of the waste produced or to be produced, an estimation of the waste traffic volumes and a waste zoning plan. In addition, every year, each site sends ASN a summary report on its production of waste and the corresponding disposal routes, a comparison with the results of previous years, a summary of the site organisation and the differences observed with respect to the management procedures specified in the waste management study, the list of significant events which have occurred and the outlook for the future. Prevention of the health impacts caused by the growth of legionella and amoeba in certain cooling systems of the NPP secondary systems The cooling systems of nuclear reactors equipped with a cooling tower are environments favourable to the development of legionella and other amoeba. EDF monitors the legionella and amoeba concentrations and takes preventive measures and, if necessary, remedial measures in accordance with the provisions of ASN resolution 2016-DC-0578 of 6 December 2016 on the prevention of risks resulting from the dispersion of pathogenic micro-organisms (legionella and amoeba) by the cooling installations of the system. For most of these reactors, preventive and remedial measures to limit the development of legionella and amoeba are based on the injection of a biocidal product (monochloramine) into the cooling system. 2.5.2 Prevention and control of the non-radiological risks Prevention of non-radiological risks with airborne effects The accidents with effects said to be “non-radiological” are all the accidents which can arise from the release of hazard potentials not specific to the nuclear activity, insofar as they not concern radioactive substances. These hazard potentials, which can also be present in other industries such as Installations Classified for Protection of the Environment (ICPEs), are associated with storage facilities and processes using gaseous or liquid chemical substances. Through a specific study, known as the non-radiological risks assessment, these non-radiological accidents are taken into account in the nuclear safety case in accordance with the provisions of Title III of the Order of 7 February 2012. This study is drawn up, pursuant to II of Article 3.7 of the Order of 7 February 2012, with the methodology applicable to ICPEs. The purpose of this study is to justify the thermal, toxic, missile or over-pressure effects generated by release of the hazard potentials present on the site and leading to no effects beyond the perimeter of the site. This justification is based, on the one hand, on identification of the hazard potentials (storage facilities or processes) and their potential hazard sources and, on the other, on characterisation of the possible dangerous phenomena and the specific prevention measures for reducing both probability and effects. Each NPP thus has a study of non-radiological risks which analyses and as necessary identifies the possible dangerous phenomena, as well as the specific material and organisational provisions for preventing these phenomena or limiting their effects. Prevention of liquid pollution resulting from accidental spillage of dangerous substances As with numerous industrial activities, the operation of an NPP involves the handling and storage of dangerous chemical substances. The management of these substances and the prevention of pollution, which are the responsibility of the licensee, are regulated by the Order of 7 February 2012 and ASN resolution 2013-DC-0360 of 16 July 2013 and must also comply with the requirements of the European texts. The licensee has obligations regarding the operational management of these substances and the identification of the corresponding potential hazards. It must also be able to take the necessary steps in the event of any incident or accident situations which would lead to pollution. The licensee must thus for instance precisely identify the location of each dangerous substance on its site, along with the corresponding quantities. Drums and tanks must be labelled in compliance with the European CLP (Classification, Labelling, Packaging) regulation and there must be retention areas designed to collect any spills. The NPPs must also adopt an organisation and resources to prevent pollution of the natural environment (groundwater, river, soil). For several years and at the request of ASN, EDF has been carrying out steps to improve its management of the pollution risk by working to improve the confinement of dangerous liquid substances on its sites. 2.5.3 Assessment of control of environmental and health impacts and non-radiological hazards ASN monitors the organisational and material measures put into place by EDF, on the one hand to prevent non-radiological risks and liquid pollution resulting from the dangerous substances present in its installations, and on the other, to guarantee control of the detrimental effects arising from the operation of the installations, such as water intake, effluent discharge into the natural environment, and waste. As each year, ASN carried out inspections on these measures in 2022: Two inspection campaigns – described in detail below – were in particular carried out. ASN also conducted a campaign of inspections on seven NPPs with regard to the organisation adopted for the management of non-radiological risks. During these inspections, which were primarily focused on field inspections, ASN carried out unannounced situational exercises to check the licensee’s organisation in the event of a non-radiological accident which could be the cause of potential effects off the site. These inspections revealed the fact that although these NPPs do have an organisation and resources to deal with non-radiological accident scenarios, this organisation could be improved. These inspections were thus able to identify areas for improvement, such as updating of the operational documentation relative to the organisation to be implemented in the event of a non-radiological accident, or reinforcement of the specific material and organisational CAMPAIGN OF INSPECTIONS ON THE ULTIMATE BACK-UP DIESEL GENERATOR SETS The “Ultimate back-up” DUS are electrical power sources installed in response to the technical prescriptions issued by ASN following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. Their role is to provide electricity to the “hardened safety core” systems, enabling the basic safety functions to be controlled in extreme situations. The inspections performed by ASN show that operator training and familiarisation with this new equipment could be improved. The commissioning of the DUS was also marked by the outbreak of fire on some of the DUS for the 1,300 MWe reactors. Following these outbreaks of fire, EDF defined an action plan to remedy these situations. The provisions of this action plan are being examined and closely monitored by ASN, which will continue in 2023. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2022 303 • 10 • The EDF Nuclear Power Plants 10 01 07 08 13 AP 04 06 12 14 03 09 05 11 02
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