secondary systems; this update is particular in that the design hypotheses were initially produced for 40 years of operation. EDF will begin the first ten-yearly outage associated with this periodic safety review at the end of 2025. The 1,450 MWe reactors The second periodic safety review In 2011, EDF transmitted the envisaged guidelines for the generic study programme for the second periodic safety review of the 1,450MWe reactors, notably concerning the prevention of core melt and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents. ASN issued a position statement in February 2015 regarding the orientations of this second periodic safety review. It in particular asked EDF to look for measures to mitigate the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents and measures with a strong impact in terms of preventing and mitigating the con– sequences of severe accidents. The examination of the generic phase of this periodic safety review was completed in 2021 and ASN aims to issue a position statement on this generic phase in 2022. Chooz NPP reactors B1 and B2 carried out their second ten-yearly outages in 2019 and 2020. The ten-yearly outage for Civaux NPP reactor 1 was started in 2021. That for reactor 2 is scheduled for 2022. 3 // Oversight of the safety of the Flamanville EPR reactor The EPR is a PWR using a design that has evolved from that of the reactors currently in operation in France. It meets reinforced safety objectives: reduction in the number of significant events, limitation of discharges, reduced volume and activity of waste, reduced individual and collective doses received by the workers (in normal operation and incident situations), reduced overall frequency of core melt, taking account of all types of failures and hazards and reduced radiological consequences of any accidents. In May 2006, EDF submitted a creation authorisation application to the Ministers responsible for nuclear safety and for radiation protection, for an EPR type reactor with a power of 1,650 MWe on the Flamanville site, which was already home to two 1,300MWe reactors. The Government authorised its creation through Decree 2007‑ 534 of 10 April 2007, after a favourable opinion issued by ASN following the examination process. This Decree was modified in 2017 and in 2020, to extend the time allowed for commissioning of the reactor. After the issue of this Creation Authorisation Decree and the building permit, construction of the Flamanville EPR reactor began in September 2007. The first concrete was poured for the nuclear island buildings in December 2007. EDF plans to load fuel and start up the reactor by mid-2023. This schedule takes account of the time needed on the one hand to repair certain MPS welds and, on the other, for the end of the assembly and testing operations. 3.1 Examination of the authorisation applications Examination of the commissioning authorisation application In March 2015, EDF sent ASN its commissioning authorisation application for the installation, including the safety analysis report, the RGEs, a study of the facility’s waste management, the PUI, the decommissioning plan and an update of the facility’s impact assessment. Following a preliminary examination, ASN considered that all the documents required by the regulations were officially present, but it decided that additional justifications were needed if ASN was to be able to reach a final decision on the commissioning authorisation application. ASN began the technical examination of the subjects for which most of the information was available, although it did submit some requests on certain points. In June 2017, ASN received updated versions of the commissioning authorisation files and in 2018 made requests for additional information, notably concerning the RGEs. ASN obtained the opinion of the GPR on 4 and 5 July 2018 concerning the safety analysis report for the Flamanville EPR reactor. This meeting was devoted in particular to the action taken following the previous GPR sessions devoted to this reactor since 2015. The Advisory Committee considered that the reactor’s safety case is on the whole satisfactory and points out that some additional information is still required concerning how the fire risk is addressed and the behaviour of the fuel rods which have experienced a boiling crisis. The GPR also considered that the design and dimensioning of the back-up systems and auxiliary safety systems are on the whole satisfactory and observed that additional information was still required concerning the breaks liable to affect the fuel storage pool cooling system. In 2019 and 2020, in the light of this opinion and the conclusions of its technical examinations, ASN submitted requests for supplements to the safety case that are needed for it to make a final decision on the commissioning authorisation application. In June 2021, EDF sent ASN a new commissioning authorisation application. This application replaces the initial application of March 2015 and contains a complete update of the file appended to the initial application, incorporating certain additions requested and the conclusions of the examinations conducted since 2015. Partial commissioning authorisation for arrival of the fuel On 8 October 2020, ASN authorised partial commissioning of the installation for arrival of the fuel on the site. This authorisation enabled EDF to receive fuel assemblies and store them in the fuel storage pool, for use in the first fuelling of the reactor. This partial commissioning is one of the steps prior to commissioning of the Flamanville EPR reactor, but in no way prejudges this commissioning, which is the subject of a separate examination. 3.2 Construction, start-up tests and preparation for operation ASN is faced with numerous challenges concerning oversight of the construction, start-up tests and preparation for operation of the Flamanville EPR reactor. These are: ∙ checking the quality of equipment manufacturing and in– stallation construction, in order to be able to issue a position statement on the ability of the installation to meet the defined requirements; ∙ ensuring that the start-up tests programme is satisfactory, that the tests are correctly performed and that the required results are obtained; ∙ ensuring that the various stakeholders learn the lessons from the construction phase and the performance of the start-up tests, including the upstream phases (selection and monitoring of contractors, construction, procurement, etc.) which will 306 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 10 – THE EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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