In 2023, four NPPs activated their emergency organisation, described in the PUI: ∙ for a fire in the controlled area of the Cattenom NPP, on 3 March; ∙ for a fire outside the controlled area, that is in an industrial building containing no radioactive substances, on three occasions: on 14 April in the Flamanville NPP, on 30 July in the Bugey NPP and on 17 October in the Blayais NPP. These four situations had a limited impact inside the installation and required no population protection measures. In 2023, in order to test the emergency organisation of EDF and the public authorities, ASN took part in national exercises. Four exercises of this type were held on a number of NPPs (SaintLaurent-des-Eaux, Golfech, Chooz and Nogent-sur-Seine) and were able to test the emergency organisation on these sites and the exchanges with the authorities. ASN also carried out several inspections on the EDF emergency organisation and resources. These inspections, some of which are based on unscheduled situational exercises leading to activation of the site’s emergency organisation, were also an opportunity to test the operational nature of the system on specific subjects (resilience of the organisation, emergency premises equipment, documentation, training, etc.). Overall, these exercises and inspections demonstrated that the EDF sites have assimilated the principles of organisation, preparedness and management of emergency situations to the extent that they can take the required action in the event of an emergency. ASN also underlines the professionalism and motivation of the on-call personnel mobilised. However, EDF will have to continue its efforts to maintain the good operational condition of certain equipment that could be called on in an emergency and must be more vigilant with respect to the work done in the emergency premises or in the vicinity of equipment needed in an emergency. Finally, EDF must continue its efforts regarding preparedness for emergency situations of non-radiological origin. 2.4.3 The Operating Experience Feedback process It is essential for EDF to take account of OEF from the operation of its installations and those of other licensees if safety is to be continuously improved. This is based on the collection and analysis of events. Significant events are analysed individually. This analysis aims to identify their root causes and the changes required to prevent them from happening again. Analyses of trends and weak signals are regularly performed by EDF to identify the deterioration of installations safety as far upstream as possible. EDF pays particular attention to detecting and analysing potentially generic significant events detected on one reactor, but which could affect others. 2.4.4 Assessment of the Operating Experience Feedback process The Operating Experience Feedback process ASN analyses the significant event notifications and reports transmitted by EDF to ensure that they are pertinent. It also carries out inspections on the NPPs to ensure that the OEF process is correctly implemented. Ensuring the correct configuration of the hydraulic and electrical systems of nuclear reactors contributes to the safety of the installations. Controlling the configuration of systems covers line connection activities (configuration of a set of devices enabling a system to function in the way it was designed, or meet a particular operating objective), lock-out (configuration of a set of devices in defined and locked positions in order to guarantee the required safety conditions for maintenance work) and administrative lock-out (physical immobilisation of a set of devices, which must be kept in this position for the safety of the installation). At the end of 2022, ASN observed a rise in the number of line connection and lock-out errors, compromising the safety of the installations or leading to risk of personnel accidents. It therefore decided to run a campaign of inspections to check the steps taken by the licensees to ensure the correct configuration of the systems in the installations. In 2023, ASN carried out ten dedicated inspections. On each NPP inspected, ASN examined the oversight of all the processes contributing to control of systems configuration. The inspectors also carried out checks on the conformity of the configurations of the installations and were able to observe the performance of certain activities. Finally, the inspectors conducted explanatory interviews with the personnel in charge of these activities. These inspections revealed the quality of the monitoring of the processes related to these topics by the bodies concerned in the NPPs. However, the inspectors identified several subjects requiring improvement on the part of EDF. Errors in preparation and a lack of rigour in the assimilation and performance of the activities are major contributors to systems configuration faults. Some workers also experience difficulty in perceiving the potential safety impact of incorrect performance of certain actions on the equipment. ASN favourably noted the reactivity of certain sites which, being aware of their problems, implemented action plans notably to safeguard the time allotted to preparation and performance of the activities. This inspection campaign also identified a lack of coordination between the teams in charge of installation maintenance and those in charge of its operation. The operations teams are regularly called on to configure systems so that the maintenance teams can carry out their work safely. In some cases, these maintenance operations are not in fact actually carried out. In a situation such as this, equipment is unnecessarily made unavailable whereas it could have been of use in managing an incident or accident. After each of these inspections ASN sent improvement requests to EDF. This campaign will continue in 2024 to cover all the NPPs. INSPECTION CAMPAIGN ON THE CONTROL OF SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 301 • 10 • The EDF Nuclear Power Plants 10 05 15 08 11 04 14 06 07 13 AP 03 02 09 12 01
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