Assessment of the CEA Saclay site ASN considers that the CEA Saclay site BNIs are operated under suitably safe conditions on the whole, and observes the continuation in 2022 of the operations to reduce the radiological inventory stored in the BNIs, particularly following several removal operations in BNI 72. As in 2021, the decommissioning and Waste Retrieval and Packaging (WRP) operations continued to fall behind schedule in 2022. ASN considers that the progress of the decommissioning projects is one of the major safety challenges for the shutdown installations and that the management of the waste from the decommissioning operations is crucial for the smooth running of the decommissioning programmes. The majority of the CEA Saclay site BNIs are concerned, either directly or indirectly, by decommissioning or decommissioning preparation operations. It should nevertheless be noted that the Ulysse reactor (former BNI 18) was delicensed during 2022. ASN therefore expects the CEA to continue its efforts to make its implementation schedules for these operations more robust. Several files are currently being drafted or examined to define the decommissioning schedules of the facilities for the coming decades. ASN will remain particularly attentive to the progress of the decommissioning and WRP projects, with the aim of checking control of the schedules. In 2021, an abnormally high tritium content was discovered in the Fontainebleau Sands aquifer, at a new piezometer installed on the site. The studies conducted by the CEA during 2022 furthered knowledge of the origin of this pollution and its development over time, based on models. The installation of new piezometers during 2023 will enable the posited hypotheses to be verified and better identify the extent of the pollution plume. On another note, further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident (Japan), ASN had ordered the creation on the Saclay site of new emergency management facilities capable of withstanding extreme conditions. After receiving a compliance notice from ASN in September 2019, the CEA submitted in December 2019 its file presenting and justifying the dimensioning of the future emergency management buildings. After discovering faults in the civil engineering reinforcements, the work site was suspended in mid-2021, preventing the CEA from meeting its commitment to have the premises commissioned before the end of 2021. Acceptance of the new emergency premises is now planned for 2024. With regard to the emergency organisation and resources, an update of the On-Site Emergency Plan submitted by the CEA in late 2021 was discussed during 2022 in order to clarify the chosen provisions. In 2023, ASN will examine emergency management and the holding of exercises with, in particular, active situational exercises involving the site’s local safety organisation. Following a reorganisation of VLL waste management on the CEA Saclay site in early 2021, which led to a few occasional difficulties within the BNIs, ASN conducted a specific inspection focusing on six BNIs on the site in order to review the situation. The inspections revealed that the BNIs are now capable of managing directly the packaging and removal of this waste. Some of the BNIs are examining the implementation of new measures to meet their future needs. Particular vigilance is nevertheless required in the management of waste storage durations and the quality of the waste inventories in the BNIs. The hazardous substance inventories must also be kept more strictly up to date. Even though the CEA conducted a specific study of the strategy for managing the liquid radioactive effluents produced on the Saclay site at the request of ASN, more specifically to examine the possibility of treating them in BNI 35, the organisational set up for managing the radioactive effluents, which have been treated on the Marcoule site for several years, was found to be appropriate. With regard to radioactive substance transport, ASN’s inspection found the tracking of these operations to be satisfactory, with a transport organisation providing for appropriate management of the safety issues. Lastly, ASN conducted an inspection on the CEA Saclay site as part of its examination of the file concerning the setting up of radiation protection skills centres within the CEA Paris‑Saclay centre. It served to review the substantial work achieved by the CEA teams and examine the methods of integrating the regulatory requirements, and thereby supplement or clarify certain aspects of the file. An inspection on this theme was also carried out on the CEA Fontenay-aux-Roses site. The setting up of radiation protection skills centres constitutes a positive point. 68 ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2022 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection • ÎLE-DE-FRANCE •
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