ASN Report 2020

of the IRSN and the reference players (CEA and LCIE). The conclusions of this work will be taken into account to adapt the regulatory framework and subject the supply of devices generating ionising radiation to licensing, in the same way as for radioactive sources. In 2020, ASN continued its work to characterise the advantages, drawbacks and the feasibility of various provisions for regulating the design of industrial radiology devices. Discussions with the General Directorate for Labour (DGT) will be continued. 2.3.2 Implementation of oversight of the protection of ionising radiation sources against malicious acts Although the safety and radiation protection measures provided for by the regulations guarantee a certain degree of protection of ionising radiation sources against the risk of malicious acts, they cannot be considered sufficient. Reinforcing the oversight of protection against malicious acts targeting sealed radioactive sources has therefore been encouraged by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which published a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, approved in 2003, supplemented in 2012 by two implementing guides in the Nuclear Security Series relative to the security of radioactive sources and the security of radioactive material transport. As of 2004, France confirmed to the IAEA that it was working with a view to applying the guidelines set out in this Code. The organisation adopted for the oversight of protection against malicious acts Measures implemented to ensure radiation protection, safety, and protection against malicious acts have many interfaces. Generally speaking, ASN’s counterparts in other countries are responsible for oversight in these three areas (see Table 2 in chapter 2). In France, the protection against malicious acts concerning nuclear materials used in certain facilities termed “of vital importance” because they are essential for the functioning of the country, is coordinated by a service under the authority of the Defence and Security High Official (HFDS) of the Ministry of Ecological Transition, responsible for energy. The changes in regulations adopted since early 2016 have led to an organisation for oversight of the protection of ionising radia- tion sources against malicious acts which takes into account the existing organisation by entrusting this oversight: ∙ to the service of the HFDS of the Ministry responsible for energy in installations whose security is already under its control; ∙ to the Ministry of Defence in the locations placed under its authority; ∙ to ASN for the other facilities where nuclear activities take place. The process necessary to set up this oversight, initiated by the Government in 2008 with the assistance of ASN, resulted in Ordinance 2016‑128 of 10 February 2016 and then Decree 2018‑434 of 4 June 2018 introducing various provisions concerning nuclear activities. These texts, which amend the Public Health Code, divide up the oversight duties in the various installations as indicated above, by including protection against malicious acts in the risks that must be taken into account by those responsible for nuclear activities and by the regulatory bodies when reviewing the licensing applications. The sources and installations concerned Oversight of source protection against malicious acts concerns all sources of ionising radiation, that is to say all the devices that could cause exposure to radiation. The majority of the regulatory requirements are however taken to increase the security of the sources presenting the greatest radiological risks: this concerns radioactive sources of categories A, B and C as defined in the Public Health Code, which stems directly from that of the IAEA. The protection requirements are proportionate to the intrinsic dangerousness of the sources. The graded approach therefore implies stricter obligations for the sources (or batches of sources) in category A than in category C. Sources that are not in categories A, B or C are classified in category D. Some 250 facilities in the civil sector in France hold around 5,200 radioactive sources presenting such security risks. These sources are used essentially for industrial purposes (irradiation, radiography, measurements, etc.) or medical purposes (such as telegammatherapy and brachytherapy. Due to their frequent movements when on worksites, industrial radiography sources present particular security risks. If sources of different categories are stored together, the lower category sources may be subject to the stricter security measures applicable to the higher category sources. Regulatory work The Decree modifying the regulatory part of the Public Health Code taken in application of Ordinance 2016‑128 of 10 February 2016 (Decree 2018‑434 introducing various provisions with regard to nuclear activities) was published on 4 June 2018. It contains several provisions concerning the protection of sources against malicious acts, and more specifically: ∙ the classification of ionising radiation sources and aggregation (batching) of radioactive sources into category A, B, C or D (R. 1333-14); ∙ the prompt notification to various administrative authorities, and the regionally competent law enforcement agencies, of any actual or attempted malicious act or loss concerning a source of ionising radiation or a batch of radioactive sources of category A, B or C (R. 1333‑22); ∙ the sending of documents that could facilitate malicious acts by separate, specially identified mail (R. 1333‑130); ∙ the nominative and written authorisations to be delivered to the persons having access to ionising radiation sources or batches of radioactive sources in category A, B or C, transporting them, or having access to information concerning their protection against malicious acts (R. 1333‑148). The preparation of the Ministerial Order setting the organisa­ tional and technical requirements to protect sources of ionising radiation (or batches of radioactive sources) against malicious acts ended in 2019. The Order was signed on 29 November 2019 and published in the Official Journal of the French Republic on 11 December 2019. It entered into force on 1 January 2020 for the sites not licensed on its date of publication (nor being examined on that same date). For already licensed sites, entry into force takes place in two stages: the first, within 6 months (1 July 2020), concerned the organisational and human provisions, the second, 18 months later (1 January 2022) concerned the systems of physical protection against malicious acts. However, due to the health crisis, these two deadlines have been pushed back by 6 months by the Order of 24 June 2020, on which ASN issued an opinion (ASN opinion 2020-AV-0353 of 11 June 2020). The Order of 29 November 2019 also applies to the transport of category A, B and C sources, whether individually or in batches. The main requirements of this Order aim, by adopting a graded approach based on categories A, B, C (and D for two items), to have the licensee put in place physical barriers and equipment, along with a policy and an internal organisation, to protect sources against malicious acts. These technical and organisational arrangements are intended to: ∙ prevent or delay the theft of radioactive sources through access control measures, reinforcement of physical barriers and their openings (doors, windows, etc.), alarms and crossing detection; 248 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 08 – SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND THEIR INDUSTRIAL, VETERINARY AND RESEARCH APPLICATIONS