Abstracts ASN Report 2019

҄ during the outage, through regular briefings and inspections, the implementation of the programme and the handling of any unforeseen circumstances; ҄ at the end of the outage, when the licensee presents the reactor outage review, the condition of the reactor and its suitability for restart. It is after this inspection that ASN approves reactor restart, or not; ҄ after reactor restart, the results of all the tests performed during the outage and in the restart phase. • Áǝƺ ǣƳƺȇɎǣǔǣƬƏɎǣȒȇ ƏȇƳ ȵȸȒƬƺɀɀǣȇǕ Ȓǔ ƳƺɮǣƏɎǣȒȇɀ Ļĸ ĶĻĸĶľņ ļŁļŇļĴŇĸķ ĵŌ ŊļŇĻļŁ ŇĻĸ ĹŅĴŀĸŊłŅľ łĹ ļŇņ łŃĸŅĴŇļŁĺ baseline requirements and the additional verifications requested by ASN, on the basis more particularly of operating experience feedback, can lead to the detection of deviations from the defined requirements, which must then be processed. These deviations can have a variety of origins: design problems, construction errors, insufficient expertise in maintenance work, deterioration through ageing, organisational shortcomings, etc. The steps taken to detect and correct deviations, specified in the ŅķĸŅ łĹ ӊׇ ĸĵŅňĴŅŌ ӅӃӄӅё ŃĿĴŌ ĴŁ ĸņņĸŁŇļĴĿ ŅłĿĸ ļŁ ŀĴļŁŇĴļŁļŁĺ the level of safety of the facilities. • «ٹ ƺƏǼ ٮ Ɏǣȅƺ ٺ ƬǝƺƬǸɀ Carrying out periodic test and preventive maintenance pro- grammes on the equipment and systems contributes to identifying deviations. Routine visits in the field and technical inspection and verification of activities considered to be important for the protection of persons and the environment are also effective means of detecting deviations. • àƺȸǣǔǣƬƏɎǣȒȇɀ ƳɖȸǣȇǕ ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸ ȒɖɎƏǕƺɀ ŇĴľĸņ ĴķʼnĴŁŇĴĺĸ łĹ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅ łňŇĴĺĸņ Ňł ĶĴŅŅŌ łňŇ maintenance work and inspections which cannot be performed when the reactor is generating electricity. These operations more particularly correct deviations already known, but can also lead to the detection of new ones. Before each reactor restart, ASN Ĵņľņ Ňł ļķĸŁŇļĹŌ ĴŁŌ ĴŁłŀĴĿļĸņ ŁłŇ ŌĸŇ Ņĸŀĸķļĸķё Ňł ŇĴľĸ appropriate compensatory measures and to demonstrate the acceptability of these anomalies with respect to the protection of persons and the environment for the coming production cycle. • Áƺȇ ٮ ɵƺƏȸǼɵ ɮƺȸǣǔǣƬƏɎǣȒȇɀ ي ƬȒȇǔȒȸȅǣɎɵ ƬǝƺƬǸɀ ĶĴŅŅļĸņ łňŇ ŃĸŅļłķļĶ ņĴĹĸŇŌ ŅĸʼnļĸŊņ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ every ten years, in accordance with the regulations (see ŃłļŁŇ ӅєӄӃєӅҏє ŇĻĸŁ ĶĴŅŅļĸņ łňŇ ĴŁ ļŁіķĸŃŇĻ ŅĸʼnļĸŊ łĹ ŇĻĸ ĴĶŇňĴĿ state of the facilities by comparison with the applicable safety requirements, more particularly on the basis of the in-service monitoring hitherto carried out, and lists any deviations. These verifications can be supplemented by a programme of additional investigations, the aim of which is to check the parts of the facility which are not covered by a preventive maintenance programme. • Áǝƺ ƏƳƳǣɎǣȒȇƏǼ ɮƺȸǣǔǣƬƏɎǣȒȇɀ ǣȇ ȸƺɀȵȒȇɀƺ ɎȒ ³z ȸƺȷɖƺɀɎɀ Ł ĴķķļŇļłŁ Ňł ŇĻĸ ņŇĸŃņ ŇĴľĸŁ ĵŌ ŊļŇĻ ŅĸĺĴŅķ Ňł ļŇņ łŃĸŅĴŇļŁĺ baseline requirements, additional checks are carried out at the request of ASN, whether, for example, with regard to operating experience feedback about events which have occurred on other facilities, after inspections, or after examination of the provisions proposed by the licensee within the context of the periodic safety reviews. • XȇǔȒȸȅƏɎǣȒȇ Ȓǔ ³z ƏȇƳ Ɏǝƺ ȵɖƫǼǣƬ ĻĸŁ Ĵ ķĸʼnļĴŇļłŁ ļņ ķĸŇĸĶŇĸķё ё ļŁ ŇĻĸ ņĴŀĸ ŊĴŌ Ĵņ ĴŁŌ licensee, is required to assess the impacts on nuclear safety, radiation protection and protection of the environment. If ŁĸĶĸņņĴŅŌё ŇĻĸŁ ņĸŁķņ Ĵ ņļĺŁļĹļĶĴŁŇ ĸʼnĸŁŇ ŁłŇļĹļĶĴŇļłŁє ņ łĹ ĿĸʼnĸĿ ӄׇłŁ ŇĻĸ ņĶĴĿĸё ŇĻĸ ŃňĵĿļĶ ļņ ļŁĹłŅŀĸķ łĹ ŇĻĸ events thus reported on asn.fr . • ³z ȸƺȷɖǣȸƺȅƺȇɎɀ ƬȒȇƬƺȸȇǣȇǕ ȸƺȵƏǣȸɀ łŅ ŇĻĸ ŀłņŇ ļŀŃłŅŇĴŁŇ ķĸʼnļĴŇļłŁņё ŃňĵĿļņĻĸķ ļŇņ ňļķĸ łє ӅӄׇłŁ Ӊׇ ĴŁňĴŅŌ ӅӃӄӈׇŅĸĺĴŅķļŁĺ ŇĻĸ ĻĴŁķĿļŁĺ łĹ ĶłŁĹłŅŀļŇŌ deviations. This Guide specifies ASN’s requirements concerning the correction of non-conformities and presents the approach expected of the licensee in accordance with the principle of proportionality. This is based more specifically on an assessment of the potential or actual consequences of any deviation identified and on the licensee’s ability to guarantee control of the reactor in the event of an accident, by taking appropriate compensatory measures. The Guide also recalls the principle of correction of compliance deviations as soon as possible and in any case defines the maximum times allowed. • ³ǣǕȇǣǔǣƬƏȇɎ ƺɮƺȇɎɀ ļņ ŅĸńňļŅĸķ Ňł ŁłŇļĹŌ łĹ ĴŁķ ŇĻĸŁ ĴŁĴĿŌņĸ ĴŁŌ ņļĺŁļĹļĶĴŁŇ events occurring in its NPPs (see chapter 3, point 3.3). Each significant event is, whenever appropriate, rated by ASN on the INES scale. This processing of notification and analysis of significant events contributes to operating experience feedback and to the continuous improvement approach for the protection łĹ ŇĻĸ ļŁŇĸŅĸņŇņ ŀĸŁŇļłŁĸķ ļŁ ŅŇļĶĿĸ є ӈӌӆіӄׇłĹ ŇĻĸ ŁʼnļŅłŁŀĸŁŇ Code. At the local and national levels, ASN examines all reported ņļĺŁļĹļĶĴŁŇ ĸʼnĸŁŇņ ҎĴ ņňŀŀĴŅŌ łĹ ŇĻĸļŅ ĴŁĴĿŌņļņ ĹłŅ ӅӃӄӌׇļņ ĺļʼnĸŁ ļŁ ŃłļŁŇ ӅєӇєӋҏ ĴŁķ ŀłŁļŇłŅņ ŇĻĸ ŃŅłĶĸņņļŁĺ łĹ ŇĻĸņĸ ĸʼnĸŁŇņ ĵŌ є Ļĸ ņļĺŁļĹļĶĴŁŇ ĸʼnĸŁŇņ ķĸĸŀĸķ ŁłŇĸŊłŅŇĻŌ ķňĸ Ňł ŇĻĸļŅ severity or their recurrent or generic nature, undergo an in-depth analysis by ASN. ňŅļŁĺ ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ļŁ ŇĻĸ ņ ĴŁķ ŇĻĸ ĻĸĴķ łĹĹļĶĸ departments, ASN checks the licensee’s organisation and the steps taken to learn the technical and organisational lessons from operating experience feedback. ³z ȒɮƺȸɀǣǕǝɎ Ȓǔ ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸ ȒɖɎƏǕƺɀ ASN has made changes to its oversight of reactor outages. Until now, this was primarily based on implementation of ASN resolution 2014-DC-0444 of 15 July 2014 concerning PWR reactor outages and restarts, requiring that the licensee submit a file to ASN ahead of the outage and then in support of a restart approval application. Under its 2018-2020 strategic plan, ASN experimented with a relaxation of its documentary checks and a reinforcement of its field inspections during the course of ten reactor outages in 2019. This approach led to it performing more inspections relating to these outages. Given the positive feedback from this experiment, ³z ژ ƳƺƬǣƳƺƳ ɎȒ ǕƺȇƺȸƏǼǣɀƺ Ɏǝǣɀ ȇƺɯ ȒɮƺȸɀǣǕǝɎ ƏȵȵȸȒƏƬǝ in 2020 for the 46 refuelling outages scheduled by EDF in 2020. These new oversight methods enable ASN’s resources to be targeted on the activities with the highest risks and this oversight to be made more efficient. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 293 ׏׎ ٲ THE EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 10