ASN Report 2020

∙ monitoring of the psychosocial risk cases within the context of the health crisis and the alerts reported by the social and economic committees at EDF and the contractors. Even if, at the beginning of the first lockdown, problems were noted with defining and implementing appropriate protection measures, EDF was able to mobilise organisational and material resources to combat the spread of the virus on its sites. With regard to occupational health and safety, the ASN labour inspections more specifically covered the following topics in 2020: ∙ the use of electrical installations. The inspectors are continuing to monitor the measures taken by EDF to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Labour Code; ∙ the worksites with asbestos risks. The labour inspectors are particularly vigilant during their inspections with regard to preventing the risk of inhalation of these fibres; ∙ the conformity of the working equipment and more specifically the lifting gear. The labour inspectors are still finding shortcomings; ∙ the fire and explosion hazards, for which the ASN inspectors revealed non-conformities. ASN provides coordinated oversight to take account of all aspects of these hazards, which are important both for worker safety and for nuclear safety (see point 2.4.6); ∙ improvement of the ventilation conditions in the workplace. Finally, the labour inspectors systematically initiate an inquiry in the event of a severe accident or severe near-accident. International subcontracting and provision of services Steps were taken in 2020 regarding the monitoring of notifications and the conditions for the secondment of staff from foreign companies, notably on the Chooz decommissioning site. Several inquiries regarding the transfer of labour contracts were also carried out when the contractors on the sites were changed. Criminal and administrative procedures in progress With regard to illegal working, ASN closely monitors the criminal proceedings instigated in previous years, more specifically through regular contacts with the Public Prosecutor’s offices. In terms of health and safety, the work by the ASN labour inspectorate led to ten criminal procedures being opened against EDF or contractors in 2020, with regard to non-conformity of personal protection equipment, the working of the personnel representative bodies or the secondment of staff from foreign companies. Administrative penalty procedures for violations of working hours regulations were initiated by the labour inspectors and monitored by the Regional Directorates for Enterprises, Competition, Labour and Employment, who have the power to issue sanctions in this area. 2.8.2 Assessment of health and safety, professional relations and quality of employment in the Nuclear Power Plants Certain occupational risk situations, such as the risks linked to working equipment and more particularly to lifting gear, explosion and fire risks and electrical risks, are still subjects of concern and must be significantly improved. EDF has however put measures in place to correct these situations. The labour inspectorate also still observes occasional situations in which the risk linked to the presence of asbestos is not considered prior to the work, in order to avoid accidental exposure. Finally, progress is still required in the management of joint contractor working (quality of prevention plans in particular), the use of subcontracting and foreign staff secondment situations. 2.9  Lessons learned from the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, ASN adopted a range of resolutions dated 5 May 2011, requiring the licensees of the major nuclear facilities to carry out stress tests. The conclusions of these stress tests led to an ASN position statement on 3 January 2012, which was itself peer reviewed in April 2012, under the European stress tests programme. On the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Committees and the conclusions of the European stress tests, ASN issued a range of resolutions dated 26 June 2012, instructing EDF to implement: ∙ a range of corrective measures or improvements, notably the acquisition of additional communication and radiological protection means, the implementation of additional instrumentation, the extensive consideration of internal GRAPH 5 Mean collective dose per reactor (Man-Sv/reactor) Source: EDF. This graph includes radiation protection data for the Fessenheim NPP. 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 0.62 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.72 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.61 0.67 0.61 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 309 10 – THE EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 10