ ∙ the session of 2 February 2017 focused primarily on the strategies for management of accidents that can occur on the reactor and pool and on the functional adequacy of the (new or existing) equipment for these accidents. Chronology of first criticality of the French nuclear power reactors at the end of 2018 Fessenheim 1 Fessenheim 2 Bugey 2 Bugey 3 Bugey 4 Bugey 5 Tricastin 1 Gravelines 1 Tricastin 2 Tricastin 3 Gravelines 2 Dampierre 1 Gravelines 3 Saint-Laurent B1 Dampierre 2 Saint-Laurent B2 Blayais 1 Dampierre 3 Tricastin 4 Gravelines 4 Dampierre 4 Blayais 2 Chinon B1 Cruas 1 Blayais 4 Blayais 3 Chinon B2 Cruas 3 Paluel 1 Cruas 2 Paluel 2 Gravelines 5 Cruas 4 Saint-Alban 1 Paluel 3 Gravelines 6 Flamanville 1 Paluel 4 Saint-Alban 2 Flamanville 2 Chinon B3 Cattenom 1 Cattenom 2 Nogent 1 Belleville 1 Chinon B4 Belleville 2 Nogent 2 Cattenom 3 Penly 1 Golfech 1 Cattenom 4 Penly 2 Golfech 2 Chooz B1 Chooz B2 Civaux 1 Civaux 2 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 1999 1,800 MWe 1,800 MWe 1,800 MWe 7,200 MWe 6,300 MWe 1,800 MWe 3,600 MWe 6,200 MWe 4,800 MWe 6,100 MWe 4,800 MWe 2,600 MWe 3,900 MWe 1,300 MWe 1,300 MWe 1,300 MWe 1,450 MWe 2,900 MWe 1,450 MWe Total power Date of 1st criticality Source: ASN 1 ,300 MWe 1 ,450 MWe 900 MWe 306  ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018 10 – EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS