Abstracts ASN Report 2019

׮٫ ڲ Inspections concerning fraud and processing of reported cases ד ِ׏ xƏȇƏǕǣȇǕً ȅȒȇǣɎȒȸǣȇǕ ƏȇƳ ƬȒȇɎȸȒǼ Ȓǔ ǔȸƏɖƳ Since 2015, several cases of irregularities that could be considered to be falsifications have been brought to light at known manufacturers, suppliers or organisations who have been ŊłŅľļŁĺ ĹłŅ ŀĴŁŌ ŌĸĴŅņ łŁ ĵĸĻĴĿĹ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŅĸŁĶĻ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ļŁķňņŇŅŌє Confirmed cases of counterfeit or falsification have also been encountered in a number of other countries in recent years. The term of irregularity is employed by ASN to cover any intentional modification, alteration or omission of certain information or data. An irregularity detected by ASN can be dealt with by a judge in a case of criminal fraud. The number of confirmed or suspected cases only represents a very small proportion of the nuclear activities, but these cases show that neither the robustness of the monitoring and inspection chain, for which the manufacturers, suppliers and licensees have prime responsibility, nor the high level of quality required in the nuclear industry, have been able to totally rule out the risk of counterfeit, fraud and falsification. Not all of these cases were detected by the licensee’s monitoring process, which must now be more adequately tailored to the prevention, detection, analysis and processing of cases of fraud. In 2016, ASN began to look at adapting BNI inspection methods in an irregularity context. In so doing, it questioned other oversight administrations, its foreign counterparts and the licensees with regard to their practices, in order to learn the pertinent lessons. This particular risk led to changes in the ASN oversight methods, but it continues to be dealt with ňņļŁĺ ŇĻĸ ĸŋļņŇļŁĺ ŃŅłĶĸķňŅĸņє Ł ӅӃӄӌё ĻļŅĸķ ŇŊł ņŇĴĹĹ from administrations regularly faced with these problems: the gendarmerie and national police force. These two persons are tasked with developing actions already in progress, notably with regard to inspections. They also give ASN the benefit of their experience in proposing different approaches, notably with regard to the possible enforcement measures and relations with the Public Prosecutors’ Offices. Ł ӅӃӄӋё ĴĿņł ŅĸŀļŁķĸķ ŇĻĸ ĿļĶĸŁņĸĸņ ĴŁķ ŇĻĸ ŀĴļŁ manufacturers of nuclear equipment that an irregularity is a deviation as defined by the BNI Order. The requirements of the BNI Order therefore apply to the prevention, detection and processing of cases that can be considered to be fraud. More generally, the regulatory requirements concerning the safety and protection of persons against the risks related to ionising ŅĴķļĴŇļłŁ ĴĿņł ĴŃŃĿŌє łŅ ĸŋĴŀŃĿĸё ĴŃŃĿŌļŁĺ Ĵ ņļĺŁĴŇňŅĸ Ňł ĶĸŅŇļĹŌ that an activity has been correctly carried out, whereas in reality it was not, could, depending on the circumstance, be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. Ł ӅӃӄӌё ĶĴŅŅļĸķ łňŇ ӅӈׇļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ķĸʼnłŇĸķ ļŁ ŃĴŅŇ łŅ ļŁ ĹňĿĿ to the search for irregularities. Two inspections were carried out ļŁ ŇĻĸ ĴŁķ ŅĴŁł ĻĸĴķ łĹĹļĶĸ ķĸŃĴŅŇŀĸŁŇņё ŊļŇĻ ŇĻĸ ĺłĴĿ of examining how these groups have incorporated prevention of the risk of fraud into their buying policies and the state of progress of the handling of certain confirmed cases of fraud they have identified. The other inspections took place on the nuclear sites: the inspectors were able to identify suspicious cases compromising the performance of important activities: inspection sheets filled out before these inspections were actually carried out, failure to carry out these inspections, signature by a checker on a date when they were apparently absent, and so on. These cases are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that they can be addressed as a priority. Depending on the potential implications of the deviation, a report or notification is sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. One report and three ŁłŇļĹļĶĴŇļłŁņ ŊĸŅĸ ņĸŁŇ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌє In order to improve practices, ASN shares its experience feedback: Ҋ ŊļŇĻ ŇĻĸ ĿļĶĸŁņĸĸє łŅ ĸŋĴŀŃĿĸё ļŇ ŃĴŅŇļĶļŃĴŇĸķ ļŁ Ĵ ķĴŌ łĹ ķĸĵĴŇĸņ łŅĺĴŁļņĸķ ĵŌ ђ Ҋ with its foreign counterparts. ASN notably takes part in the working groups of the Nuclear Energy Agency and the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) for new reactors, which held discussions on this subject. ASN is coordinating action to produce a model for rapid information between safety regulators when irregularities occurring abroad are discovered in a country. ĴŅŇļĶňĿĴŅ ĶĴņĸņ łĹ ļŅŅĸĺňĿĴŅļŇŌ ĴŅĸ ŀĸŁŇļłŁĸķ ļŁ ŃłļŁŇ ӅєӅєӅׇłĹ chapter 10. Foodstuffs Surrounding environment Gas/Air Aerosols/Filter Biological Soils Water 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Licensee Private Institutional University Association Total GRAPH 11 Breakdown of the number of approved laboratories for a given environmental matrix as at 1 January 2020 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 159 03 ׎ ٲ ב REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURE TO IONISING RADIATION