to take place. A public inquiry was held on this subject at the end of 2020. The project received an authorisation decree in 2022. “New concentration of fission products” project on the La Hague site In order to replace the fission products evaporator-concentrators at La Hague, which are suffering from a more advanced stage of corrosion than imagined in the design, Orano is building new units, called “NCPF”, comprising six new evaporators. This particularly complex project required several authorisations and was the subject of an ASN resolution in 2020, concerning the process of three of these evaporators (NCPF T2). The authorisations for connection of this new equipment to the existing units will be the subject of other resolutions and authorisations in the course of 2022. Construction of new storage capacity for waste packages To anticipate the saturation of storage capacity for CSD-V (units R7, T7 and E/EV/SE), construction work on new storage facilities, known as the “glass storage extension on the La Hague site” (E/EV/LH) began in 2007. These facilities are being built module by module, with the construction of identical units called “pits”. Pits 50 and 60 are under construction to increase storage capacity. An extension to the CSD-C storage facility was also authorised by the Decree of 27 November 2020; ASN had issued a favourable opinion regarding this draft text on 8 September 2020. Construction is under way and the introduction of radioactive substances into this extension for the first time will require authorisation from ASN. The special fuels reprocessing unit project In order to be able to receive and reprocess special fuels irradiated in the Phénix reactor or in other research reactors, Orano submitted the safety options file in 2016 for a new special fuels reprocessing unit. This unit would comprise new shearing and dissolving equipment. In March 2017, ASN informed the licensee that the safety options for this new unit were on the whole satisfactory. Orano however encountered technical difficulties in developing the process, which led to a significant change in the initial design options. In the light of this, ASN granted Orano more time to submit the authorisation application for this unit. The licensee transmitted new safety options for this project in January 2020. ASN released its observations on this file on 9 December 2020. EDF centralised storage pool project During the public debate held in 2019, prior to the fifth edition of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR), EDF reaffirmed that the strategy to increase the spent fuel storage capacity is based on the construction of a new centralised storage pool. This new facility should allow storage of spent fuels for which reprocessing or disposal can only be envisaged in the long-term future. The envisaged operating life for this storage facility is about a century. In 2017, EDF transmitted a safety options file for this project. In July 2019, ASN issued its opinion on the safety options presented by EDF for such a facility and considers that the general safety objectives and the design options adopted are satisfactory. In 2020, EDF indicated a delay in this storage pool project, which would be located on the La Hague site, but would not be commissioned before 2034. In 2021, EDF referred this project to the National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP) and a prior public inquiry under the aegis of the CNDP was organised by EDF from 22 November 2021 to 15 February 2022. As of 2018, ASN had asked EDF to present the countermeasures it envisaged for this situation, given the possible saturation of French spent fuel storage capacity by the time of this commissioning. The countermeasures envisaged by EDF, together with Orano, are to increase the density in the La Hague pools, increase the use of MOX fuels in the reactors and use dry storage of spent fuels. With regard to the increased density in the La Hague pools, Orano submitted a safety options file in November 2020. In order to promote technical discussions around this subject, ASN created a pluralistic working sub-group at the beginning of 2021 to take part in the proceedings of the PNGMDR working group, to which the members of the La Hague Local Information Committee (CLI) had been invited. ASN issued a position statement in February 2022. In its letter of 14 February, ASN considers that the safety options presented by the licensee are on the whole satisfactory. Observations and additional information were requested and are to be transmitted as part of the noteworthy modification authorisation application the licensee intends to submit in mid2022. ASN also recalls that the increased density in the La Hague pools cannot be a lasting solution for saturation of fuel storage capacity and that this countermeasure cannot take the place of a new storage facility compliant with the most recent safety standards. With regard to dry storage of spent fuels, Orano sent ASN a safety options file in November 2021 and it will be added to in the coming months. 2 // ASN actions in the field of “fuel cycle” facilities: a graded approach 2.1 The graded approach according to the risks of the facilities At each step in the “fuel cycle”, the potential risks in the facilities are different: ∙ The conversion and enrichment facilities mainly entail toxic risks (owing to the chemical form of the radioactive substances they use), criticality risks (when they use enriched materials) and the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder, liquid or crystallised form). ∙ The fuel fabrication facilities mainly entail toxic risks (when they have conversion units), criticality, fire or explosion risks (in the ceramic plants which use heating processes), as well as the dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder or crystallised form) and exposure to ionising radiation (when they use reprocessed substances). ∙ The spent fuel reprocessing facilities mainly entail risks of dissemination of radioactive substances (the substances used are mainly liquids and powders), of criticality (the fissile substances employed change geometrical shape) and exposure to ionising radiation (the fuels contain highly irradiating substances). Their common point is that they never seek to create chain reactions (prevention of the criticality risk) and that they use dangerous substances in industrial quantities. Conventional industrial risks are therefore particularly present. Certain plants, Orano at Tricastin and La Hague or Framatome at Romans-surIsère, are in this respect subject to the Seveso Directive. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 317 11 – “NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE” INSTALLATIONS 08 07 13 04 10 06 12 14 03 09 05 11 02 AP 01
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