Abstracts ASN Report 2019

Agency (IAEA), which published a Code of conduct on the safety and ņĸĶňŅļŇŌ łĹ ŅĴķļłĴĶŇļʼnĸ ņłňŅĶĸņё ĴŃŃŅłʼnĸķ ļŁ ӅӃӃӆׇĴŁķ ņňŃŃĿĸŀĸŁŇĸķ ņļŁĶĸ ŇĻĸŁ ĵŌ ŇŊł ĴŃŃĿļĶĴŇļłŁ ĺňļķĸņє ņ łĹ ӅӃӃӇё ŅĴŁĶĸ ĶłŁĹļŅŀĸķ to the IAEA that it was working on applying the guidelines set out in this Code. • Áǝƺ ȒȸǕƏȇǣɀƏɎǣȒȇ ƏƳȒȵɎƺƳ ǔȒȸ Ɏǝƺ ȒɮƺȸɀǣǕǝɎ Ȓǔ ȵȸȒɎƺƬɎǣȒȇ ƏǕƏǣȇɀɎ ȅƏǼǣƬǣȒɖɀ ƏƬɎɀ Measures implemented to ensure radiation protection, safety, and protection against malicious acts have many interfaces. Generally speaking, ASN’s counterparts in other countries are responsible for oversight in these three areas. Ł ŅĴŁĶĸё ŇĻĸ ŃŅłŇĸĶŇļłŁ ĴĺĴļŁņŇ ŀĴĿļĶļłňņ ĴĶŇņ ĶłŁĶĸŅŁļŁĺ nuclear materials used in certain points of vital importance is coordinated by the services of the Defence and Security High ĹĹļĶļĴĿ Ҏ ҏ łĹ ŇĻĸ ļŁļņŇŅŌ ŅĸņŃłŁņļĵĿĸ ĹłŅ ĸŁĸŅĺŌ Ҏ ļŁļņŇŅŌ of Ecological and Solidarity-based Transition). Ļĸ ĶĻĴŁĺĸņ ļŁ ŅĸĺňĿĴŇļłŁņ ĴķłŃŇĸķ ņļŁĶĸ ĸĴŅĿŌ ӅӃӄӉׇĻĴʼnĸ Ŀĸķ Ňł ĴŁ organisation for oversight of the protection of ionising radiation sources against malicious acts (hereinafter called “oversight of the security of sources”) which takes into account the existing oversight systems by entrusting: Ҋ Ňł ŇĻĸ ņĸŅʼnļĶĸņ łĹ ŇĻĸ łĹ ŇĻĸ ļŁļņŇŅŌ ŅĸņŃłŁņļĵĿĸ ĹłŅ energy, oversight of the security of sources in installations whose security is already under their control; Ҋ to the Ministry of Defence, oversight of the sources in the locations placed under its authority; Ҋ to ASN, oversight of the security of sources held by the other persons/entities responsible for nuclear activities. The process necessary to set up this oversight, initiated by ŇĻĸ łʼnĸŅŁŀĸŁŇ ļŁ ӅӃӃӋׇŊļŇĻ ŇĻĸ ĴņņļņŇĴŁĶĸ łĹ ё ŅĸņňĿŇĸķ ļŁ ŅķļŁĴŁĶĸ ӅӃӄӉіӄӅӋׇłĹ ӄӃׇ ĸĵŅňĴŅŌ ӅӃӄӉׇĴŁķ ŇĻĸŁ ĸĶŅĸĸ ӅӃӄӋіӇӆӇׇłĹ Ӈׇ ňŁĸ ӅӃӄӋׇļŁŇŅłķňĶļŁĺ ʼnĴŅļłňņ ŃŅłʼnļņļłŁņ ĶłŁĶĸŅŁļŁĺ nuclear activities. These texts, which amend the Public Health Code, divide up the oversight duties of the various installations as indicated above, by including protection against malicious acts in the risks that must be taken into account by those responsible for nuclear activities and by the regulatory bodies when reviewing the licensing applications. • Áǝƺ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ƏȇƳ ǣȇɀɎƏǼǼƏɎǣȒȇɀ ƬȒȇƬƺȸȇƺƳ Oversight of source security concerns all sources of ionising radiation that is to say all the devices that could cause exposure to radiation. The majority of the regulatory provisions are however taken to increase the security of the sources presenting the greatest security risks: this concerns radioactive sources of categories A, B and C as defined in the Public Health Code, which stems directly from that of the IAEA. The protection requirements are proportionate to the intrinsic dangerousness of the sources. The graded approach therefore implies stricter obligations for the sources (or batches of sources) in category A than in category C. Sources that are not in categories A, B or C are classified in category D. Ł ŇĻĸ ĶļʼnļĿ ņĸĶŇłŅё ŇĻĸŅĸ ĴŅĸ ņĿļĺĻŇĿŌ ŀłŅĸ ŇĻĴŁ ӈёӃӃӃׇņłňŅĶĸņ presenting such security risks held by end-users in some ӅӈӃׇļŁņŇĴĿĿĴŇļłŁņ ļŁ ŅĴŁĶĸє Ļĸņĸ ņłňŅĶĸņ ĴŅĸ ňņĸķ ĸņņĸŁŇļĴĿĿŌ for industrial purposes (irradiation, radiography, measurements, etc.) or medical purposes (such as telegammatherapy and brachytherapy). Due to their frequent movements when on worksites, industrial radiography sources present particular security risks. If sources of different categories are stored together, the lower category sources may be subject to the stricter security measures applicable to the higher category sources. 238 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 ׎ ٲ ז SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND THEIR INDUSTRIAL, VETERINARY AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS GRAPH 5 Breakdown of the oversight of protection of sources against malicious acts 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Ministry of Defence (ƺǔƺȇƬƺ ƏȇƳ ³ƺƬɖȸǣɎɵ RǣǕǝ…ǔˡƬǣƏǼ ٢RI(³٣ ASN ³z ƏȇƳ RI(³ Áǝƺ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ǣȇ ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ¨ɖƫǼǣƬ RƺƏǼɎǝ !ȒƳƺ ٢¨R!٣ correspond to the IAEA category-1 sources. Áǝƺ ¨R! ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ ٮ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ƬȒȸȸƺɀȵȒȇƳ ɎȒ ي – the IAEA category-2 sources, and – the IAEA category-3 sources contained ǣȇ Ə ȅȒƫǣǼƺ Ȓȸ ȵȒȸɎƏƫǼƺ ƳƺɮǣƬƺِِ Áǝƺ ¨R! ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ !ٮ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ƬȒȸȸƺɀȵȒȇƳ ɎȒ Ɏǝƺ X 0 ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ בٮ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ȇȒɎ ƬȒȇɎƏǣȇƺƳ ǣȇ Ə ȅȒƫǣǼƺ Ȓȸ ȵȒȸɎƏƫǼƺ ƳƺɮǣƬƺِ !ƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ ׏ X0 !ƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ ב X0 !ƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ א X0 !ƏɎƺǕȒȸǣɀƏɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ ȸƏƳǣȒƏƬɎǣɮƺ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ Radioactive sources have been classified by the IAEA ɀǣȇƬƺ א ׎׏׏ ژ Ȓȇ Ɏǝƺ ƫƏɀǣɀ Ȓǔ ȵȸƺƳƺɎƺȸȅǣȇƺƳ ƺɴȵȒɀɖȸƺ ɀƬƺȇƏȸǣȒɀً ǣȇ ǔǣɮƺ ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸǣƺɀ ǔȸȒȅ ׏ ژ ɎȒ ד ً ƏƬƬȒȸƳǣȇǕ to their ability to create early harmful effects on human health if they are not managed safely ƏȇƳ ɀƺƬɖȸƺǼɵِ !ƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ ژ ׏ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ Əȸƺ ƬȒȇɀǣƳƺȸƺƳ ƺɴɎȸƺȅƺǼɵ ƳƏȇǕƺȸȒɖɀ ɯǝǣǼƺ ɎǝȒɀƺ ǣȇ ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ דژ are considered very unlikely to be dangerous. ³ȒɖȸƬƺɀ ǣȇ ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸǣƺɀ ׏ ژ ɎȒ ژב Əȸƺ ƬȒȇɀǣƳƺȸƺƳ dangerous for humans to varying degrees. This categorisation is based solely on the capacity of the sources to produce deterministic effects in certain exposure scenarios and must not under any circumstances be considered as proof that Ɏǝƺȸƺ ǣɀ ȇȒ ƳƏȇǕƺȸ ǣȇ ƺɴȵȒɀɖȸƺ ɎȒ Ə ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸɵ ژג Ȓȸ ژד ɀȒɖȸƬƺً Əɀ ɀɖƬǝ ƺɴȵȒɀɖȸƺ ƬȒɖǼƳ ƬƏɖɀƺ ɀɎȒƬǝƏɀɎǣƬ effects in the longer term. The principles of justification and optimisation must therefore be respected in all cases. This IAEA work has been taken up in an Appendix to the Public Health !ȒƳƺ ƏȅƺȇƳƺƳ ƫɵ (ƺƬȸƺƺ א ׎׏ ژגבגٮז ƺɀɎƏƫǼǣɀǝǣȇǕ various provisions in the nuclear field. Nevertheless, Ɏǝƺ X 0 ƬƏɎƺǕȒȸǣƺɀ ژג ƏȇƳ ژד ǝƏɮƺ ƫƺƺȇ ǕȸȒɖȵƺƳ together in category D of this Code.