ASN Report 2020

ASN observes major inadequacies regarding the f ire hazard and excessively slow improvement within the BNIs of the Orano group on this subject. The licensee must improve its incident response instructions, so that they are more appropriate and operational, and carry out periodic exercises to test them. 2020 was in particular marked by a f ire in a complete building on the La Hague site, regarding which the operating experience feedback would appear to have been examined in insuff icient depth. On this site, ASN finds that the measures to prevent the flow and environmental dispersal of radioactive or hazardous liquid substances, including those liable to result from actions taken to combat a possible incident, must still be improved. On the Tricastin site, control of the f ire hazard was the subject of enforcement measures by ASN in 2020. ASN observes that improvements have been made. Orano demonstrated a proactive approach to its performance of the stress tests further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Orano has completed the construction of virtually all the complementary resources resulting from these stress tests. These are resources designed to help cope with extreme situations in its facilities, particularly water make-up resources and new emergency response buildings that are robust to extreme hazards. Only the emergency control post in the Melox plant is still to be completed. Monitoring of outside contractors In 2020, ASN observed that outside contractor monitoring practices in the BNIs of the Orano group still need to be improved. The group must continue and reinforce the efforts made on this subject, notably by improving the means of monitoring and its organisation. Legacy waste retrieval and conditioning, decommissioning and waste management Large quantities of legacy waste at La Hague are not stored in accordance with current requirements and present major safety risks. The retrieval and conditioning of this legacy waste determines the progress of decommissioning in the definitively shut down plants. ASN observes significant delays in the Orano legacy waste retrieval and conditioning projects. The complexity of this waste retrieval and conditioning, for shipment to approved routes, meant that Orano had to revise its retrieval and processing scenarios several times and announced significant postponement, sometimes for decades, of the deadlines to which it was committed. Thus, in 2019, ASN initiated a procedure to monitor the management of these projects, assisted by the General Directorate for Energy and Climate (DGEC). In this procedure, ASN asked Orano to make structural improvements to its organisation and to the management of these projects. In 2020, Orano presented improvements to its organisation and to its project management, which should lead to more robust management, notably by taking account of operating experience feedback and adopting a project maturity evaluation table. However, this approach needs to be taken further and supplemented in order to lead to better evaluation of the time- frame for Retrieval and Conditioning of legacy Waste (RCD) and decommissioning, so that Orano can announce firm dates that will actually be met. ASN will continue with its monitoring of the management of these projects in 2021. It will make a more complete evaluation of the progress made, by examining the integrated schedules that are to act as the basis for the revision of ASN resolution 2014-DC-0472 of 9 December 2014 concerning the binding requirements to be met by Orano concerning these retrieval operations. ASN considers that the completion of vitrification of the legacy solutions of fission products fromUP2-400 and the production of the f irst drums of waste from silo 130 are satisfactory. This progress means significant improvements in the safety of these ageing facilities, owing to the reduction in the source term. ASN however urges the licensee to achieve the industrial retrieval rate for the waste from silo 130, without delay. CEA ASN considers that the safety of the facilities operated by the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) remains on the whole satisfactory, at a time of reduced activity. The safety issues concern on the one hand the continued operation of the facilities, designed in accordance with old safety standards, and on the other, the decommissioning of the definitively shut down facilities and the retrieval and conditioning of legacywaste, as well as the management of its radioactive waste and materials with no identified use. ASN considers that there are nonetheless weaknesses at the CEA, notably with regard to the organisation for the management of emergency situations and to safety-related projects which span several years. Safety organisation and management ASN considers that the CEA’s organisation has been constantly changing for a number of years, with a further major modifica­ tion in 2020. In the light of these changes, ASN considers that the CEA must remain attentive to ensuring that all the safety- related aspects are properly taken into account at all levels of the organisation and are led by people with the necessary resources, skills and authority. ASN is expecting the CEA to provide operating experience feedback regarding the latest organisational changes and rapidly propose a strategic vision of safety management for the coming years. ASN considers that the implementation of “major safety commitments”, managed at the highest level and enabling the most important nuclear safety and radiation protection issues to be monitored, is on the whole satisfactory. It will be necessary to ensure that the reduction in resources allocated to the CEA has no impact on compliance with other commitments, particularly those that are governed by ASN requirements. Managing the consequences of the health crisis The restrictions put in place by the Government in the spring of 2020 led the CEA to shut down most of its BNIs and make them safe. This interruption in operations, the restrictions placed on travel and the unavailability of certain contractors meant that, after analysis, the CEA was unable to carry out certain periodic checks and maintenance operations on schedule. Monitoring and the essential safety inspections were however maintained and the CEA conducted safety analyses in order to def ine the actions to be taken before resuming its activities. The CEA learned lessons f rom the f irst lockdown and in November 2020 maintained certain activities felt to be priorities by the operational divisions, along with maintenance and all inspections and periodic tests. The CEA’s regular reporting to ASN during the health crisis was satisfactory. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 17 ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY AREA OF ACTIVITY