ASN Report 2020

with the licensee and the personnel representative bodies. An inspection of lifting operations was carried out with the aim of checking the conformity of the work equipment, among other things. Particular attention must be paid to the servicing and maintenance of the lifting equipment. Reactor A undergoing decommissioning In 2020, the decommissioning of the equipment inside the reactor vessel continued, despite a long period during which all activities were stopped on account of the health crisis. After transferring the reactor closure head to Andra’s Aube repository (CSA) at the end of 2019, the year was marked by the dispatching of the f irst low- and intermediate-level waste packages to the activated waste packaging and storage facility (Iceda) operated by EDF on the Bugey site in the Ain département . ASN’s examination of the facility’s safety review file submitted in 2017 continued in 2020 after it had received several complements requested of EDF. On a more general note, ASN considers that the licensee must maintain its vigilance in the areas of radiation protection, the environment and the monitoring of service providers. The low level of activity in 2020 due to the health context, however, makes it impossible to measure the effectiveness of the action plans put in place in these areas at the request of ASN. In the specific area of radiation protection, the commitments made in 2019 concerning the licensee’s organisation were met. The risk of alpha particle contamination remains a major issue on the site and continues to be monitored with particular attention by ASN. Lastly, with regard to occupational safety, an inspection focusing in particular on the lawfulness of the conditions of work of foreign companies on the French territory was carried out. This inspection detected irregularities concerning subcontractor companies during the provision of their services. Fessenheim nuclear power plant The Fessenheim NPP comprises two PWRs, each with a unit power of 900 MWe. It is situated 1.5 km from the German border and about 30 km from Switzerland. The two reactors were commissioned in 1977 and were definitively shut down in 2020. The year 2020 was marked by the final shutdown of the site’s two reactors, one on 22 February and the other on 30 June, in accordance with the dates announced by EDF in its f inal shutdown declaration of 27 September 2019. The Fessenheim site’s electricity production activity ended with a highly satisfactory level of performance in terms of safety, in line with the good results obtained by the site over the last few years. The number of significant events declared during the reactor production period was below the average for the fleet and a very good standard of reactor operation was maintained. This performance reflects in particular the determination of the site’s management and personnel to maintain exemplary operating rigour through to final shutdown of the reactors. As from September 2020, in view of the ongoing personnel departures in the various departments and the end of production, the site’s organisation was modif ied as regards the size of the operating teams, the organisation of the On-Site Emergency Plan (PUI), the f ire teams’ service, the site’s organisation chart and the number of departments. Contrasting with the situation observed during the period of production, this period brought a transient increase in signif icant events with an inhabitual “organisational and human factors” component, possibly linked to the disruption of organisational and managerial practices resulting from the ongoing reorganisation of the departments. Moreover, since production stopped, the on-site activity now concerns systems, procedures, and configurations that are less familiar to the site’s teams than the previous habitual recurrent operating and maintenance operations. Consequently, in the area of the environment ASN has observed a few events stemming f rom system management errors that can be attributed to such inhabitual operations. The risk analysis practices must be adapted to the site’s new activities and operations. Over and beyond the activities associated with decommissio­ ning preparation, a certain level of maintenance activity will continue, particularly for the systems remaining in operation, such as ventilation, effluent treatment of and f ighting the fire risk. ASN has noted the site’s proactive attitude and good management in this area of activity. Lastly, in view of the presence of nuclear fuel on the site until 2023, ASN has prescribed, through resolution 2020-DC-0699 of 17 November 2020, the putting in place of an “adapted hardened safety core” of material and organisational measures designed to prevent uncovering of the fuel assemblies in the fuel pools in any extreme hazard situation that reaches the “hardened safety core” level. This same resolution obliges the reinforcement of some of the site’s facilities, particularly the groundwater well and the associated generator set, which constitute an additional source of cooling and of electrical power that can be mobilised in the event of an accident. The necessary work was carried out in accordance with the deadline for these requirements set at 31 December 2020. Lastly, this resolution sets 31 December 2023 as the deadline for removal of the fuel from the site, which will automatically eliminate the source of the risk of any major nuclear accident. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 61 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION GRAND EST

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