Abstracts ASN Report 2019

required. The availability of spares for this equipment is heavily dependent on any changes in the industrial network of suppliers. The end of manufacturing of certain components or the closure of the manufacturing company can lead to supply difficulties. ŅļłŅ Ňł ŇĻĸļŅ ļŁņŇĴĿĿĴŇļłŁё ŀňņŇ ĶĻĸĶľ ŇĻĴŇ ŁĸŊ ņŃĴŅĸņ ŇĻĴŇ are different from the original parts do not compromise the qualification of the equipment on which they are to be installed. ļʼnĸŁ ŇĻĸ Ňļŀĸ ŅĸńňļŅĸķ ĹłŅ ŇĻļņ ŃŅłĶĸķňŅĸё ŀňņŇ ĴŁŇļĶļŃĴŇĸ well in advance. • Áǝƺ ȇɖƬǼƺƏȸ ȵȒɯƺȸ ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸɀ ƏǕƺǣȇǕ ȅƏȇƏǕƺȅƺȇɎ ȵȸȒƬƺɀɀ Ļĸ ĴŃŃŅłĴĶĻ ĴķłŃŇĸķ ĵŌ Ňł ŀĴŁĴĺļŁĺ ŇĻĸ ĴĺĸļŁĺ łĹ ļŇņ facilities is built around three key points: ҄ Anticipate ageing as of the design process: at design and during manufacture of the components, the choice of materials and the installation arrangements must be appropriate to the planned operating conditions and take account of the known or presumed degradation kinetics. ҄ Monitor the actual condition of the facility: during operation, degradation phenomena other than those considered in the design can be discovered. The periodic test and preventive maintenance programmes, the additional investigation programmes as well as examination of operating experience ĹĸĸķĵĴĶľ Ҏņĸĸ ŃłļŁŇņ ӅєӇєӆё ӅєӇєӇё ӅєӇєӊё ӅєӇєӋׇĴŁķ ӅєӉєӄҏ ŀňņŇ enable these phenomena to be detected sufficiently well in advance. ҄ Repair, renovate or replace the equipment: given the operating constraints that such routine or exceptional maintenance operations are liable to generate, especially when they can łŁĿŌ ĵĸ ŃĸŅĹłŅŀĸķ ķňŅļŁĺ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ŃłŊĸŅ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅ łňŇĴĺĸņё must seek to anticipate them, in particular to take account of the time taken to procure new components, the time taken to prepare for and carry out the work, the risk of obsolescence of components and the loss of technical skills on the part of the workforce. Ň ŇĻĸ ŅĸńňĸņŇ łĹ ё ĸņŇĴĵĿļņĻĸķ Ĵ ŀĸŇĻłķłĿłĺŌ ĹłŅ ŀĴŁĴĺļŁĺ ŇĻĸ ĴĺĸļŁĺ łĹ ļŇņ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ŃłŊĸŅ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ ĵĸŌłŁķ ӆӃׇŌĸĴŅņ of operation, the aim of which is to demonstrate their ability to continue to function until their fourth periodic safety review in satisfactory conditions of safety, on the one hand in the light of the understanding of and ability to manage the mechanisms and kinetics of the damage modes linked to ageing and, on the other, according to the condition of the facilities observed during their third periodic safety review. This methodology comprises a first generic phase which aims to determine how ageing is taken into account for a set of similar reactors. Subsequently, on the occasion of the third periodic safety review of each nuclear power reactor, a summary file specific to the reactor is drawn up in order to demonstrate management of the ageing of the equipment and the reactor’s ability to continue to function for the ten-year period following its third ten-yearly inspection. To ensure continued operation of the nuclear power reactors ĵĸŌłŁķ ŇĻĸļŅ ĹłňŅŇĻ ŇĸŁіŌĸĴŅĿŌ ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁё Ņĸňņĸņ ŇĻļņ ŇŌŃĸ łĹ approach, which is applied not only to all the systems, structures and components important for managing radiological risks, but also conventional risks. א ِ׏׎ِ ! ב ɖȸȸƺȇɎ ȵƺȸǣȒƳ ɀƏǔƺɎɵ ȸƺɮǣƺɯɀ ǣȇ Ɏǝƺ z¨¨ɀ • Áǝƺ ח ׎׎ ژ xáƺ ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸɀ The third periodic safety review Ł ňĿŌ ӅӃӃӌё ļņņňĸķ Ĵ ŃłņļŇļłŁ ņŇĴŇĸŀĸŁŇ łŁ ŇĻĸ ĺĸŁĸŅļĶ ĴņŃĸĶŇņ łĹ ŇĻĸ ĶłŁŇļŁňĸķ łŃĸŅĴŇļłŁ łĹ ŇĻĸ ӌӃӃׇ ĸ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ ĵĸŌłŁķ ӆӃׇŌĸĴŅņє ķļķ ŁłŇ ļķĸŁŇļĹŌ ĴŁŌ ĺĸŁĸŅļĶ ĸĿĸŀĸŁŇņ ĶłŀŃŅłŀļņļŁĺ ѡņ ĴĵļĿļŇŌ Ňł ĸŁņňŅĸ ŇĻĸ ņĴĹĸŇŌ łĹ ŇĻĸ ӌӃӃ ĸ reactors up until the next periodic safety review. It considers that the new baseline safety requirements presented in the generic ņĴĹĸŇŌ ŅĸŃłŅŇ ĹłŅ ŇĻĸ ӌӃӃ ĸ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ ĴŁķ ŇĻĸ ŀłķļĹļĶĴŇļłŁņ Ňł ŇĻĸ ļŁņŇĴĿĿĴŇļłŁ ĸŁʼnļņĴĺĸķ ĵŌ ĴŅĸ ņňĶĻ Ĵņ Ňł ŀĴļŁŇĴļŁ ĴŁķ improve the overall level of safety of its nuclear power reactors. This generic assessment does not take account of any specific individual aspects and ASN gives a ruling on the suitability for continued operation of each nuclear power reactor, notably on the basis of the results of the conformity checks and the assessment made in the periodic safety review conclusions report for the ŅĸĴĶŇłŅ ņňĵŀļŇŇĸķ ĵŌ є ņ ĴŇ ŇĻĸ ĵĸĺļŁŁļŁĺ łĹ ӅӃӅӃё ӆӆׇłĹ ŇĻĸ ӆӇׇŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ łĹ ӌӃӃ ĸ have carried out their third periodic safety review and have incorporated the improvements resulting from this review. Ł ӅӃӄӌё ĴĿņł ņĸŁŇ ŇĻĸ ļŁļņŇĸŅ ŅĸņŃłŁņļĵĿĸ ĹłŅ ŁňĶĿĸĴŅ ņĴĹĸŇŌ its analysis of the periodic safety review conclusions report for the Blayais NPP reactor 1. On the basis of this analysis, ASN did ŁłŇ ļķĸŁŇļĹŌ ĴŁŌ ĸĿĸŀĸŁŇņ ĶłŀŃŅłŀļņļŁĺ ѡņ ĴĵļĿļŇŌ Ňł ĸŁņňŅĸ ŇĻĸ ņĴĹĸŇŌ łĹ ŇĻļņ ӌӃӃ ĸ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅ ňŃ ňŁŇļĿ ŇĻĸ ŁĸŋŇ ŃĸŅļłķļĶ ņĴĹĸŇŌ ŅĸʼnļĸŊє ňŅņňĴŁŇ Ňł ŅŇļĶĿĸ є ӈӌӆіӄӌׇłĹ ŇĻĸ ŁʼnļŅłŁŀĸŁŇ Code, ASN took this opportunity to issue additional binding requirements designed to reinforce the safety of these reactors. The fourth periodic safety review A review with major implications Ļĸ ӆӇׇ ӌӃӃׇ ĸ ŅĸĴĶŇłŅņ ŊĸŅĸ ĶłŀŀļņņļłŁĸķ ĵĸŇŊĸĸŁ ӄӌӊӊׇĴŁķ ӄӌӋӊׇĴŁķ ŇĻĸ ĹļŅņŇ łĹ ŇĻĸŀ ĴŅĸ ĴŃŃŅłĴĶĻļŁĺ ŇĻĸļŅ fourth periodic safety review. The conditions for the continued ¨ȒɀɎȵȒȇƺƳ ƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇǣȇǕ Ȓǔ ÈǼɎǣȅƏɎƺ ƏƬǸ ٮ ɖȵ (ǣƺɀƺǼ ǕƺȇƺȸƏɎȒȸ ɀƺɎɀ ٢(ȳ٣ In its resolutions of 26 June 2012 issued in the light of the conclusions of the stress tests performed following the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, ³z ژ ǣȇɀɎȸɖƬɎƺƳ 0(I ɎȒ ǣȇɀɎƏǼǼ Əȇ ƏƳƳǣɎǣȒȇƏǼ ƺǼƺƬɎȸǣƬǣɎɵ supply means before 31 December 2018, capable of supplying the systems and components of the “hardened safety core” in the event of loss of other off-site and on-site electricity sources. In response ɎȒ ژ Ɏǝƺɀƺ ȸƺȷɖǣȸƺȅƺȇɎɀً 0(I ƫƺǕƏȇ Ɏǝƺ ƬȒȇɀɎȸɖƬɎǣȒȇ of Ultimate Back-up Diesel generating sets (DUS). EDF informed ASN that for 54 reactors, it was impossible to meet the 31 December 2018 deadline for deployment of these DUS. ASN considered that the difficulties encountered by EDF were justified and that some of them still persist. They are notably the result of the scale and complexity of the operations and the particularities of certain sites. ASN modified the commissioning schedule for the DUS owing to the technical difficulties encountered by EDF. As a counterpart to this rescheduling, with the deadline now being set at 31 December 2020, ³z ژ ǣɀɀɖƺƳ ƫǣȇƳǣȇǕ ȸƺȷɖǣȸƺȅƺȇɎɀ ǔȒȸ Əȇ ǣȇƬȸƺƏɀƺ ǣȇ ژ Ɏǝƺ ȸȒƫɖɀɎȇƺɀɀ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ƺɴǣɀɎǣȇǕ ƺǼƺƬɎȸǣƬǣɎɵ ɀȒɖȸƬƺɀِ At the end of 2019, EDF had commissioned 35 DUS. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 305 ׏׎ ٲ THE EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 10