Abstracts ASN Report 2019

׫٫ ڲ Regulations governing the transport of radioactive substances Given that shipments can cross borders, the regulations governing the transport of radioactive substances are based on international requirements established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They are contained in the document entitled “ Specific Safety Requirements – 6 ” (SSR-6), which constitutes the ĵĴņļņ ĹłŅ ňŅłŃĸĴŁ ĴŁķ ŅĸŁĶĻ ŅĸĺňĿĴŇļłŁņ łŁ ŇĻĸ ņňĵĽĸĶŇє א ِ׏ «ǣɀǸɀ ƏɀɀȒƬǣƏɎƺƳ ɯǣɎǝ Ɏǝƺ ɎȸƏȇɀȵȒȸɎ Ȓǔ ȸƏƳǣȒƏƬɎǣɮƺ ɀɖƫɀɎƏȇƬƺɀ The major risks involved in the transport of radioactive substances are: Ҋ the risk of external irradiation of persons in the event of damage to the shielding provided by the packaging, (the shielding reduces the radiation in contact with the packages of radioactive substances); Ҋ the risk of inhalation or ingestion of radioactive particles in the event of release of radioactive substances out of the packaging; Ҋ contamination of the environment in the event of a release of radioactive substances; Ҋ the onset of an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction (criticality risk) that can cause serious irradiation of persons. This risk only concerns fissile substances. In addition, radioactive substances may also present a chemical risk. This, for example, is the case with shipments of natural uranium with low radioactivity, for which the major risk for humans is related to the chemical nature of the compound, more particularly if it is ingested. Similarly, uranium hexafluoride, used in the manufacture of fuels for NPPs can, in the case of release and contact with water, form hydrofluoric acid, a powerful corrosive and toxic agent. By their very nature, transport operations take place across the entire country and are subject to numerous contingencies that are hard to control or anticipate, such as the behaviour of other vehicles using the same routes. A transport accident at a given point in the country cannot therefore be ruled out, possibly in the immediate vicinity of the population. Unlike events occurring within BNIs, the personnel of the companies concerned are generally unable to intervene immediately, or even to give the alert (if the driver is killed in the accident) and the first responding emergency services are unlikely to be specialists in dealing with Ĵ ŅĴķļłĴĶŇļʼnĸ ĻĴōĴŅķє ĸĶłĺŁļōļŁĺ ŇĻĸņĸ ņŃĸĶļĹļĶļŇļĸņё ķĸķļĶĴŇĸķ ŅĸĺňĿĴŇļłŁņ ĻĴʼnĸ ĵĸĸŁ set up to regulate radioactive substance transport operations. א ِ א ¨ȸǣȇƬǣȵǼƺ Ȓǔ ƳƺǔƺȇƬƺ ǣȇ ƳƺȵɎǝ In the same way as the safety of facilities, the safety of transport is based on the concept of defence in depth, which consists in implementing several technical or organisational levels of protection, in order to ensure the safety of the public, workers and the environment, in routine conditions, in the event of an incident and in the event of a severe accident. In the case of transport, defence in depth is built around three complementary levels of protection: Ҋ The robustness of the package is designed to ensure that the safety functions are maintained, including in the event of a severe accident if the implications so warrant. To ensure this robustness, the regulations stipulate reference tests which the packages must be able to withstand. Ҋ The reliability of the transport operations minimises the occurrence of anomalies, incidents and accidents. This reliability relies on compliance with the regulatory requirements, such as training of the various persons involved, the use of a quality assurance system for all operations, compliance with the package utilisation conditions, effective stowage of packages, etc. Ҋ Emergency preparedness and response, so that the con- ņĸńňĸŁĶĸņ łĹ ļŁĶļķĸŁŇņ ĴŁķ ĴĶĶļķĸŁŇņ ĴŅĸ ŀļŇļĺĴŇĸķє łŅ example, this third level entails the preparation and distribution of instructions to be followed by the various parties in the event of an emergency, the development of emergency plans and the performance of emergency exercises. The robustness of the packages is particularly important: the package must, as a last resort, offer sufficient protection to mitigate the consequences of an incident or accident (depending łŁ ŇĻĸ ĿĸʼnĸĿ łĹ ĻĴōĴŅķ ŅĸŃŅĸņĸŁŇĸķ ĵŌ ŇĻĸ ĶłŁŇĸŁŇҏє א ِ ב Áǝƺ ȸƺȷɖǣȸƺȅƺȇɎɀ ƺȇɀɖȸǣȇǕ Ɏǝƺ ȸȒƫɖɀɎȇƺɀɀ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ɮƏȸǣȒɖɀ Ɏɵȵƺɀ Ȓǔ ȵƏƬǸƏǕƺ There are five main package types: excepted packages, indus- trial packages, type A packages, type B packages and type C packages. These package types are determined according to the characteristics of the material transported, such as total radiological activity, specific activity which represents the degree of concentration of the material, and its physicochemical form. The regulations define tests, which simulate incidents or accidents, following which the safety functions must still be guaranteed. The severity of the regulatory tests is graded according to the potential danger of the substance transported. ňŅŇĻĸŅŀłŅĸё ĴķķļŇļłŁĴĿ ŅĸńňļŅĸŀĸŁŇņ ĴŃŃĿŌ Ňł ŃĴĶľĴĺĸņ ĶĴŅŅŌļŁĺ uranium hexafluoride or fissile materials, owing to the specific risks these substances entail. א ِ ב ِ׏ 0ɴƬƺȵɎƺƳ ȵƏƬǸƏǕƺɀ ŋĶĸŃŇĸķ ŃĴĶľĴĺĸņ ĴŅĸ ňņĸķ Ňł ŇŅĴŁņŃłŅŇ ņŀĴĿĿ ńňĴŁŇļŇļĸņׇłĹ radioactive substances, such as very low activity radiopharma- ceuticals. Due to the very limited safety implications, these packages are not subject to any reference tests. They must nevertheless comply with some general specifications, including for radiation safety, to ensure that the radiation around the excepted packages remains very low. TABLE 2 Breakdown of transported packages by type TYPE OF PACKAGE APPROXIMATE SHARE OF PACKAGES TRANSPORTED ANNUALLY Packages approved by ASN Type B packages, packages containing fissile materials and packages containing UF 6 2% Packages not requiring approval by ASN Type A packages not containing fissile radioactive substances 32% Industrial packages not containing fissile radioactive substances 8% Excepted packages 58% 260 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 ׎ ٲ ח TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES