Abstracts ASN Report 2019

ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY AREA OF ACTIVITY A fatal accident resulting from worksite organisation and handling problems occurred in 2019. EDF has taken actions to mitigate the main risks for workers further to inspections by the ASN labour inspectors. Certain occupational risk situations are nevertheless still worrying and must be significantly improved. They concern the risks linked to work equipment andmore particularly to lifting gear, the explosion and fire risks and electrical risks. Individual NPP assessments The ASN assessments of each NPP are detailed in the Regional Overview in this report. Some NPPs stand out positively: ڗى in the area of nuclear safety: Fessenheim, Saint-Alban and, to a lesser extent, Blayais; ڗى in the area of environmental protection: Fessenheim, Saint-Alban and Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux; ڗى in the area of radiation protection: Saint-Alban. Other sites on the contrary are under-performing in at least one of these three areas: ڗى in the area of nuclear safety: Flamanville, Golfech and Gravelines; ڗى in the area of environmental protection: Flamanville, Cruas, Dampierre-en-Burly; ڗى in the area of radiation protection: Flamanville, Dampierre-en-Burly and Tricastin. Áǝƺ IǼƏȅƏȇɮǣǼǼƺ 0¨« ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸ ɖȇƳƺȸ ƬȒȇɀɎȸɖƬɎǣȒȇ ASN considers that, in view of the lack of rigour observed in the performance and monitoring of certain welding operations, EDFmust extend the scale of the verifications performed to demonstrate the satisfactory condition of the facility. Beyond these verifications, ASN considers that the organisation put into place to prepare for operation of the Flamanville EPR reactor is on the whole satisfactory. The deviations found on the main steam letdown pipes revealed a lack of control over the welding operations and a breakdown in EDF monitoring of its contractors. ASN therefore asked that the review of the quality of the Flamanville EPR reactor equipment be extended to include a broader scope of equipment and subcontractors, while adapting the depth of the review according to the implications. EDF still has to supplement this procedure. EDF must moreover be careful to ensure that the necessary repairs and worksite completion are carried out giving priority to the quality of workmanship and professional rigour. In 2019, ASN observed improvements in equipment qualification and traceability of the startup tests. EDF must nevertheless further develop its practices concerning the demonstration of startup test representativeness. z¨¨ɀ ƫƺǣȇǕ ƳƺƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇƺƳ ƏȇƳ ɯƏɀɎƺ ȅƏȇƏǕƺȅƺȇɎ ǔƏƬǣǼǣɎǣƺɀ ASN considers that the level of safety of the facilities being decommissioned and of waste management is on the whole satisfactory, but that the risk of worker exposure to ionising radiation, the main issue during decommissioning, must be better controlled. With EDF facilities undergoing decommissioning from which the fuel has already been removed, nuclear safety consists in controlling the containment of the radioactive substances. Most of these substances are situated in the currently contained reactor pressure vessels which are not undergoing any decommissioning operations that could put the substances back into suspension (with the exception of Chooz A and Superphénix). The issues that EDF has to address concern worker radiation protection and waste management. With regard to these points, in 2019, EDF continued to have difficulties in controlling the risk associated with the presence of alpha- emitting radionuclides, more particularly in the Chooz A facility. Furthermore, EDF is confronted with the problem of asbestos, which requires the suspension of work in order to establish appropriate protective measures and remove the asbestos. As a general rule, the ongoing decommissioning operations are falling behind schedule and the major operations, which concern reactor core decommissioning, have been postponed. Managing time lines in complete safety therefore remains a major issue for EDF. ASN considers that EDF must reinforce the coordination of the Fessenheim NPP decommissioning project in order to have an overall view of the project integrating all its interactions. It also considers that EDF must improve its organisation to establish and validate fundamental decisions for the decommissioning scenario based on proven and formalised hypotheses. 10 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019