Abstracts ASN Report 2019
The major decommissioning phases are regulated by Decree א ژחבוٮה Ȓǔ ژא hɖȇƺ א ה ِ ³z ȸƺɀȒǼɖɎǣȒȇ א ٮ!(ٮה ژגהד Ȓǔ ژו hɖǼɵ א ژה ɀƺɎɀ ɮƏȸǣȒɖɀ ƳƺƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇǣȇǕ ȅǣǼƺɀɎȒȇƺɀ ƏȇƳ operations for the CEA. In 2019, the licensee continued the actions to meet the ASN requirements and the commitments it made further to the periodic safety review. ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection of the Phénix reactor is relatively satisfactory. Improvements are more particularly required in the management of the fire risk, the monitoring of outside contractors, and the analysis of the organisational causes of significant events. Removal of the irradiated fuels and ƳǣɀȅƏȇɎǼǣȇǕ Ȓǔ ƺȷɖǣȵȅƺȇɎ ƬȒȇɎǣȇɖƺƳ ǣȇ א ژח ɖȇƳƺȸ ǕƺȇƺȸƏǼǼɵ satisfactory conditions of safety, but at a slower rate than planned as far as fuel removal is concerned, due to technical incidents. Construction of the NOAH facility, which will treat the sodium from Phénix and other CEA installations, progressed ǣȇ א ژח ƏȇƳ Ɏǝƺ ǔǣȸɀɎ ȒȵƺȸƏɎǣȇǕ ɎƺɀɎɀ ɯƺȸƺ ƬƏȸȸǣƺƳ ȒɖɎِ Áǝƺ commissioning file for this facility is to be submitted in 2020. (ǣƏƳƺȅ ǔƏƬǣǼǣɎɵ – CEA Centre The Diadem facility, currently under constructions, shall be dedicated to the storage of containers of radioactive waste emitting beta and gamma radiation, or waste rich in alpha emitters, pending construction of facilities for the disposal of long-lived waste, or low and intermediate-level short-lived wastes whose characteristics –especially the dose rate– means they cannot be accepted as-is by the Aube ȸƺȵȒɀǣɎȒȸɵ ژ ٢!³ ٣ِ After partial suspension of the construction work (apart ǔȸȒȅ ƬǣɮǣǼ ƺȇǕǣȇƺƺȸǣȇǕ ɯȒȸǸ٣ ǣȇ א ژז ǔȒȸ ƫɖƳǕƺɎƏȸɵ ȸƺƏɀȒȇɀً the majority of the work packages resumed their activity in hƏȇɖƏȸɵ אژ ח ِ ³ɖƫȅǣɀɀǣȒȇ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ ƬȒȅȅǣɀɀǣȒȇǣȇǕ ǔǣǼƺ ǔȒȸ Ɏǝǣɀ facility is planned in 2020. ASN considers that worksite management is satisfactory. It underlines that this facility is to play a key role in the overall decommissioning and waste management strategy of the CEA, and that the CEAmust consider the operations necessary for its commissioning to be a priority. It is to be noted that a request to modify the creation authorisation decree will be necessary in order to change the package closure technology with the aim of reducing the fire risk in the facility. Melox plant !ȸƺƏɎƺƳ ǣȇ חח ژ ƏȇƳ ȒȵƺȸƏɎƺƳ ƫɵ
ȸƏȇȒ !ɵƬǼƺً Ɏǝƺ xƺǼȒɴ ȵǼƏȇɎ ٢ zX ژ ד ٣ ȵȸȒƳɖƬƺɀ x
æ ǔɖƺǼ ɯǝǣƬǝ ƬȒȇɀǣɀɎɀ Ȓǔ Ə ȅǣɴ Ȓǔ uranium and plutonium oxides. ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection of the Melox plant remains satisfactory. The containment barriers, on which a large part of the safety case is based, are effective and robust. The radiation exposure risks in the facility are addressed with rigour, and the licensee is continuing the work to improve dosimetry in the context of ageing facilities and the necessary optimisation of work stations. In 2019, the licensee deployed a major plan for preventive maintenance of equipment and increasing the reliability of the production facilities, which had a positive impact on the dosimetry in the medium term. In 2019, ASN also observed substantial research and development work on techniques for measuring and evaluating the dose at the lens of the eye and on lens-of-the-eye protection devices that are adapted to the facility, to take into account the lowering of the regulatory limit of exposure of the crystalline lens for ɯȒȸǸƺȸɀ ɎȒ א ژ ȅ³ɮٖɵƺƏȸ ٢ȅǣǼǼǣɀǣƺɮƺȸɎɀ ȵƺȸ ɵƺƏȸ٣ Əɀ Ȓǔ ژ hɖǼɵ א בא ِ Prevention of the criticality risk in this facility is a major concern for the licensee and ASN, notably with the consideration of social, organisational and human factors in the operational aspects and in the maintenance operations. With regard to integration of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, the improvements required by ASN are currently being implemented. Commissioning of the new emergency command post will take place later than initially planned due to technical and contractual difficulties with the prime contractor. On the basis of compensatory measures proposed by the licensee, ASN revised the commissioning deadline, pushing it back to September א א ژ ƫɵ ³z ȸƺɀȒǼɖɎǣȒȇ א !(ٮח ژזוה Ȓǔ ژה hɖǼɵ א ח ِ א ژח ɯƏɀ ƏǼɀȒ ȅƏȸǸƺƳ ƫɵ Ə ǔƏǣǼɖȸƺ ɎȒ ȅƺƺɎ ȵȸȒƳɖƬɎǣȒȇ ɎƏȸǕƺɎɀ in the Melox plant (see chapter 11). ɀɀƺɀɀȅƺȇɎ Ȓǔ Ɏǝƺ !0 xƏȸƬȒɖǼƺ ƬƺȇɎȸƺ ASN considers that the level of nuclear safety and radiation protection of the CEA Marcoule centre is relatively satisfactory. With regard to environmental protection, the licensee is deploying an action plan to bring the centre’s piezometers into compliance with the Order of 11 September 2003. ASN considers that the management of on-site transport operations at the Marcoule centre and the local emergency organisation are on the whole satisfactory. In the context of the stress tests carried out further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, the CEA Marcoule centre in 2018 submitted an update of its file relative to the planned work to reinforce the centre’s emergency management building against the tornado risk. The ongoing examination of this file will endeavour to assess the impact of these reinforcements on the seismic resistance of the buildings and the demonstration of habitability and accessibility of the premises in the different potential accident situations. At the joint request of ASN and Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND), an expert assessment of the seismic site effects specific to the Marcoule site is being carried out. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019 83 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION OCCITANIE
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