ASN Report 2020

following monitoring plans and appointing the CEA personnel to specif ically monitor the subcontracted activities. ASN notes the need for the CEA to reinforce the monitoring of the chain of outside contractors, particularly its contractors’ subcontractors. Finally, there are still disparities in the quality of this monitoring between the facilities operated by the CEA and this needs to be remedied. Risk control and emergency management ASN observes signif icant delays in the construction of the emergency management buildings for the Cadarache, Marcoule and Saclay centres, designed to take account of the lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The CEA’s emergency organisation and resources still need to be signif icantly improved, in order to make up the delay in meeting the current requirements. The national organisation in particular needs to be reinforced, paying very close attention to the coordination between the national level, the sites and the facilities. ASN notes that the teams in the f ield are engaged and motivated in the performance of emergency exercises. Coordination between the local security force and the facilities of the CEA centres is improving, particularly as regards keeping the intervention plans and instructions up to date. ASN f inally considers that the CEA must continue its efforts to improve protection against the fire hazard. Management of the technical devices (f ire doors and dampers, detection systems, etc.), must be improved and f ire loads limited, particularly on worksites. Personnel radiation protection Within the various the CEA centres, radiation protection is on the whole dealt with satisfactorily. For all the centres, the identif ication of items and activities important to protection, management of measuring instrument ageing and the monitoring of outside contractors (handling of deviations, traceability and application of the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) approach need to be improved. Environmental protection For the year 2020, control of the detrimental effects and impact of the CEA facilities on the environment is on the whole satisfactory. The action plans implemented in 2020 regarding non-conformities identif ied in the management of non- radioactive liquid effluents from certain facilities at Cadarache, are satisfactory. ASN does however consider that the CEA must continue with implementation of actions on several subjects associated with control of environmental impacts, in particular for its Cadarache site, such as the ageing of its industrial liquid effluents network and the compliance work need on the piezometers network. Individual facility assessments The ASN assessments of each centre and each nuclear facility are detailed in the Regional Overview in this report. The Jules Horowitz research reactor currently under construction The Jules Horowitz Reactor (RJH), which was authorised in 2009, is currently under construction. The worksite contingencies, such as the management of safety-related deviations, are handled satisfactorily. In view of the extension of the construction period and of the time required to commission the reactor, the CEA must address issues of project management, maintaining its technical skills over time and the conservation of equipment already manufactured and possibly installed, before it is commissioned. In 2020, the project governance changed, with no reduction in the resources allocated to safety. ANDRA Andra is the only licensee operating radioactive waste disposal BNIs in France. ASN considers that the operation of Andra’s waste disposal BNIs is satisfactory. Andra is a dynamic player investing heavily in public information and in consultation. Operation of Andra’s existing facilities ASN considers that safety and radiation protection in the facilities operated by Andra are satisfactory. In 2020, Andra’s service continuity efforts during the lockdowns and its regular reporting to ASN on the conditions of operation in the facilities should be underlined. ASN considers that the measures adopted enabled a satisfactory level of monitoring to be maintained. ASN observes that the number of signif icant events reported for the Aube repository (CSA) since 2018 remains at a very low level in 2020 (no significant event in 2018 and 2019, and just one in 2020). It has concerns regarding Andra’s reporting of events. ASN also considers that certain components of Andra’s safety approach need to be improved, notably so that defence in depth can be better taken into account in the classification of certain elements or activities important for protection. Organisation dedicated to the Cigéo project creation authorisation file In 2020, ASN observes a further postponement in the announced date for the submission of the creation authorisation application for the Cigéo deep geological disposal project. It considers that the calendar must be stabilised, in order to identify the consequences of any postponement in the commissioning of Cigéo on the entire management route. The technical exchanges between ASN and Andra continued in 2020 on the subject of the work identified during examination of the safety options f ile prior to the creation authorisation application. ASN considers that the consultation regarding Cigéo is primarily the responsibility of the project manager. It observes that Andra is exemplary on this point, having brought in the National Public Debates Commission, which appointed guarantors for this process, and regularly informing ASN. ASN considers that the principle of incremental development envisaged by Andra for the Cigéo repository needs to be clarified, in particular by identifying any nuclear safety justifica­ tion data that would be provided after the creation authorisation application. ASN’s assessments of the other licensees are presented in the Regional Overview part and in the various chapters of this report. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 19 ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY AREA OF ACTIVITY