ASN Report 2018

AUVERGNE-RHÔNE-ALPES REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION ASN has noted in particular the ILL’s substantial work on its new deviation management process. ASN expected the ILL to improve the tracking and performance of the inspections and periodic tests specified in the general operating rules, and it observed this in 2018. ASN nevertheless considers that the ILL must continue to put in place the other processes of its IMS. It must also associate deployment of this systemwith training and awareness-raisingmeasures for its teams. Lastly, it must improve worker oversight and monitoring. ASN also expects improvements in the process for managing physical modifications to the facility, as the shortcomings it noted had led it, in February 2018, to serve formal notice on the ILL to comply with the regulations in effect on this subject. Furthermore, during 2018 ASN observed shortcomings in the tracking of ILL commitments made in the context of the inspection follow-ups and the significant event reports. The effectiveness and the durability of the corrective actions defined in response to deviations, events or ASN findings, must be improved. Lastly, ASN has asked the licensee to reinforce its organisation for controlling the fire risk. The licensee has set up an action plan. Alongside this, ASN has conducted a preliminary analysis of the periodic safety review report submitted by the ILL in November 2017. ASN notes the work of the licensee, particularly on the conformity check of Equipment Important to the Protection of interests (EIP) with regard to safety and on the updating of the safety baseline requirements. Nonetheless, a number of shortcomings have been identified, especially regarding the analysis of conformity of the facility with the regulatory requirements, in particular for the hazard risks (fire, aircraft crash, etc.). ASN has therefore asked the licensee to supplement the file so that its examination can be continued. Ionisos irradiator The company Ionisos operates an industrial irradiator in Dagneux, situated in the Ain département . This irradiator, which constitutes BNI 68, uses the radiation from cobalt-60 sources for purposes such as sterilising medical equipment (syringes, dressings, prostheses) and polymerising plastic materials. The facility displayed a satisfactory level of safety in 2018. Ionisos must nevertheless improve its analyses of deviations and events, and the communication of information to ASN. CERN accelerators and research centre (Geneva) Following the signing of an international agreement between France, Switzerland and CERN on 15 November 2010, ASN and the OFSP (Swiss Federal Office of Public Health) – the Swiss radiation protection oversight body – are contributing to the verification of the safety and radiation protection requirements applied by CERN. The joint actions concern transport, waste and radiation protection. Three joint inspections by the French and Swiss Authorities were held in 2018, focusing on the commissioning of the Medicis facility, the management of inter-site transport of radioactive substances and CERN’s fire management organisation. These inspections found the practices on the whole to be satisfactory. In 2018, ASN and the OFSP also finalised the examination of the safety files submitted by CERN to demonstrate the safety of the new facilities, particularly the Medicis facility designed to produce radioisotopes for medical research purposes. Installations undergoing decommissioning  Superphénix reactor and the fuel storage facility The Superphénix fast neutron reactor (BNI 91), a 1,200 MWe sodium-cooled industrial prototype, is situated at Creys- Malville in the Isère département . It was definitively shut down in 1997. The reactor has been unloaded and the majority of the sodium has been neutralised in concrete. Superphénix is associated with another BNI, the APEC fuel storage facility (BNI 141). The APEC essentially comprises a pool containing the fuel unloaded from the reactor pressure vessel and the area for storing the soda concrete packages resulting from neutralisation of the sodium from Superphénix. ASN considers that the safety of Superphénix decommissioning operations and of APEC operation is on the whole satisfactory. ASN has authorised the commencement of the second Superphénix decommissioning phase, which consists in opening the reactor pressure vessel to dismantle its internal components both in situ and in dedicated facilities constructed in the reactor building, by direct or remote manipulation, depending on the activation of the structures. Following two failures of equipment important to the protection of the facilities, one of them rated a significant event of level 1 on the INES scale, EDF had difficulties in procuring certain items of equipment which had become obsolete. ASN has asked the licensee to establish an action plan for the management of obsolescence. 36  ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018