Abstracts ASN Report 2019

Ҋ the accuracy of the worksite location information (not to be confused with the address of the ordering company); Ҋ the completeness of the worksite notification. Ņłŀ ļŇņ ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁ ĹļŁķļŁĺņё ĶłŁņļķĸŅņ ŇĻĴŇё łŁ ŇĻĸ ŊĻłĿĸё the risks are properly taken into account, with the exception of ŇĻĸ ĶłŅķłŁļŁĺ łĹĹ łĹ ŊłŅľ ōłŁĸņ ĴŇ ŇĸŀŃłŅĴŅŌ ŊłŅľņļŇĸņє also underlines the persistence of some significant differences between companies in the way the risks are taken into account. ASN observes that the large majority of companies maintained the necessary rigour to meet the regulatory requirements with respect to the radiation protection advisor (less than 5% noncompliance observed) and worker dosimetric monitoring (less than 10% noncompliance observed). Likewise, the inspectors observed that the persons/entities responsible for nuclear activities complied with the authorised radioactivity limit per radionuclide and the frequency of the verifications conducted by an organisation approved for radiation protection controls or by IRSN, these having effectively been carried out for all the sources and devices at the required frequency in more than ӌׇĶĴņĸņ łňŇ łĹ ӄӃє The inspectors also noted that newly arrived workers likely to ĴĶĶĸņņ ĶłŅķłŁĸķіłĹĹ ĴŅĸĴņ ňŁķĸŅ ŅŇļĶĿĸņ єׇӇӇӈӄіӅӇׇĴŁķ єׇӇӇӈӄі ӅӋ łĹ ŇĻĸ ĴĵłňŅ łķĸ ĻĴķ ŅĸĶĸļʼnĸķ ļŁĹłŅŀĴŇļłŁ ļŁ ŀłŅĸ ŇĻĴŁ ӋӃՌ łĹ ŇĻĸ ĶłŀŃĴŁļĸņ ĶłŁĶĸŅŁĸķ ļŁņŃĸĶŇĸķ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌׇĶłŀŃĴŅĸķ ŊļŇĻ ӉӊՌ ļŁ ӅӃӄӋє łŊĸʼnĸŅ ŇĻĸ ĶłŁŇĸŁŇ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŇŅĴļŁļŁĺ łĹ ŊłŅľĸŅņ ĶĿĴņņļĹļĸķ ňŁķĸŅ ŅŇļĶĿĸ єׇӇӇӈӄіӈӊׇłĹ ŇĻĸ ĴĵłňŅ łķĸ ĶłňĿķ be considerably improved by integrating all the aspects specific to the company (such as the safety procedures and instructions, lessons learned from significant radiation protection events, etc.). Conversely, ASN is still concerned by the deficiencies observed ļŁ ĶłŅķłŁļŁĺ łĹĹ ŇĻĸ ŊłŅľ ōłŁĸņ łŁ ŇĸŀŃłŅĴŅŌ ŊłŅľņļŇĸņє Ļĸ ĹļŁķļŁĺņ ĹŅłŀ ŇĻĸ ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ĶĴŅŅļĸķ łňŇ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌׇņĻłŊ Ĵ ŊłŅņĸŁĸķ ņļŇňĴŇļłŁ ĶłŀŃĴŅĸķ ŊļŇĻ ӅӃӄӋё ŊļŇĻ ӇӉՌ łĹ ŇĻĸ ĶĴņĸņ ķļņŃĿĴŌļŁĺ ĶłŅķłŁļŁĺіłĹĹ ķĸĹļĶļĸŁĶļĸņ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌׇĶłŀŃĴŅĸķ ŊļŇĻ ӅӊՌ ļŁ ӅӃӄӋє ASN points out that the work area must be cordoned off before the work begins and, in all events, before the radiography equipment is installed. To ascertain that cordoning off ensures compliance with the regulatory dose rate values, it is vital to take at least one measurement and to record the result. Cordoning off must be continuous and signal lights must be provided in sufficient quantity. Cordoning off is effectively the main safety barrier in worksite configurations, particularly to prevent unintended exposures. Consequently, ASN remains extremely vigilant regarding this point, which is systematically checked during worksite inspections; moreover, penal enforcement actions have already been proposed. With regard to application of the principles of justification and optimisation, the long-term reflections undertaken by the non-destructive testing professionals have resulted in guidelines which aim to promote the use of alternative methods to industrial radiography. The work is continuing within the professional bodies, in particular with the updating of the construction and maintenance codes for industrial equipment, in order to promote the use of non-ionising inspection methods. ňŅŇĻĸŅŀłŅĸё ŅĴŁĶĸ ĻĴņ Ĵ ĿĴŅĺĸ ŁĸŇŊłŅľ łĹ Ĺļŋĸķ ļŁķňņŇŅļĴĿ ŅĴķļłĺŅĴŃĻŌ ĹĴĶļĿļŇļĸņ ҎӋӋׇĺĴŀŀĴ ŅĴķļłĺŅĴŃĻŌ ĹĴĶļĿļŇļĸņ ĴŅĸ ĿļĶĸŁņĸķ ļŁ ŅĴŁĶĸ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌҏё ĸŁĴĵĿļŁĺ ӊӃՌ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŃŅłĹĸņņļłŁĴĿņ to propose industrial radiography services in bunkers. ASN considers the risks of incidents and the workers’occupational exposure are generally well controlled by the licensees when ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 245 ׎ ٲ ז SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND THEIR INDUSTRIAL, VETERINARY AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS 08 JƏȅȅƏ ȸƏƳǣȒǕȸƏȵǝɵ ي ɀƺȸǣȒɖɀ ƏƬƬǣƳƺȇɎɀ ƏƫȸȒƏƳ The number and consequences of gamma radiography accidents in France have remained limited since xƏȸƬǝ ژ ׏ חוח ً ɯǝƺȇ Ə ɯȒȸǸƺȸ ǝƏƳ ɎȒ ǝƏɮƺ Ə ǼƺǕ ƏȅȵɖɎƏɎƺƳ ƏǔɎƺȸ ǝƏɮǣȇǕ ȵǣƬǸƺƳ ɖȵ Ə ד ׏ ژז J ȷ ɀȒɖȸƬƺ Ȓǔ ژ ǣȸǣƳǣɖȅ ٮ ׏ ژאח ƏȇƳ ژ ȵɖɎ ǣɎ ǣȇ ǝǣɀ ȵȒƬǸƺɎِ Áǝǣɀ ǣȇƬǣƳƺȇɎ ǝƏƳ ژ ǼƺƳ ژ ɎȒ Ə ɎǣǕǝɎƺȇǣȇǕ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ȸƺǕɖǼƏɎǣȒȇɀ ǣȇ ƺǔǔƺƬɎ ƏɎ Ɏǝƺ ژ Ɏǣȅƺِ ³z Ǹƺƺȵɀ Ə ɯƏɎƬǝǔɖǼ ƺɵƺ ǔȒȸ ƏƬƬǣƳƺȇɎɀ ȒƬƬɖȸȸǣȇǕ abroad which have had major deterministic effects. Recent examples brought to ASN’s attention include: ཛྷ In 2019, in Spain, an employee of a non-destructive ɎƺɀɎǣȇǕ ƬȒȅȵƏȇɵ ɯƏɀ ƺɴȵȒɀƺƳ ɎȒ ƏƫȒɖɎ א ׎׎ ژ ȅ³ɮ ٢ɯǝȒǼƺ body) by entering a gamma radiography bunker when Ɏǝƺ ǣȸǣƳǣɖȅ ٮ ׏ ژאח ɀȒɖȸƬƺ ɯƏɀ ȇȒɎ ǣȇ Ɏǝƺ ɀƏǔƺ ȵȒɀǣɎǣȒȇِ Áǝƺ ژ ƳȒȒȸ ٮ ȒȵƺȇǣȇǕ ɀǼƏɮǣȇǕ ɀɵɀɎƺȅ ǔȒȸ ȵȸȒǝǣƫǣɎǣȇǕ access to the bunker during the emission of ionising radiation, did not function due to the failure of the ƳȒɀƺ ژ ȸƏɎƺ ȅƺƏɀɖȸǣȇǕ ɀɵɀɎƺȅِ Áǝǣɀ ƺɮƺȇɎ ɯƏɀ ȸƏɎƺƳ ǼƺɮƺǼ אژ Ȓȇ Ɏǝƺ XȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ zɖƬǼƺƏȸ 0ɮƺȇɎɀ ³ƬƏǼƺ ٢Xz0³٣ِ ཛྷ In 2016, in Turkey, the operators had apparently not verified that the source had returned to the safe position after using a gamma ray projector. ׏ ٮה ɵƺƏȸ ژ ȒǼƳ ƏƳȒǼƺɀƬƺȇɎ ǔȒɖȇƳ Ɏǝƺ ɀȒɖȸƬƺ Ɏǝƺ ƳƏɵ after the inspection and took it home were several ȵƺȸɀȒȇɀ ɀƏǣƳ Ɏǝƺɵ ǝƏȇƳǼƺƳ ǣɎِ ÁɯƺȇɎɵ ژ ȵƺȒȵǼƺ ǣȇ ƏǼǼ were reportedly exposed, with most severely exposed ȵƺȸɀȒȇ ȸƺȵȒȸɎƺƳǼɵ ȸƺƬƺǣɮǣȇǕ Ə ƳȒɀƺ Ȓǔ ׏ ژ ǕȸƏɵ ٢Jɵ٣ِ Áǝƺ ƺɮƺȇɎ ɯƏɀ ȸƏɎƺƳ ǼƺɮƺǼ ژא Ȓȇ Ɏǝƺ Xz0³ ɀƬƏǼƺِ ཛྷ In 2015, in Iran, two operators were exposed to effective ƳȒɀƺɀ Ȓǔ ׏ِ ژה ƏȇƳ ב ِ ژג Jɵِ Áǝƺ ǕƏȅȅƏ ȸƏɵ ȵȸȒǴƺƬɎȒȸ ɀȒɖȸƬƺ ٢ǣȸǣƳǣɖȅ ٮ ׏ ژאח Ȓǔ ׏ِ ژב Á ȷ٣ ƫƺƬƏȅƺ ƳǣɀƬȒȇȇƺƬɎƺƳ and remained blocked in the guide tube without the operators realising it. The operators then spent the night in their vehicle near the guide tube and the source. ཛྷ Xȇ א ׎׏ ג ً ǣȇ ¨ƺȸɖً Əȇ ƺȅȵǼȒɵƺƺ ɯƏɀ ƺɴȵȒɀƺƳ ɎȒ ד ׎׎ ژ ȅ³ɮ ɯǝȒǼƺ ƫȒƳɵ ƏȇƳ ژדא Jɵ Ȓȇ Ɏǝƺ ǼƺǔɎ ǝǣȵ ɯǝƺȇ ǝƺ ȅȒɮƺƳ a guide tube and a collimator without realising that the source was disconnected from the remote control cable and had remained in the collimator ٢ǣȸǣƳǣɖȅ ٮ ׏ אח ً ׏ِ ژא Á ȷً ב ׎ ژ ȅǣȇɖɎƺɀ Ȓǔ ƺɴȵȒɀɖȸƺ٣ِ ཛྷ In 2013, in Germany, an employee of a non-destructive ɎƺɀɎǣȇǕ ƬȒȅȵƏȇɵ ɯƏɀ ƺɴȵȒɀƺƳ ɎȒ ȅȒȸƺ ɎǝƏȇ ژדו ȅ³ɮ ɯǝȒǼƺ ƫȒƳɵ ƏȇƳ ׏׎ ژ ɎȒ ב ׎ ژ Jɵ ƏɎ Ɏǝƺ ƺɴɎȸƺȅǣɎǣƺɀ ٢ǝƏȇƳɀ٣ while attempting to release a source from a guide tube. ཛྷ In 2012, a Peruvian employee was admitted to Percy ǝȒɀȵǣɎƏǼ ǣȇ !ǼƏȅƏȸɎ ǔȒǼǼȒɯǣȇǕ ƺɴȵȒɀɖȸƺ Ȓǔ ׏ ژ ɎȒ ژא Jɵ ٢ɯǝȒǼƺ ƫȒƳɵ٣ ƏȇƳ Ȓǔ ژדב Jɵ ɎȒ Ɏǝƺ ǝƏȇƳ ٢ ו ׎ ژ Jɵ ƏɎ Ɏǝƺ fingertips) after handling a guide tube with his bare hands, without first checking the position of the source. ཛྷ Xȇ א ׎׏׏ً ژד ɖǼǕƏȸǣƏȇ ɯȒȸǸƺȸɀ ɯƺȸƺ ƏƳȅǣɎɎƺƳ ɎȒ ¨ƺȸƬɵ hospital in Clamart for major treatment following ǣȸȸƏƳǣƏɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ ژא ɎȒ ژב Jɵ ȒɯǣȇǕ ɎȒ Əȇ ƺȸȸȒȸ ǣȇ Ɏǝƺ handling of a gamma ray projector, from which they believed the source had been removed. ཛྷ In 2011, in the United States, an apprentice radiographer disconnected the guide tube and noticed that the source was protruding from the source applicator He tried to push the source into the device with his finger Áǝƺ ƺɀɎǣȅƏɎƺƳ ƳȒɀƺ ȸƺƬƺǣɮƺƳ ƏɎ Ɏǝƺ ƺɴɎȸƺȅǣɎǣƺɀ ǣɀ ژזב Jɵِ