5 Inspections concerning counterfeit, falsifications and suspected fraud, and processing of reported cases 5.1 INSPECTIONS CONCERNING COUNTERFEIT, FALSIFICATIONS AND SUSPECTED FRAUD Since 2015, several cases of irregularities that could be considered to be falsifications have been brought to light at known manufacturers, suppliers or organisations who have been working for many years on behalf of the French nuclear industry. Confirmed cases of counterfeit or falsification have also been encountered in a number of other countries in recent years. The term of irregularity was initially employed by ASN to cover any intentional modification, alteration or omission of certain information or data. ASN will gradually adopt the term of “Counterfeit, Falsification or Suspected fraud” (CFS), which is better suited to the issue as it is more in line with the term usually employed internationally : Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI). A CFS detected by ASN can be dealt with by a judge in a case of criminal fraud. The number of confirmed or suspected cases remain few in number but they do exist, despite the high level of quality demanded in the nuclear industry and the robustness of the monitoring and inspection chain, the key links of which are the manufacturers, suppliers and licensees. The licensees have improved their monitoring and therefore the detection of CFS. They must however maintain their efforts to adapt more adequately to the prevention, detection, analysis and processing of cases of CFS. In 2016, ASN began to look at adapting BNI inspection methods in an irregularity context. In so doing, it questioned other regulation and oversight administrations, its foreign counterparts and the licensees with regard to their practices, in order to learn the pertinent lessons. This particular risk gave rise to changes to ASN’s oversight methods (specific check list, dedicated governance bodies, development of awareness of licensees and suppliers, etc.). The existing framework is used for processing. ASN also reminded the BNI licensees and the main manufacturers of nuclear equipment in 2018 that a CFS is a deviation as defined by the BNI Order. The requirements of the Order therefore apply to the prevention, detection and processing of cases of CFS. More generally, the regulatory requirements concerning the safety and protection of persons against the risks related to ionising radiation also apply. For example, applying a signature to certify that an activity has been correctly carried out, whereas in reality it has not, could – depending on the circumstances – be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. In 2023, the search for CFS continued during the inspections. For a number of years now this search has become one of the usual inspection practices and specific internal tools have been made available to the inspectors. Incorporating CFS into inspections corresponds to three contexts: ∙ inspections further to known subjects, resulting from CFS discovered in other facilities, or to monitor the processing of a case previously detected; ∙ inspections including an in-depth search for proof in the performance of activities, for example with verification of the actual presence of a person who certified that they had carried out an activity on a given date, or the examination of inspection registration source data; ∙ inspections with the purpose of raising awareness concerning the risks of CFS, notably during supplier inspections, where the risk of CFS in the subcontracting chain is dealt with. About fifty inspections were thus carried out in 2023. They mainly took place on the nuclear sites and at the manufacturers of equipment intended for use there. Inspections devoted to this topic were also carried out in the head office departments of the main nuclear licensees. The inspections of suppliers of safetyimportant nuclear equipment are detailed in chapter 10. The cases detected are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that preventive action can be taken. Depending on the potential implications of the deviation, a report or notification is sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Licensee Private Institutional University Association Total Foodstuffs Ambient environment Gas / Air Aerosols / Filters Biological Soils Water GRAPH Approved laboratories per type of matrix as at 1 January 2024 7 164 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 • 03 • Regulation of nuclear activities and exposure to ionising radiation
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