ASN Report 2020

5. Inspections concerning fraud and processing of reported cases 5.1  Managing, monitoring and control of fraud Since 2015, several cases of irregularities that could be considered to be falsifications have been brought to light at known manu­ facturers, suppliers or organisations who have been working for many years on behalf of the French nuclear industry. Confirmed cases of counterfeit or falsification have also been encountered in a number of other countries in recent years. The term of irregularity is employed by ASN to cover any intentional modification, alteration or omission of certain information or data. An irregularity detected by ASN can be dealt with by a judge in a case of criminal fraud. The number of confirmed or suspected cases only represents a very small proportion of the nuclear activities, but these cases show that neither the robustness of the monitoring and inspection chain, for which the manufacturers, suppliers and licensees have prime responsibility, nor the high level of quality required in the nuclear industry, have been able to totally rule out the risk of counterfeit, fraud and falsification. Not all of these cases were detected by the licensee’s monitoring process, which must now be more adequately tailored to the prevention, detection, analysis and processing of cases of fraud. In 2016, ASN began to look at adapting BNI inspection methods in an irregularity context. In so doing, it questioned other oversight administrations, its foreign counterparts and the licensees with regard to their practices, in order to learn the pertinent lessons. This particular risk led to changes in the ASN oversight methods, but it continues to be dealt with using the existing procedures. In addition to its inspectors, ASN recruited an officer from the Gendarmerie nationale in 2019, who brings his experience to bear and enhances inspection practices in the fight against fraud type irregularities. In 2018, ASN also reminded the BNI licensees and the main manufacturers of nuclear equipment that an irregularity is a deviation as defined by the BNI Order. The requirements of the BNI Order therefore apply to the prevention, detection and processing of cases that can be considered to be fraud. More generally, the regulatory requirements concerning the safety and protection of persons against the risks related to ionising radiation also apply. For example, applying a signature to certify that an activity has been correctly carried out, whereas in reality it has not could, depending on the circumstances, be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. In 2020, ASN carried out 25 inspections devoted in part or in full to the search for irregularities. They mainly took place on the nuclear sites: the inspectors were able to identify suspicious cases compromising the performance of important activities: inspection sheets pre-filled out before these inspections were actually carried out, failure to carry out these inspections, signature by a checker on a date when they were apparently absent, and so on. These cases are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that they can be addressed as a priority. Depending on the potential implications of the deviation, a report or notification is sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. One report was sent in 2020. In order to improve practices, ASN shares its experience feedback: ∙ with the licensees. For example, it participated in a day of debates organised by EDF; ∙ with its foreign counterparts. ASN notably takes part in the working groups of the Nuclear Energy Agency and the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme for new reactors, which held discussions on this subject. ASN is coordinating action to produce a model for rapid information between safety regulators when irregularities occurring abroad are discovered in a country. Particular cases of irregularity are mentioned in point 2.2.2 of chapter 10. Foodstuffs Surrounding environment Gas/Air Aerosols/Filter Biological Soils Water 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Licensee Private Institutional University Association Total GRAPH 7 Breakdown of the number of approved laboratories for a given environmental matrix as at 1 January 2021 168 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 03 – REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURE TO IONISING RADIATION