ASN Report 2020

CEA FONTENAY‑AUX‑ROSES SITE Created in 1946 as the CEA’s f irst research centre, the Fontenay‑aux‑Roses site is continuing its transition from nuclear activities towards research activities in living sciences. The Fontenay-aux-Roses centre comprises two BNIs, namely Procédé (BNI 165) and Support (BNI 166). BNI 165 accommodated the research and development activities on nuclear fuel reprocessing, transuranium elements, radioactive waste and the examination of irradiated fuels. These activities were stopped in the 1980s-1990s. BNI 166 is a facility for the characterisation, treatment, reconditioning and storage of legacy radioactive waste from the decom­ missioning of BNI 165. Broadly speaking, the CEA’s decommissioning and waste management strategy has been examined by ASN, which stated its position in May 2019 on the priorities defined by the CEA (see chapter 13). Procédé facility and Support facility – CEA Centre Decommissioning of the two facilities Procédé and Support, which constitute BNI 165 and BNI 166 respectively, was authorised by two Decrees of 30 June 2006. The initial planned duration of the decommissioning operations was about ten years. The CEA informed ASN that, due to strong presumptions of radioactive contamination beneath one of the buildings, to unforeseen difficulties and to a change in the overall decommissioning strategy of the CEA’s civil centres, the decommissioning operations would extend beyond 2030 and that the decommissioning plan would be modif ied. In June 2015, the CEA submitted an application to modify the prescribed deadlines for these decommissioning operations. ASN deemed that the first versions of these Decommissioning Decree modif ication application f iles were not admissible. In accordance with the commitments made in 2017, the CEA submitted the revised versions of these files in 2018. Assessment of the CEA Saclay site ASN considers that the Basic Nuclear Installations (BNIs) of the Saclay centre are operated under suitably safe conditions on the whole and notes that certain operations contributing to the reduction of the source terms stored in the BNIs concerned were carried out in 2020. Consequently, there is no more irradiated fuel in the Orphée reactor and the removal of irradiated fuels from the centre’s reactors should be completed in the first half of 2021. Moreover, several isotopic generators present in BNI 72 have been removed. Nevertheless, the activities were slowed down by the Covid-19 pandemic, which obliged certain works and modifications to be put on standby. This is because during the first lockdown the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) stopped the activities of the BNIs while maintaining the essential monitoring and inspection operations (see box on previous page). In view of the structural delays in the decommissioning operations, ASN expects the CEA to continue its efforts to make its implementation schedules for these operations more robust. ASN will maintain particular vigilance in monitoring the progress of the decommissioning and waste retrieval and packaging projects, with the aim of ensuring control of the schedules. The decommissioning and waste recovery and packaging operations continued to fall behind schedule in 2020. ASN considers that the progress of the decommissioning projects is one of the major safety challenges for the shutdown installations and that the management of the waste from the decommissioning operations is crucial for the smooth running of the decommissioning programmes. The majority of the CEA Saclay centre BNIs are concerned, either directly or indirectly, by decommissioning or decommissioning preparation operations. Further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, ASN had initiated stress tests on the nuclear installations. More particularly, the emergency management means of the centres were examined for the Saclay centre. In 2016, ASN prescribed the creation of new emergency management means, notably the construction or reinforcement of “hardened safety core” emergency centres capable of withstanding extreme conditions. After receiving a compliance notice from ASN in September 2019, the CEA submitted in December 2019 its file presenting and justifying the dimensioning of the future emergency management buildings, whose commissioning is planned for the end of 2021. The licensee also submitted an authorisation request to ASN in December 2020 for the commissioning of its future emergency management premises. With regard to the emergency organisation and means, ASN requested complementary information concerning the proposed update to the 2019 On-site Emergency Plan which must be submitted by the CEA in 2021. The ASN information requests relate to the organisational or structural changes at the CEA and also concern updates of operational documents concerning each of the BNIs so that they correspond to the actual state of the facilities. As part of its oversight actions, ASN performed an inspection further to loss of the centre’s compressed air supply in order to ascertain that it has no impact on the BNIs, and observed that the overall organisation put in place to manage this situation was satisfactory. ASN also noted, during a specific inspection, the ready availability of the fire-fighting means, with tests performed on the fire network. ASN nevertheless considers that the CEA must maintain its vigilance in the performance of the periodic inspections and tests of its equipment. 72 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2020 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION