ASN recalls the importance of obtaining new spent fuels storage capacity meeting the most recent safety standards as rapidly as possible, in order to address the problem of saturation of the existing capacity, for which there is no alternative equivalent to the centralised storage pool. As of 2018, ASN had asked EDF to present the countermeasures it envisaged for this situation, given the possible saturation of French spent fuel storage capacity by the time of this commissioning. The countermeasures envisaged by EDF, together with Orano, are to increase the density in the La Hague pools, increase the use of MOX fuels in the reactors, subject to return to nominal operation by the Melox plant, and use dry storage of spent fuels. La Hague pools densification project In November 2020, Orano submitted a DOS. In order to promote technical discussions on this dossier, ASN created a pluralistic working sub-group at the beginning of 2021 to take part in the proceedings of the PNGMDR working group, to which the members of the La Hague Local Information Committee (CLI) had been invited. ASN issued a position statement on the dossier in February 2022. The noteworthy modification authorisation application was transmitted by the licensee at the end of 2022 and will be the subject of an ASN position statement in 2024. Project for dry storage of spent fuels on the La Hague site In November 2021, Orano submitted the first version of a DOS to ASN, which considers it to be insufficient at this stage to enable it to issue a ruling. The DOS update transmitted by Orano in 2023 is being examined by ASN. 2 ASN actions in the field of “fuel cycle” facilities: a graded approach 2.1 THE GRADED APPROACH ACCORDING TO THE RISKS OF THE FACILITIES At each step in the “fuel cycle”, the potential risks in the facilities are different: ∙ The conversion and enrichment facilities mainly entail toxic risks (owing to the chemical form of the radioactive substances they use), criticality risks (when they use enriched materials) and the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder, liquid or crystallised form). ∙ The fuel fabrication facilities mainly entail toxic risks (when they have conversion units), criticality, fire or explosion risks (processes using heating methods), as well as the risk of dissemination of radioactive substances (in powder form) and of exposure to ionising radiation (when they use reprocessed substances). ∙ The spent fuel reprocessing facilities mainly entail risks of dissemination of radioactive substances (the substances used are mainly liquids and powders), of criticality (the fissile substances employed change geometrical shape) and exposure to ionising radiation (the fuels contain highly irradiating substances). Their common point is that they never seek to create chain reactions (prevention of the criticality risk) and that they use substances that are dangerous, owing to their radiological or chemical properties, in industrial quantities. Conventional industrial risks are often preponderant; certain plants, such as Orano at Tricastin and La Hague or Framatome at Romans-surIsère, are in this respect subject to the Seveso Directive. ASN devotes efforts to applying oversight that is proportionate to the potential risks of each facility. These are thus classified by ASN in one of the three categories defined according to the scale of the risks and their impacts on safety, health and the environment. This BNI classification enables the oversight and monitoring of the facilities to be adapted, reinforcing the inspections and the scope of the reviews carried out by ASN for the higher risk facilities. When the installations are substantially modified or when they are finally shut down, ASN is in charge of examining these modifications, which are the subject of an amending decree from the Government, after prior consultation of ASN. ASN also establishes binding requirements for these main steps. Finally, ASN also reviews the safety files justifying the operation of each BNI. For each facility, ASN monitors the organisation and means chosen by the licensee to enable it to assume its responsibilities in terms of nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency management in the event of an accident and protection of the environment and public health and safety. ASN monitors the working of the organisations put into place by the licensees mainly through inspections, more specifically those devoted to safety management. 2.2 PERIODIC SAFETY REVIEWS OF “FUEL CYCLE” FACILITIES Since the publication of the Decree of 2 November 2007, all the BNI licensees must carry out periodic safety reviews of their facilities at least every ten years. These exercises were carried out gradually on the “fuel cycle” facilities. Defining the review procedures may be somewhat complex, because unlike nuclear power reactors, most of these facilities are in fact unique. There are thus few baseline requirements or other facilities with which a comparison can be easily made. Examination of these periodic safety reviews confirmed the pertinence of an upstream definition, in the “guidance” phase, of the priority subjects for examination by the licensee during the periodic safety review, along with the associated methodologies. In addition, probabilistic analyses must be added to the safety cases for all the BNIs. The periodic safety review of plant UP2-800 (BNI 117) ended with ASN issuing technical requirements for the continued operation of this BNI. For plant UP3-A (BNI 116), Orano transmitted its review concluding report at the end of 2020, and it will be examined by the Advisory Committee of Experts for Laboratories and Plants (GPU) during the course of several meetings scheduled between 2023 and 2025. In November 2022, following examination of the review concluding report for STE3 (BNI 118) and considering that the provisions put into place or planned by the licensee on this point are appropriate, ASN validated continued operation of this facility. With regard to the fresh fuel fabrication plants, the licensee of the Melox plant submitted its review concluding report in September 2021. This report is currently being examined by ASN, with a view to a review by the GPU in 2024. The concluding report for the periodic safety review of the FBFC and Cerca plants, combined in a single BNI (63-U) by the Decree of 23 December 2021, was submitted by Framatome in June 2023. 336 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 • 12 • “Nuclear fuel cycle” facilities
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