‒ a “protection of persons, the environment and property” unit, notably in charge of proposing population protection actions; ‒ an “internal and external communication” unit; ‒ an “international relations” unit; ‒ a “forward planning” unit. The working of the Emergency Centre is regularly tested during national emergency exercises and is activated for actual incidents or accidents. At the local level, ASN representatives visit the département and zone Prefects to help them with their decisions and their communication actions. ASN inspectors may also go to the site affected; others take part in emergency management at the headquarters of the regional division involved. In 2021, the ASN Emergency Centre was activated on nine occasions for seven national exercises, one major exercise (SECNUC–see box below) and one international exercise. The ASN emergency response organisation was also partially activated on several occasions in 2021. In the night of Sunday 4 to Monday 5 April 2021, the Paluel NPP in Seine-Maritime (département 76) triggered the ASN’s general alert system owing to the fire on the main transformer of reactor 1, leading to activation of the installation’s PUI. On Saturday 21 October 2021, ASN was informed by IRSN on-call manager that a radioactivity detection alarm had been triggered in the foundry process of the LME company’s plant at Trith-SaintLéger (département 59) during the night of Saturday to Sunday. For these events, and even without actually activating the Emergency Centre, the ASN on-call team was mobilised remotely in order to collect the information needed to monitor the situation and be ready to intervene if necessary. During exercises, or in the event of a real emergency, ASN is supported by a team of analysts working in IRSN’s Technical Emergency Centre. ASN’s alert system allows mobilisation of its Emergency Centre staff and those of IRSN. This automatic system sends an alert signal to the staff equipped with appropriate reception devices, as soon as it is remotely triggered by the BNI licensee originating the alert. It also sends the alert to the staff of the SGDSN, the General Directorate for Civil Security and Emergency Management, the Interministerial Emergency Management Operations Centre, DIAGRAM The role of ASN in a nuclear emergency situation 2 Licensee Information of the public Information International assistance ASN inspector Media Stakeholders (CLI, HCTISN, etc.) Structured and organised process CIC Government Prefect COD COZ ASN representative Embassy ASN (Head office) Commission + Technical PC + Communication PC IRSN (Head office) Emergency technical centre Oversight Inspections Requirements Recommendations protection of the population ASN representatives ASN representative COD: Departmental Operations Centre – COZ: Zone Operations Centre – CIC: Interministerial Crisis Committee – CICNR: Interministerial Committee for Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies – CLI: Local Information Committee – HCTISN: High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety – PC: Command Post IAEA – EU Other countries DURING INSPECTIONS, ASN TESTS THE CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LICENSEES’ EMERGENCY ORGANISATION For several years now, ASN has been testing the EDF emergency organisation in extreme situations during its inspections. These are organised with the help of the IRSN scenario writers, and enable the inspectors to conduct an on-site check of the correct working and resilience of the on-call teams mobilised. These inspections, which mobilise large numbers of inspectors, have notably been able to check the ability of several NPPs to manage an extreme climatic (or comparable) situation which prevented the licensee from having access to its full on-call team for at least several hours. These inspections are usually performed outside working hours and without prior warning of the inspected site and confirmed the good level of preparedness of the EDF teams for all types of emergency situations. In 2021, ASN also carried out an inspection at CEA based on a situational exercise simultaneously mobilising the emergency response organisation of the Saclay site and the licensee’s national emergency response organisation. Two teams of inspectors were deployed, one to the Saclay site and one to the CEA national emergency response centre at Fontenay-aux-Roses. The first team, on the Saclay site, simulated a fire in a facility using radioactive materials and then observed how the licensee managed this event. At the same time, the second team observed activation of CEA’s national emergency organisation in response to this event. The inspectors deployed found a reliable and robust emergency response organisation enabling the licensee’s local and national levels to deal with a radiological emergency situation. 174 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 04 – RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS
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