ASN Report 2020

Construction of new storage capacity for waste packages To anticipate the saturation of storage capacity for CSD-V (units R7, T7 and E/EV/SE), construction work on new storage facilities, known as the “glass storage extension on the La Hague site” (E/EV/LH) began in 2007. These facilities are being built module by module, with the construction of identical units called “pits”. Pits 50 and 60 are under construction to increase storage capacity. In April 2017, Orano also requested a modification of the UP3-A plant Creation Authorisation Decree so that CSD-C storage could be extended. This extension, for which ASN issued a favourable opinion on 8 September 2020, was authorised by the Decree of 27 November 2020. The special fuels reprocessing unit project In order to be able to receive and reprocess special fuels irradiated in the Phénix reactor or in other research reactors, Orano submitted the safety options file in 2016 for a new special fuels reprocessing unit. This unit would comprise new shearing and dissolving equipment. In March 2017, ASN informed the licensee that the safety options for this new unit were on the whole satisfactory. Orano however encountered technical difficulties in developing the process, which led to a significant change in the initial design options. In the light of this, ASN granted Orano more time to submit the authorisation application for this unit. The licensee transmitted new safety options for this project in January 2020. ASN released its observations on this file on 9 December 2020. EDF centralised storage pool project Given the time-frame, identified by the review of the previous “cycle consistency” file, for saturation of spent fuel storage capacity and the time needed for the design and construction of a new facility, Article 10 of the Order of 23 February 2017 setting out the requirements of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR), instructed EDF “ to send ASN the technical and safety options for the creation of new storage capacity before 30 June 2017 ”. EDF opted for a centralised storage pool, which should allow storage of spent fuels for which reprocessing or disposal can only be envisaged in the long-term future. The envisaged operating life for this storage facility is about a century. In 2017, EDF transmitted the safety options file for this project, the siting of which has not yet been specified. Following examination of the safety options file transmitted by EDF, ASN issued its opinion in July 2019. It considered that the general safety objectives and the design options adopted are on the whole satisfactory. Additional studies and demonstrations are however required, notably concerning the design and the control of manufacturing, in order to guarantee the long-term leaktightness of the pool, as well as the external hazard levels adopted once the actual site of the facility has been identified. In 2020, EDF reported a delay concerning this storage pool project, which would be located on the La Hague site but which would not be commissioned before 2034. As of 2018, ASN had asked EDF to present the counter­ measures it envisaged for this situation, given the possible saturation of French spent fuel storage capacity by the time of this commissioning. The countermeasures envisaged by EDF, together with Orano, are to increase the density in the La Hague pools, increase the use of MOX in the 900 MWe reactors and use dry storage of spent fuels. With regard to the increased density in the La Hague pools, Orano submitted a safety options file in November 2020. This file was presented to the PNGMDR working group and will be examined by ASN. 2. ASN actions in the field of fuel cycle facilities: a graded approach 2.1  The graded approach according to the risks in the facilities At each step in the fuel cycle, the potential risks in the facilities are different: ∙ The conversion and enrichment facilities mainly entail toxic risks (owing to the chemical form of the radioactive substances they use), criticality risks (when they use enriched materials) and the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder, liquid or crystallised form). ∙ The fuel fabrication facilities mainly entail toxic risks (when they have conversion units), criticality, fire or explosion risks (in the ceramic plants which use heating processes), the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (powder or crystals) and of exposure to ionising radiation (when they use reprocessed substances). ∙ The spent fuel reprocessing facilities mainly entail risks of dissemination of radioactive substances (the substances used are mainly liquids and powders), of criticality (the fissile substances employed change geometrical shape) and exposure to ionising radiation (the fuels contain highly irradiating substances). Their common point is that they never seek to create chain reactions (prevention of the criticality risk) and that they use dangerous substances in industrial quantities. Conventional industrial risks are therefore particularly present. Certain plants, Orano at Tricastin and La Hague or Framatome at Romans-sur- Isère, are in this respect subject to the Seveso Directive. ASN endeavours to apply oversight that is proportionate to the potential risks of each facility, which is more specifically classified by ASN in one of three categories defined on the basis of the scale of the risks and detrimental effects it represents. This BNI classification enables the oversight and monitoring of the facilities to be adapted, reinforcing the inspections and the scope of the reviews carried out by ASN for the higher risk facilities. When the installations are substantially modified or when they are finally shut down, ASN is in charge of examining these modifications, which are the subject of an amending decree from the Government, after prior consultation of ASN. ASN also establishes binding requirements for these main steps. Finally, ASN also reviews the safety files justifying the operation of each BNI. For each facility, ASN monitors the organisation and means chosen by the licensee to enable it to assume its responsibilities in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency management in the event of an accident and protection of nature, the environment and public health and safety. ASN monitors the working of the organisations put into place by the licensees mainly through inspections, more specifically those devoted to safety management. In this respect, Orano submitted applications for a change of licensee concerning all its BNIs, in February 2020. The purpose of this project, called “PEARL”, is to separate the group’s activities into three separate subsidiaries dealing with the cycle front-end, the cycle back-end and decommissioning. ASN’s examination of this application showed that it led to a ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 327 11 – “NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE” INSTALLATIONS 11