ASN Report 2020

The reinforcement work to ensure the earthquake resistance of building 625 was authorized in February 2019. ASN shall be particularly attentive to the meeting of the deadlines for this work (end of the second quarter of 2021). The inspections carried out by ASN in 2020 revealed satisfactory operational management of the fire risk. Improvements are nevertheless expected in the management of the criticality risk, more specifically with the updating of the operating documents and better management of the quantities of radioactive substances present in the various areas of the facility. Poséidon irradiator – CEA Centre Authorised in 1972, the Poséidon facility (BNI 77) is an irradiator comprising a storage pool for cobalt-60 sources, partially surmounted by an irradiation bunker. The BNI moreover includes another bunkered irradiator baptised Pagure, and the Vulcain accelerator. This facility is used for studies and qualification services for the equipment installed in the nuclear reactors, notably thanks to an immersible chamber, as well as for the radiosterilisation of medical products. The main risk in the facility is of personnel exposure to ionising radiation due to the presence of very high-activity sealed sources. Examination of the periodic safety review report for the facility was completed with the publication of ASN Chairman’s’ resolution CODEP-CLG-2019-048416 of 22 November 2019. The major themes addressed include the resistance of the building to seismic and climatic hazards (snow and wind in particular), and the monitoring of ageing of the Poséidon storage pool. In the light of the inspections carried out in 2020, ASN considers that the facility is operated satisfactorily. By way of example, the modif ications to the Poseidon source-holder elevator following a failure that occurred in early 2020 were correctly carried out with good traceability of the modifications. However, ASN observes shortcomings in the monitoring of the lightning protection devices and the maintenance operations on the Poseidon automatic f ire extinguishing system. Compliance with the regulatory periodic inspection deadlines must also be improved. SOLID WASTE AND LIQUID EFFLUENT TREATMENT FACILITIES The CEA operates diverse types of facilities: laboratories associated with “fuel cycle” research as well research reactors. The CEA also carries out numerous decommissioning operations. Consequently, it produces diverse types of waste. The CEA has specif ic processing, packaging and storage facilities for the management of this waste. 1. The Potential Source Term ( Terme Source Mobilisable – TSM in French) corresponds to the quantity of radioactive actvity that could be involved in an incident or accident. Solid radioactive waste management zone – CEA Centre The solid radioactive waste management zone (BNI 72) was authorized by the Decree of 14 June 1971. Operated by the CEA, this facility processes, packages and stores the high, intermediate and low-level waste from the Saclay centre facilities. It also stores legacy materials and waste (spent fuels, sealed sources, scintillating liquids, ion-exchange resins, technological waste, etc.) pending disposal. In view of the Potential Source Term (1) (TSM) currently present in the facility, BNI 72 is one of the priorities in the CEA’s decommissioning strategy which has been examined by ASN, which stated its position on these priorities among other things in May 2019 (see chapter 13). The commitments made further to the preceding safety review in 2009 aimed to guarantee an acceptable level of safety of the facility for the next 10 years. They concerned in particular the removal of the majority of the Potential Source Term from the facility and stopping the reception of new waste from the Saclay centre in order to concentrate the facility’s resources on the retrieval and packaging of the legacy waste and on the decommissioning. These commitments have not been met. In 2017, in view of the delays in the removal f rom storage operations, the CEA requested that the deadlines prescribed in ASN resolution 2010-DC-0194 of 22 July 2010 for removal of the irradiated fuel from storage and removal of the waste stored in the “40 wells” area be pushed back by several years. In 2020, the CEA asked for a further extension of several years for the removal of the waste stored in the 40 wells area. In order to be able to continue using the BNI for managing the radioactive waste from the Saclay BNIs, the CEA in 2017 asked for a change in the date of final shutdown of the facility, postponing it until the f irst of the following two terms was reached: either the effective date of the Decommissioning Decree or the date of 31 December 2022. It is also requesting certain arrangements for the management of certain types of waste until 2025. In the context of the periodic safety review, for which the report was submitted at the end of 2017, and the decommissioning file, ASN has examined the conditions of continued operation of BNI 72 with a view to its decommissioning. These two files have been examined jointly by ASN and the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Reactor Safety (IRSN), ASN having requested the latter’s opinion. ASN shall be particularly vigilant with regard to rigorous application of the action plan proposed by the CEA, and meeting of the commitments made during the examination. ASN considers that the safety of the facility is acceptable, while at the same time noting numerous delays in the operations to remove the fuel and waste from storage. ASN nevertheless takes positive note of the removal of three isotopic generators from the facility in 2020, which contributes to the gradual reduction of its TSM. 68 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION