Abstracts ASN Report 2019

With regard to the deviations in the design and production of welds on the main steam letdown lines, ASN stated as early as 2018 that preference should be given to repairing all the welds. At the end of 2018, EDF however proposed an approach to justify maintaining certain welds as they were (the eight containment penetration welds). Given the nature and the particular high number of deviations which occurred in the design and production of these welds, and given that their repair is technically feasible, ASN informed 0(I ǣȇ hɖȇƺ אژ ׎׏ ח ɎǝƏɎ Ɏǝƺǣȸ ȸƺȵƏǣȸ ȵȸǣȒȸ ɎȒ ƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇǣȇǕ Ȓǔ the reactor was the baseline solution. Irregularities which should cause everyone ɎȒ ȸƺ ډ ƺɴƏȅǣȇƺ Ɏǝƺǣȸ ƏƬɎǣɮǣɎǣƺɀ ڳ ASN has established an action plan to deal with the risk of fraud. The first conclusions have been reached after a campaign of fraud-targeted inspections and the analysis of fraud reports sent by whistle blowers. The risk of fraud exists, but the number of confirmed cases at this stage is very low when compared with the volume of activities. The first findings mainly concern irregularities in the implementation of special processes (identity fraud among welders or inspectors), in internal controls at the suppliers (falsification of test results) or in the monitoring of activities (declaration of monitoring work not actually performed). Not all of these irregularities were detected by the licensee’s monitoring activities. In most cases, the analyses by the licensees and the investigations carried out by ASN further to these findings, revealed no safety risks. The manufacturers and licensees must remain vigilant, including with regard to their own personnel, and question the underlying root causes of this type of behaviour. A new step in the consultation process for the management of radioactive materials and waste As co-sponsor, alongside the Ministry for Energy, ASN was heavily involved in the public debate held in 2019 to prepare the next version of the French National Radioactive Material and Waste Management Plan. The conclusions of the public debate underlined the major importance of the management of high and intermediate level, long-lived waste, the need to take greater account of certain aspects (transport, environmental assessment, decommissioning issues and interaction with energy policy) as well as the central nature of the governance of the national radioactive materials and waste management system. The joint decision by the Ministry for Ecological and Inclusive Transition and the ASN Chairman, specifying how the lessons learned from the public debate are to be addressed, was published ǣȇ ژ IƺƫȸɖƏȸɵ א ׎ א ׎ِ ³z ɯǣǼǼ ƬȒȇɎǣȇɖƺ ǣɎɀ ǣȇɮȒǼɮƺȅƺȇɎ ɎȒ ƺȇɀɖȸƺ safe management of the waste and materials and will work to make an effective contribution to high-quality consultation with the stakeholders. The permanent need to anticipate the nuclear safety and radiation protection challenges of new projects ASN seeks to anticipate the safety challenges associated with the facilities it regulates, in particular on the basis of forward-looking analysis carried out within the framework of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan and the guidelines of the multi-year energy programme. In this context, ASN issued its opinion on the safety options dossier of the EDF project for a centralised storage pool, sufficiently early on so its safety requirements could be integrated into the project. Faced with the prospect of final shutdown of the two reactors of the Fessenheim NPP, and then of several other reactors, planned under the multi-year energy programme, ASN will be attentive to ensuring that the steps taken by the licensee enable decommissioning to be carried out as rapidly as possible. ASN will aim to optimise its examination processes and learn all relevant lessons from the decommissioning of the Fessenheim NPP, for the benefit of subsequent decommissioning work. Finally, with regard to the potential construction of new reactors, ASN issued its opinion on the safety options of the “EPR New Model” reactor project and its “EPR 2” evolution, taking account of the lessons learned from the IǼƏȅƏȇɮǣǼǼƺ ژ 0¨« ƏȇƳ Ɏǝƺ ȸƺƏƬɎȒȸɀ ǣȇ ȒȵƺȸƏɎǣȒȇِ Áǝǣɀ ȒȵǣȇǣȒȇ identifies the subjects which would need to be examined in greater depth, or the choices that would have to be justified for a possible reactor creation authorisation application, for example, the adoption of a break preclusion approach. Vigilance to be maintained owing to the complexity of some medical procedures and the chain of professionals involved In 2019, the number of significant radiation protection events reported to ASN in the medical field did not change significantly and remains low when compared with the number of procedures performed and the complexity of some of them. The most important challenges from the radiation protection viewpoint concern: Ҋ for workers: fluoroscopy-guided interventional practices and nuclear medicine, where the dose limits are excee- ded, notably for the hands and eyes; Ҋ for patients: fluoroscopy-guided interventional practices, owing to the duration of certain procedures, external beam radiotherapy, notably owing to wrong-side errors 4 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 COMMISSION EDITORIAL