Abstracts ASN Report 2019

Broadly speaking, ASN considers that the safety of the facility improved in 2019. ASN notes in particular the efforts !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ǝƏɀ ȅƏƳƺ ɎȒ ȅƏǸƺɀ ǣɎɀ ȒȸǕƏȇǣɀƏɎǣȒȇ ƏȇƳ functioningmore effective, and the culmination of large-scale projects and actions fostering safety. The inspections have revealed an improvement in the management of the periodic checks and tests, in the monitoring of deviations and the identification of significant events, and more effective tracking of commitments, even if numerous schedule slippages are still observed. The organisation of radiation protection during work interventions is satisfactory, but greater rigour is nevertheless required in some them. IɖȸɎǝƺȸ ɎȒ Ɏǝƺ ǔȒȸȅƏǼ ȇȒɎǣƬƺ ɀƺȸɮƺƳ ǣȇ א ׎׏ ژז ɎȒ ƬȒȅȵǼɵ ɯǣɎǝ the requirements resulting from the preceding safety ȸƺɮǣƺɯً Ɏǝƺ ƺǔǔȒȸɎɀ ȅƏƳƺ ƫɵ !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ƫȸȒɖǕǝɎ Ə satisfactory response to all these requirements. Two inspections ǣȇ אژ ׎׏ ژח ƬȒȇǔǣȸȅƺƳ ɎǝƏɎ Ɏǝƺɀƺ ȸƺȷɖǣȸƺȅƺȇɎɀ ǝƏƳ ƫƺƺȇ ȅƺɎِ zɖȅƺȸȒɖɀ ȵȸȒǴƺƬɎɀً ɀɎɖƳǣƺɀ ƏȇƳ ɯȒȸǸɀ ɖȇƳƺȸɎƏǸƺȇ ƫɵ !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ɯƺȸƺ ǔǣȇƏǼǣɀƺƳ ǣȇ א ׎׏ ژח Ȓȸ ɯǣǼǼ ƫƺ ǣȇ ƺƏȸǼɵ א ׎ א ׎ِ These projects help improve the safety of the facility. Broadly speaking, the time frames for completing the large-scale ƏƬɎǣȒȇɀ ɖȇƳƺȸɎƏǸƺȇ ƫɵ !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ٫ɀȒȅƺ Ȓǔ ɯǝǣƬǝ are already underway for several years and are often difficult to implement– must be better controlled. ASN nevertheless observes that there is considerable room for progress in several areas. The causes of the numerous significant events almost always include organisational and human deficiencies. Compliance with the requirements of the operating rules, the monitoring andmanagement of activities must be improved, particularly as regards complying with the operating envelope and the management of liquid effluents. ASN’s oversight reveals, with regard to safety, a lack of rigour and integration of experience feedback and highlights the need for a robust action plan relative to organisational and human factors. ÁȒ ƬȒȇƬǼɖƳƺً ³z ƺɴȵƺƬɎɀ !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ ɎȒ ƬȒȇɎǣȇɖƺ Ɏǝƺ ongoing improvement actions. Operating rigour, safety culture, consolidation of the workforce and skills, control of operations, the cross-disciplinary functioning of the organisation, compliance with the baseline requirements of the facility and ƬȒȇɎȸȒǼ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ɀƬǝƺƳɖǼƺɀ Əȸƺ ƏȸƺƏɀ ǣȇ ɯǝǣƬǝ !X³ ژ ƫǣȒ ǣȇɎƺȸȇƏɎǣȒȇƏǼ must particularly concentrate its improvement efforts. ɀɀƺɀɀȅƺȇɎ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ !0 ³ƏƬǼƏɵ ɀǣɎƺ ASN considers that the Basic Nuclear Installations (BNIs) of the Saclay centre are operated under satisfactory conditions of safety and observes that certain operations important to the protection of people and the environment have been completed. In August 2019, the The French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) thus announced the end of the Ulysse reactor decommissioning operations. Removal of the irradiated fuel from the centre’s reactors continued, contributing to the reduction in of the source term stored in the BNIs concerned. Through its inspections, ASN has observed that the overall organisation in place for tracking discharges from the BNIs and monitoring the environment is satisfactory. Áǝƺ ȵȸȒƬƺɀɀ ǔȒȸ ȅƏȇƏǕǣȇǕ ȇȒɎƺɯȒȸɎǝɵ zX ژ ȅȒƳǣǔǣƬƏɎǣȒȇɀ is well documented, but recurrent schedule slippages are observed, delaying the implementation of physical modifications or updates of the operating baseline requirements. ASN considers that the CEA must maintain its vigilance in the performance of the periodic checks and tests of its equipment, particular concerning compliance with deadlines and validation of the operations performed before the equipment is put back into service. It must also make sure of the operational availability of the means contributing to fire protection and the management of accident and emergency situations. With regard to the emergency organisation and means, the CEA submitted an update of its On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) in the second quarter of 2019. Nevertheless, the CEA must ensure that the operational documents of the BNIs are updated without delay so that they correspond to the state of the facilities and check that the provisions set by ASN with regard to emergency situation preparedness and management are properly taken into account. As in 2018, the CEA still has difficulties in fulfilling technical requirements within the deadlines set by ASN. The decommissioning and waste recovery and packaging ȒȵƺȸƏɎǣȒȇɀ ƬȒȇɎǣȇɖƺ ɎȒ ǔƏǼǼ ƫƺǝǣȇƳ ɀƬǝƺƳɖǼƺِ ³z ژ ƬȒȇɀǣƳƺȸɀ that the progress of the decommissioning projects is Ȓȇƺ ژ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ȅƏǴȒȸ ɀƏǔƺɎɵ ƬǝƏǼǼƺȇǕƺɀ ǔȒȸ Ɏǝƺ ɀǝɖɎƳȒɯȇ installations and that the management of the waste from the decommissioning operations is crucial for the smooth running of the decommissioning programmes. The majority of the CEA Saclay centre BNIs are concerned, either directly or indirectly, by decom- missioning or decommissioning preparation operations Xȇ ژ ɮǣƺɯ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ɀɎȸɖƬɎɖȸƏǼ ƳƺǼƏɵɀ ǣȇ Ɏǝƺ ƳƺƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇǣȇǕ preparation operations, ASN expects the CEA to make ǣɎɀ ژ ǣȅȵǼƺȅƺȇɎƏɎǣȒȇ ɀƬǝƺƳɖǼƺɀ ǔȒȸ Ɏǝƺɀƺ ȒȵƺȸƏɎǣȒȇɀ more robust. ASN will be particularly vigilant in monitoring the progress of the decommissioning and waste retrieval and packaging projects, with the aim of ensuring control over the schedules. Further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, ASN had initiated stress tests on the nuclear installations. More particularly, the emergency management means of the centres were examined for the Saclay centre. In 2016, ASN prescribed the creation of new emergency management means, notably the construction or reinforcement of “hardened safety core” emergency centres capable of withstanding extreme conditions. In view of the confirmed delays in the deployment of the new emergency management buildings, ASN gave the CEA formal notice in September 2019 to submit a file on the justification and sizing of its future emergency situation management premises before the end of 2019. In the letter accompanying its file, the CEA undertakes to submit a commissioning application for these premises in June 2020. 66 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION \n0 (ٳ 0 ٳ I« z!0