Abstracts ASN Report 2019

ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY AREA OF ACTIVITY Outside contractors ASN observes that the CEA’s monitoring of outside contractors has been stepped up over the last few years, particularly by following monitoring plans and appointing CEA personnel to specifically monitor the subcontracted activities. ASN does nevertheless note that when maintenance is carried out by outside contractors whose services are governed by contracts signed with the centres andmonitored by the support services, the monitoring is not always appropriate. This is because these monitoring plans are not individualised. The balance between the number of CEA employees in charge of monitoring and the number of work interventions performed can be improved, as can the appropriateness of the monitoring plans for the services they concern. ASN also notes the need for the CEA to tighten the monitoring of the chain of outside contractors, particularly their service providers’ subcontractors. Lastly, there are still disparities in the quality of monitoring between the facilities operated by the CEA. Risk control, emergency management and integration of the lessons learned from Fukushima ASN observes significant delays in the construction of the emergency management buildings, designed to take account of the lessons learned from Fukushima, for the Cadarache, Marcoule and Saclay centres. In 2019, ASN thus gave the CEA formal notice to submit the design basis justifications for the future emergency management buildings of the Saclay centre. The CEA’s emergency organisation and resources have to be significantly improved to catch up on the lateness inmeeting the current requirements. The national organisation in particular needs to be reinforced, paying very close attention to the coordination between the national level, the sites and the facilities. Coordination between the local security force and the facilities of the CEA centres is improving, particularly as regards keeping the intervention plans and instructions up to date. ASN also considers that the CEA must continue its efforts to improve protection against the fire risk. The management of the technical devices (fire doors and fire dampers, fire detection systems, etc.) must be improved and fire loads limited, particularly when worksites are in progress. The now identified shortcomings in the lightning protection of the buildings must also be remedied within short time frames. Personnel radiation protection Radiation protection is satisfactorily taken into account in the various CEA centres, with the exception of the Fontenay-aux-Roses site, where shortcomings have been observed in the organisation and technical provisions in place. For all the centres, the identification of items and activities important to protection, the management of measuring instrument ageing and the monitoring of outside contractors (dealing with deviations, traceability and application of the ALARA principle) need to be improved. Protection of the environment CEA’s organisation for controlling the adverse effects and the impact of the facilities on the environment is satisfactory, particularly with regard to the management of gaseous and liquid effluents. The management of non-radioactive liquid effluents however must be improved, as much in the quality of their analyses as in their management, and concerning storm water in particular. In view of the number of facilities in final shutdown status and undergoing decommissioning, the CEA has to engage in the substantial task of reviewing the impact studies and proposing discharge limits that are consistent with their operation. With regard to waste management, ASN expects on the part of the CEA improvements in zoning, in the cordoning-off of work areas, in collection areas and in the radioactive waste inventories. Individual facility assessments The ASN assessments of each centre and each nuclear facility are detailed in the Regional Overview in this report. The Jules Horowitz research reactor (JHR), currently under construction at Cadarache The JHR reactor, which was authorised in 2009, is currently under construction. The worksite contingencies, such as the management of safety-related deviations, are handled satisfactorily. In view of the extension of the construction work and the time required to commission the reactor, the CEA must respond to issues of project management, maintaining its technical skills over time and the conservation of already manufactured and possibly installed equipment items before they are commissioned. ASN considers that the change of organisation implemented in the second half of 2019 is on the whole satisfactory. ȇƳȸƏ The French National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Andra) is the only licensee of radioactive waste disposal BNIs in France. ASN considers that the operation of Andra’swaste disposal BNIs is satisfactory. ASNnotes that the low-level long-livedwaste disposal projectmade no progress during the 2016-2018 period, and that consequently the deadlines of the PNGMDR (National RadioactiveMaterial andWasteManagement Plan) on this subject have not been met. Operation of Andra’s existing facilities ASN considers that safety and radiation protection in the facilities operated by Andra are satisfactory. ASN observes a significant drop in the number of significant events reported between 2018 and 2019. It has doubts regarding Andra’s reporting of events. Alongside this, ASN considers that Andra must better inte- grate certain principles of the safety approach, particularly to take better account of defence in depth in the classification of certain items or activities as being important to protection. Organisation dedicated to the Cigéo project creation authorisation file Andra has set up a dedicated organisation for the preparation of the Cigéo project creation authorisation file, the submittal of which is planned for the end of 2020. ASN observes that this organisation is complex, which can have an impact on ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 13