Abstracts ASN Report 2019

of forthcoming changes in the regulations, particularly those concerning the protection of radioactive sources they hold, either for their own use or for future supply to customers, against malicious acts. However, these inspections and the analyses of significant events reports also revealed points requiring particular attention, including: Ҋ the ability of the suppliers to prepare and perform the source commissioning, maintenance and loading/unloading operations in the devices designed for this purpose. These operations effectively require a certain amount of prior coordination between the company requesting the service and the licensed supplier in order to ensure the radiation protection of the workers (the supplier’s personnel providing the service and the user’s personnel when the equipment Is put back into service); Ҋ the ability of the suppliers to fully and systematically track the sources from initial supply through to end-of-life recovery. This is because tracking is often incomplete and the expired or soon-to-expire sources (10-year administrative limit counting from the date of the 1st registration figuring on the supply form) are not identified sufficiently far in advance, which slows down the recovery procedure; Ҋ the suppliers’ vigilance in ensuring that the pre-delivery verifications are duly carried out. Half of the reported significant events reveal shortcomings in these verifications. The aim of these verifications, for which the supplier must take appropriate organisational measures (by computer blocking or verifications during the actual preparation of the order), is to ascertain that the delivery of a source will not lead to exceeding of the customer’s license limits or another nonconformity that could result in a significant radiation protection event (such as the unjustified exposure of an operator); Ҋ the ability of foreign suppliers to assume their responsibilities regarding the transmission of supply information to IRSN (and ŇĻĸ ňŃķĴŇļŁĺ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŅĸŁĶĻ ŁĴŇļłŁĴĿ ļŁʼnĸŁŇłŅŌҏє ׮٫ ڲ Conclusion and outlook • XȅȵǼƺȅƺȇɎƏɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ ȇƺɯ ƏƳȅǣȇǣɀɎȸƏɎǣɮƺ ɀɵɀɎƺȅɀ ǕȒɮƺȸȇǣȇǕ ȇɖƬǼƺƏȸ ƏƬɎǣɮǣɎǣƺɀ Ł ӅӃӄӌё ŊļŇĻ ŇĻĸ Ĵļŀ łĹ ņŇĸŃŃļŁĺ ňŃ ļŇņ ĺŅĴķĸķ ĴŃŃŅłĴĶĻ Ňł oversight, ASN, on the basis of its nomenclature for classifying nuclear activities using ionising radiation, developed the draft resolution relative to the newly applicable registration system ļŁŇŅłķňĶĸķ ĵŌ ŇĻĸ ĴĵłʼnĸŀĸŁŇļłŁĸķ ĸĶŅĸĸ ӅӃӄӋіӇӆӇׇłĹ Ӈׇ ňŁĸׇӅӃӄӋ laying down various provisions concerning the nuclear field. łĿĿłŊļŁĺ łŁ ĹŅłŀ ŇĻļņё ļŁ ӅӃӅӃׇŊļĿĿ ĶłŀŃĿĸŇĸ ŇĻļņ ķŅĴĹŇ resolution and prepare the update of the resolution concerning nuclear activities that are subject to the licensing system; this update will address the supply of X-ray emitting devices. • …ɮƺȸɀǣǕǝɎ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ȵȸȒɎƺƬɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ ȸƏƳǣȒƏƬɎǣɮƺ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀ ƏǕƏǣȇɀɎ ȅƏǼǣƬǣȒɖɀ ƏƬɎɀ ASN has been the designated authority for oversight of the provisions to protect the majority of radioactive sources against malicious acts. Publication of the abovementioned Decree brought ļŁŇł ĸĹĹĸĶŇ ŇĻĸ ĹļŅņŇ ŃŅłʼnļņļłŁņ ļŁ ŇĻļņ ŅĸņŃĸĶŇ ļŁ ŀļķіӅӃӄӋѓ ŇĻłņĸ responsible for nuclear activities must more specifically give ļŁķļʼnļķňĴĿ ĴňŇĻłŅļņĴŇļłŁņ ĹłŅ ĴĶĶĸņņ Ňł ŇĻĸ ŀłņŇ ĻĴōĴŅķłňņ sources, including for their transport, and for access to sensitive information. These provisions were subject to verifications during the ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ļŁ ӅӃӄӌє Ļĸ ĹļŅņŇ ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ŅĸʼnĸĴĿĸķ ŇĻĴŇ ŇĻĸŌ are poorly known and therefore not yet well integrated. Over and beyond the fact that these are new regulatory provisions, the companies must integrate this new dimension in their corporate culture. On this account, the abovementioned Order łĹ Ӆӌׇ łʼnĸŀĵĸŅ ӅӃӄӌׇŃŅłʼnļķĸņ ĹłŅ ņĸŁļłŅ ŀĴŁĴĺĸŀĸŁŇ Ňł ĴŃŃŅłʼnĸ a “protection against malicious acts policy” and delegate the authority and necessary resources to the person/entity in charge of the nuclear activity who is responsible for implementing it. The fact that the first provisions of the Order, applicable as from mid-2020, have to be documented in the license modification or renewal application should speed up the implementation of these new responsibilities. At the same time, ASN will continue to verify the actual implementation of these new provisions during inspections in 2020. ASN shall also play an educational role by informing the licensees of these new regulations and explaining their details and requirements. ASN has moreover continued the actions it had undertaken to plan ahead for its staff training and the development of appropriate tools to ensure speed and efficiency in embracing this new mission. Three or four staff training sessions are now organised each year. The training effort will continue in 2020. Lastly, ASN will adapt the tools it already uses for the oversight of radiation protection (forms to submit license applications, explanatory guide for the professionals, provisions governing the inspections and the reporting of malicious acts). It will also ensure that regular targeted communication actions are directed towards the professionals concerned. 254 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 ׎ ٲ ז SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND THEIR INDUSTRIAL, VETERINARY AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS