ASN Report 2018

OCCITANIE REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION construction of the NOAH facility and the putting in place of the equipment that will be used to treat the sodium from Phénix and other CEA installations, also progressed in 2018. The commissioning file for this facility is to be received in 2019. Management of the modifications to the facility must moreover be improved. Diadem facility – CEA Centre The Diadem facility, currently under constructions, shall be dedicated to the storage of containers of radioactive waste emitting beta and gamma radiation, or waste rich in alpha emitters, pending construction of facilities for the disposal of long-lived waste, or low and intermediate-level short- lived wastes whose characteristics – especially the dose rate – means they cannot be accepted as-is by the Aube repository (CSA) At the end of 2018, the CEA Informed ASN that certain construction operations were being put on hold for budgetary reasons. ASN considers that worksite management is satisfactory. It underlines that this facility is to play a key role in the overall decommissioning and waste management strategy of the CEA, and considers that the CEA must rapidly resume the operations necessary for its commissioning. Melox plant Created in 1990 and operated by Orano Cycle, the Melox plant (BNI 151) produces MOX fuel which consists of a mix of uranium and plutonium oxides. The licensee submitted its periodic safety review guidance file for the installation in 2018. The licensee had moreover taken all the necessary measures to meet its commitments and the requirements of ASN resolution 2014-DC-0440 of 15 July 2014, further to its previous periodic safety review. ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection of the Melox plant remains satisfactory. The containment barriers on which a large part of the safety case is based are effective and robust. The low-level events observed over the last two years concerning noncompliance with the rules of entry into and exit from specially identified areas within the plant, as much for personnel radiation protection as for safe management of radioactive waste, have come slightly down in number. The major radiation risks in the plant are addressed with rigour, the licensee having undertaken in particular to conduct work over the long term to achieve significant dosimetric improvements as part of the work environment optimisation rendered necessary by the ageing of the plant. The criticality risk, which is a major factor in this type of installations, suitably addressed by the licensee. With regard to this risk, low-level events did nevertheless occur in 2018, notably during maintenance operations in which operators have to work on the automated lines (referred to as «manual-slaved» control mode). Orano Cycle also informed ASN on 13 April 2018 of noncompliance with a criticality risk management rule prior to the introduction of a new motor into one of the glove boxes of the pelletizing facility. This event was rated level 1 on the INES scale because it concerned noncompliance with a safety-criticality rule. With regard to the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, ASN is monitoring continuation of the construction of the new earthquake-resistant emergency command post. Centraco plant The Centraco plant, which constitutes BNI 160, was created in 1996 and is operated by Socodéi, a subsidiary of EDF. The purpose of the Centraco plant is to sort, decontaminate, reuse, treat and package – particularly by reducing their volume – waste and effluents with low levels of radioactivity. The waste resulting from the plant’s processes is then routed to Andra’s CSA repository. The facility comprises: •  a melting unit melting a maximum of 3,500 tonnes of metallic waste per year; •  an incineration unit incinerating a maximum of 3,000 tonnes of solid waste and 2,000 tonnes of liquid waste per year; •  and interim storage areas. Assessment of the CEA Marcoule centre ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection of the CEA Marcoule centre is on the whole satisfactory. Regarding environmental protection, the centre’s piezometers are currently being brought into conformity with the Order of 11 September 2003. ASN considers that the management of on-site transport operations at the Marcoule centre is relatively satisfactory. Management of the on-site transport baseline rules must nevertheless be improved. In the context of the stress tests carried out further to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, CEA Marcoule in 2018 submitted an update of its file relative to the planned work to reinforce the centre’s emergency management building against the tornado risk. The ongoing examination of this file will endeavour to assess the impact of these reinforcements on the seismic resistance of the buildings and the demonstration of habitability and accessibility of the premises in the different potential accident situations. ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018  77