Abstracts ASN Report 2019

The periodic safety reviews show the importance of an in situ verification of the conformity of the Protection Important Component (PIC) that is as exhaustive as possible, or as represent- ative as possible of the EIP that are not accessible. They also illustrate the need for a robust approach to the control of the ageing of fuel cycle facilities. It may be complex to develop these approaches because most of the fuel cycle facilities are unique. ASN underlines the ambitious and rigorous methodological approach for ageing monitoring put in place within the framework of the periodic safety reviews of the La Hague installations. ASN thus considers that the method adopted by Orano for monitoring the ageing of its installations is on the whole ņĴŇļņĹĴĶŇłŅŌє Ł ӅӃӄӌё ļŁņŃĸĶŇļłŁņ ņĻłŊĸķ ŇĻĴŇ ķĸņŃļŇĸ ʼnĸŅŌ real progress, the implementation of the approach on the site could still be improved, notably in terms of the traceability of the actions to be taken. ASN will continue with its oversight, notably through inspections, in order to ensure rigorous application of the approach. In the context of the faster than anticipated corrosion of the fission products evaporators-concentrators and other equipment in the La Hague plant, the management of ageing is a priority issue for ASN with regard to the cycle back-end facilities, which are the subject of dedicated inspections and increased vigilance in the examination of the ongoing periodic safety reviews. א ِ ג ¨ƏȸɎǣƬɖǼƏȸ ȸƺǕɖǼƏɎȒȸɵ ƏƬɎǣȒȇɀ ƬȒȇƳɖƬɎƺƳ ǣȇ ƬȒȇɀɖǼɎƏɎǣȒȇ ɯǣɎǝ Ɏǝƺ (ƺǔƺȇƬƺ zɖƬǼƺƏȸ ³ƏǔƺɎɵ ɖɎǝȒȸǣɎɵ Ļĸ ňŃĶłŀļŁĺ ķĸĶĿĴņņļĹļĶĴŇļłŁ łĹ ŇĻĸ ŅļĶĴņŇļŁ ׇŇł Ĵ ׇŊļĿĿ mean that ASN will take over responsibility for oversight of the facilities it contains. Together with the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND), ASN ensures that consistency is maintained in the application of the safety and radiation protection requirements for the facilities under their respective responsibility on the Tricastin site. Most of the facilities regulated by the ASND have in fact been shut down or are being decommissioned and no longer play a role in national defence. In this respect, they no longer need to be subject to secrecy measures and will thus be ĺŅĴķňĴĿĿŌ ķĸĶĿĴņņļĹļĸķ Ňł ׇņŇĴŇňņ ļŁ ŇĻĸ ĶłŀļŁĺ ŌĸĴŅņє ASN and ASND have set up a working group to clarify the steps involved in ASN’s takeover of the regulation of the safety of activities on this site. The decision was made that this takeover will be gradual and will be an opportunity to reorganise the oversight of the Tricastin site, so that the whole site, including soils contaminated by legacy pollution, are under the control of one or other of the safety regulators. Jointly with the ASND, ASN will propose to the Minister responsible for nuclear safety Ĵ ŅĸĶĿĴņņļĹļĶĴŇļłŁ łĹ ŇĻĸ ʼnĴŅļłňņ ׇĹĴĶļĿļŇļĸņ łŁ ŇĻĸ ņļŇĸ Ĵņ BNIs, with the aim of minimising the number of steps involved. ĸŃĸŁķļŁĺ łŁ ŇĻĸļŅ ŃňŅŃłņĸё ŇĻĸ ʼnĴŅļłňņ ׇĹĴĶļĿļŇļĸņ ņĻłňĿķ be grouped within existing or new BNIs. Their safety baseline requirements will then need to be brought into line with the ׇ ŌņŇĸŀє ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 321 ׏׏ ٲ NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS 11