ASN and IRSN also carry out a more wide-ranging examination of the OEF from the events. The significant event reports and the periodic reviews sent by the licensees, as well as the assessment by ASN and IRSN, constitute the basis of OEF. The examination of OEF may lead to ASN requests for improvements to the condition of the facilities and the organisation adopted by the licensee, but also to changes to the regulations. OEF the events which occur in France and abroad in nuclear facilities or in those presenting non-radiological hazards, if it is pertinent to take them into account, in order to reinforce nuclear safety or radiation protection. 3.3.3 Technical inquiries held in the event of an incident or accident concerning a nuclear activity ASN has the authority to carry out an immediate technical inquiry in the event of an incident or accident in a nuclear activity. This inquiry consists in collecting and analysing all useful information, without prejudice to any judicial inquiry, in order to determine the circumstances and the identified or possible causes of the event, and draw up the appropriate recommendations if necessary. Articles L. 592-35 et seq. of the Environment Code give ASN powers to set up a board of inquiry, determine its composition (ASN staff and people from outside ASN), define the subject and scope of the investigations and gain access to all necessary elements in the event of a judicial inquiry. Decree 2007-1572 of 6 November 2007 on technical inquiries into accidents or incidents concerning a nuclear activity specifies the procedure to be followed. It is based on practices defined by the other boards of inquiry and takes account of aspects specific to ASN, notably its independence, its own roles, its ability to impose binding requirements or sanctions. 2. This scale is designed for communication with the public in comprehensible, explicit terms, concerning radiation protection events leading to unexpected or unforeseeable effects affecting patients undergoing a radiotherapy medical procedure. 3.3.4 Statistical summary of events In 2021, 2,116 significant events were reported to ASN: ∙ 1,254 significant events concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection, the environment and the on-site transport of hazardous materials within BNIs, 1,172 of which are rated on the INES scale (1,068 “level 0” events, 103 “level 1” events and 1 “level 2” event). Of these events, 31 significant events were rated as “generic events”, in other words concerning several reactors, including 2 at “level 1” on the INES scale; ∙ 84 significant events concerning the transport of radioactive substances on the public highway, including 4 events rated “level 1” on the INES scale; ∙ 778 significant events concerning radiation protection in smallscale nuclear activities, including 210 rated on the INES scale (34 “level 1” events). In 2021, one event was rated “level 2” on the INES scale: it concerns the external contamination of a worker in the Cruas-Meysse NPP. This is described in detail in chapter 10. In 2021, a significant event reported in 2020 and initially rated “level 1” on the INES scale was provisionally re-rated “level 2”. This event concerns the discovery of residual radioactive contamination in a building of the civil hospital of Strasbourg. As indicated earlier, these data must be used with caution: they do not in themselves constitute a safety indicator. ASN encourages the licensees to report incidents, which contributes to transparency and the sharing of experience. The breakdown of significant events rated on the INES scale is given in Table 6. As the INES scale does not apply to significant events concerning patients, the rating of significant events affecting one or more patients in radiotherapy on the ASN-SFRO scale(2) is specified in chapter 7. USING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LUBRIZOL FIRE Following the fire that occurred on 26 September 2019 in the Lubrizol and Normandie Logistique facilities in Rouen, ASN initiated a number of actions with the BNIs, in order to learn lessons from this accident and, if necessary, initiate reinforcement of the measures to prevent and control non-radiological risks in BNIs. More specifically, ASN sent a letter to all licensees in October 2019, asking them to conduct a review of the adequacy and effectiveness of the various barriers in place inside their facilities to control risks related to the storage of hazardous substances, as well as their knowledge of the nature and quantities of the hazardous substances present. After analysing the answers provided by the licensees to this letter, describing the provisions planned for their sites, ASN reinforced its inspections on the topic of non-radiological risks in 2020 and 2021. They brought to light the need for the BNI licensees to improve their organisation, in order to better guarantee the quality, exhaustiveness and robustness of the safety case regarding non-radiological risks, as well as its operational implementation. An effort to improve the inventories of hazardous substances present within the facility and the real-time stocks situation is also required. ASN will continue its inspections on this subject, notably through situational exercises in the facilities. At the same time, ASN is continuing its work to reinforce the regulatory requirements applicable to the BNIs. ASN is therefore studying whether it would be opportune to revise the new regulatory provisions made applicable to ICPEs following the fire on 26 September 2019, or adapt them to the BNIs. Finally, with regard to post-accident management, ASN ensures that the OEF from the various Ministries on this subject is incorporated into the considerations by the Steering Committee for the management of the post-accident phase (Codirpa). The General Directorate for the Prevention of Risks (DGPR) at the Ministry for Ecological Transition thus presented and shared the lessons learned from this event. The recommendations of the delegation on “transparency, information and participation by all in the management of major risks, whether technological or natural” ordered by the Ministry for Ecological Transition following the Lubrizol fire, were also presented to this committee in order to contribute to the deliberations of the Codirpa, in order to reinforce the safety and radiation protection culture around nuclear facilities. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 155 03 – REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURE TO IONISING RADIATION 08 07 13 04 10 06 12 14 03 09 05 11 02 01 AP
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