5 // Inspections concerning fraud and processing of reported cases 5.1 Monitoring of fraud Since 2015, several cases of irregularities that could be considered to be falsifications have been brought to light at known manufacturers, suppliers or organisations who have been working for many years on behalf of the French nuclear industry. Confirmed cases of counterfeit or falsification have also been encountered in a number of other countries in recent years. The term of irregularity is employed by ASN to cover any intentional modification, alteration or omission of certain information or data. An irregularity detected by ASN can be dealt with by a judge in a case of criminal fraud. The number of confirmed or suspected cases only represents a very small proportion of the nuclear activities, but these cases show that neither the robustness of the monitoring and inspection chain, for which the manufacturers, suppliers and licensees have prime responsibility, nor the high level of quality required in the nuclear industry, have been able to totally rule out the risk of counterfeit, fraud and falsification. Not all of these cases were detected by the licensee’s monitoring process, which must now be more adequately tailored to the prevention, detection, analysis and processing of cases of fraud. In 2016, ASN began to look at adapting BNI inspection methods in an irregularity context. In so doing, it questioned other regulation and oversight administrations, its foreign counterparts and the licensees with regard to their practices, in order to learn the pertinent lessons. This particular risk led to changes in the ASN oversight methods, but it continues to be dealt with using the existing procedures. In 2018, ASN also reminded the BNI licensees and the main manufacturers of nuclear equipment that an irregularity is a deviation as defined by the BNI Order. The requirements of the BNI Order therefore apply to the prevention, detection and processing of cases that can be considered to be fraud. More generally, the regulatory requirements concerning the safety and protection of persons against the risks related to ionising radiation also apply. For example, applying a signature to certify that an activity has been correctly carried out, whereas in reality it has not, could –depending on the circumstances– be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. In 2021, the search for irregularities constituting fraud was reinforced during routine inspections in the nuclear facilities. These inspections are of three types: ∙ inspections further to known subjects, resulting from irregularities discovered in other facilities, or to monitor the processing of a case previously detected; ∙ inspections including an in-depth search for proof in the performance of activities, for example with verification of the actual presence of a person who certified that they had carried out an activity on a given date; ∙ inspections with the purpose of raising awareness concerning the risks of fraud, notably during supplier inspections, where the risk of fraud in the subcontracting chain was dealt with. About sixty inspections were carried out in this way in 2021, excluding the inspections which carried out verifications but with no discovery of suspicious cases and for which there is no traceability. They mainly take place on the nuclear sites. Inspections devoted to this topic were also carried out in the head office departments of the main nuclear licensees. The cases detected are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that preventive action can be taken. Depending on the potential implications of the deviation, a report or notification is sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. One report was sent in 2021. In addition, the data integrity topic –linked to the risk of fraud in that traceability weaknesses can facilitate irregularities– is being covered with increasing frequency and is the subject of requests in certain inspection follow-up letters. The detection of irregularities or suspicious cases is still very much an issue, both for the licensees themselves, within the context of their monitoring and internal checks, and for the ASN inspectors. In the field of small-scale nuclear activities, ASN programmed a general verification in 2021 on the authenticity of the industrial radiology operator certificates (CAMARI) and the cards authorising the transport of radioactive materials, during inspections. This action is detailed in chapter 8. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Licensee Private Institutional University Association Total Foodstuffs Surrounding environment Gas/Air Aerosols/Filter Biological Soils Water GRAPH Breakdown of the number of approved laboratories for a given environmental matrix as at 1 January 2022 7 162 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 03 – REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURE TO IONISING RADIATION
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