ASN Report 2018

• Construction of new storage capacity for waste packages To anticipate the saturation of storage capacity for CSD-V (units R7, T7 and E/EV/SE), construction work on new storage facilities, known as the “glass storage extension on the La Hague site” (E/EV/LH) began in 2007. These facilities are being built module by module, with the construction of identical units called “pits”. Pits 50 and 60 are under construction to increase storage capacity. In April 2017, Orano Cycle also requested a modification of the UP3-A plant creation authorisation decree so that CSD-C storage could be extended. This application is currently being reviewed by ASN. • The special fuels reprocessing unit project In order to be able to receive and reprocess special fuels irradiated in the Phénix reactor or in other research reactors, Orano Cycle submitted the safety options file in 2016 for a new special fuels reprocessing unit. This unit would comprise new shearing and dissolving equipment. In March 2017, ASN informed the licensee that the safety options for this new unit were on the whole satisfactory. Subsequent design difficulties however led Orano Cycle in 2018 to request more time before submitting the authorisation application for this unit required by ASN. ASN will examine the acceptability of this request in 2019. • EDF centralised storage pool project Given the time-frame, identified by the review of the previous “cycle consistency” file, for saturation of spent fuel storage capacity and the time needed for the design and construction of a new facility, Article 10 of the Order of 23 February 2017 setting out the requirements of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan, instructed EDF “ to send ASN the technical and safety options for the creation of new storage capacity before 30 June 2017 ”. EDF opted for a centralised storage pool. In 2017, it transmitted the safety options file for this project. This project, for which the location has not yet been specified by EDF, should allow storage of spent fuels for which reprocessing or disposal can only be envisaged in the long-term future. The envisaged operating life for this storage facility is about a century. ASN asked EDF to supplement its file in June 2017. Once the additional data was received, ASN reviewed the acceptability of this file and asked IRSN to conduct an expert assessment and analysis of this subject. It also wished to obtain the opinion of the Advisory Committee, which met on 20 December 2018 to examine these safety options. ASN will issue an opinion in 2019. 2 —  ASN actions in the field of fuel cycle facilities: a graded approach 2.1  ̶  The graded approach according to the risks in the facilities The fuel cycle facilities represent different risks at the different stages in the fuel cycle: ∙ ∙ The conversion and enrichment facilities mainly entail toxic risks (owing to the chemical form of the radioactive substances they use), criticality risks (when they use enriched materials) and the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (powder, liquid or crystals). ∙ ∙ The fuel fabrication facilities mainly entail toxic risks (when they have conversion units), criticality, fire or explosion risks (in the ceramic plants which use heating processes), the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (powder or crystals) and of exposure to ionising radiation (when they use reprocessed substances). ∙ ∙ The spent fuel reprocessing facilities mainly entail risks of dissemination of radioactive substances (the substances used are mainly liquids and powders), of criticality (the fissile substances employed change geometrical shape) and exposure to ionising radiation (the fuels contain highly irradiating substances). Their common point is that they never seek to create chain reactions (prevention of the criticality risk) and that they use dangerous substances in industrial quantities. Conventional industrial risks are therefore particularly present. Certain plants, such as Orano Cycle at Tricastin and La Hague or Framatome at Romans-sur-Isère, are in this respect subject to the Seveso Directive. ASN devotes efforts to applying oversight that is proportionate to the potential risks of each facility. Each facility is more specifically classified by ASN in one of three categories defined on the basis of the scale of the risks and detrimental effects it represents. This BNI classification enables the oversight and monitoring of the facilities to be adapted, with reinforcement of the inspections and the scope of the reviews carried out by ASN for the higher risk facilities. In addition to the inspections carried out on each facility, ASN checks the fuel cycle facilities, paying particular attention to the following subjects: ∙ ∙ the safety cases produced by the licensee to justify the operation of the nuclear facilities or modifications to them; ∙ ∙ the organisation of the licensees; ∙ ∙ the quality of operations in the various BNIs; ∙ ∙ fuel cycle consistency; ∙ ∙ operating experience feedback within the fuel cycle BNIs (see chapter 3, point 3.3.1). When the facilities undergo a substantial modification or are finally shut down, ASN is responsible for reviewing these modifications and proposes the draft decrees in support of these changes to the Government. ASN also establishes binding requirements for these main steps. Finally, ASN also reviews the safety files specific to the operations of each BNI. For each facility, ASN regulates the organisation and means chosen by the licensee to enable it to assume its responsibilities in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency management in the event of an accident and protection of nature, the environment and public health and safety. ASN monitors the working of the organisations put into place by the licensees mainly through inspections, more specifically those devoted to safety management. 2.2  ̶  Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Priority was given to integrating the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident on all the fuel cycle facilities. The licensees supplied stress test reports in September 2011 for all facilities and sites, with the exception of BNI 63 in Romans-sur- Isère, for which the report was submitted in September 2012. In June 2012, ASN set additional requirements for the Orano Cycle and Framatome facilities assessed in 2011, in the light of the conclusions of the stress tests. These requirements more ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018  323 11 – NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS 11