Subsequently, the Ministerial Order setting the organisational and technical requirements to protect sources of ionising radiation (or batches of radioactive sources) against malicious acts was signed on 29 November 2019 and published in the Official Journal of the French Republic on 11 December 2019. Its provisions were brought progressively into effect over a period extending to the end of 2022. Today they are all applicable. The Order of 29 November 2019 amended also applies to the transport of category A, B and C sources, whether individually or in batches. The main requirements of this Order aim, by adopting a graded approach based on categories A, B, C (and D for two items), to have the licensee put in place physical barriers and equipment, along with a policy and an internal organisation to protect sources against malicious acts. These technical and organisational provisions are intended to: ∙ prevent or delay the theft of radioactive sources through access control measures, reinforcement of physical barriers and their openings (doors, windows, etc.), alarms and crossing‑detection; ∙ protect sensitive information (access limited to duly authorised personnel, promotion of good information technology security practices); ∙ detect an actual or attempted malicious act (theft in particular) as early as possible; ∙ take action or alert the local law enforcement agencies after preparing their on‑site actions; ∙ raise awareness, inform, and regularly train the personnel in the issue; ∙ periodically check the effectiveness of the equipment and organise exercises. For obvious reasons of restricting access to sensitive information, some of the provisions of this Order, detailed in its appendices, were not published in the Official Journal. ASN therefore, within its area of competence, sent the relevant appendices by personalised letter to each of the nuclear activity licensees concerned. ASN also accompanied the publishing of the Order by actions in the regions at professional events between 2020 and 2022 and by holding ad hoc meetings with professionals concerned. To help with the understanding of this Order, which introduced a new regulatory field that is little known to the RNAs, two important documents have also been produced: ∙ a guide produced jointly by ASN/SHFDS (Service of the Defence and Security High Official of the Ministry for Energy Transition) so that professionals and inspectors alike have a common understanding of the requirements of the Order; ∙ a guide on assessing the break‑in resistance of opening elements: doors, shutters, windows, etc. Nowadays, professional reference systems and standards addressing protection against malicious acts enable this aspect to be covered satisfactorily from the technical viewpoint. However, the majority of the facilities concerned were built at a time when little consideration was given to the question of malicious acts. Based on the work of IRSN, which has an office specialised in the physical protection of facilities, a guide assigning a number of points to the leaves, locks and hinges of an opening element enables it to be given an overall rating and decide whether it complies with the requirements of the appendices of the Order. The forms used to apply for authorisation to exercise a nuclear activity have moreover been adapted, and two dedicated forms have been created for the category A, B or C sources or batches of sources. Guaranteeing the control of sealed radioactive sources and protecting them against malicious acts during their import or export is crucial. The IAEA has published a document entitled Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, which aims to offer its members a consistent international framework. This framework is not mandatory, but it is intended to be taken into account by the IAEA member countries in their regulations. Its aims to ensure regulatory oversight that is as harmonised as possible throughout the transfer of these sources between the origin and destination countries. The guidance is complementary to that of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. To date, 135 countries, including France, have undertaken to take up these principles in their regulations. The guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources was published in 2005, two years after the Code of Conduct was adopted. The current version, updated in 2012, focuses primarily on the category 1 and 2 radioactive sources (the most dangerous), which are widely used in the medical and industrial sectors. Maintaining control of these sources during their import or export is of crucial importance given their high level of radioactivity, which represents a risk in the event of unintentional exposure or illegal or unauthorised use. These recommendations include in particular obtaining the consent of the importing country before the export of category 1 sources is permitted, and for the exporting company to send notification to the importing country seven days before the planned date of dispatch (for sources in category 1 or 2). The aim is to know when batches of sources of categories 1 or 2 arrive in or leave the national territory in order to respond rapidly in the event of an attempted malicious act or an emergency situation (accident, climatic event, etc.). ASN resolution 2015‑DC‑0521 of 8 September 2015 (see box page 254) has enshrined these principles in French law. Forms have been drawn up and “contact points” have been designated, as recommended in the IAEA guidelines, in order to streamline the international exchanges of information. The consent requests concerning France come essentially from three countries: the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. There are slightly fewer than ten import consents per year, and about half as many export consents. In 2023, ASN took part in a seminar organised by the IAEA in Vienna attended by 103 “contact points” designated by 76 countries to discuss the regulatory measures adopted in each of the countries on the basis of the IAEA recommendations. ASN gave a presentation demonstrating the importance of not overlooking any details. The discussions confirmed the persistent difficulties encountered in these operations. For example, what do you do if the exporting country does not acknowledge the IAEA guidelines or if the importing country is slow in providing the required information? Questions of this type were the focal point of the discussions, showing the joint desire to find solutions to streamline exchanges and guarantee safe international transfers of sources. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES: THE PRIOR CONSENT PROCEDURE 252 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 • 08 • Sources of ionising radiation and their industrial, veterinary and research applications
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