Broadly speaking, the CEA’s decommissioning and waste management strategy has been examined by ASN, which stated its position in May 2019 on the priorities defined by the CEA (see chapters 14 and 15). High-Activity Laboratory (LHA) The High-Activity Laboratory (LHA) comprises several laboratories intended for research work or the production of various radionuclides. It constitutes BNI 49. On completion of the decommissioning and clean-out work authorised by Decree of 18 September 2008, only two laboratories currently in operation should ultimately remain under the ICPE System. These two laboratories are the laboratory for the chemical and radiological characterisation of effluents and waste, and the packaging and storage facility for the retrieval of unused sources. Despite the progress of the clean-out and decommissioning operations, the accumulated delays have prevented the CEA from meeting the deadline of 21 September 2018 set by the decree authorising LHA decommissioning. The discovery of pollution in certain “intercell yards” in 2017 also led to changes being made in the operations to be carried out. Investigations ASN considers that the CEA Saclay site BNIs are operated under suitably safe conditions on the whole, and observes that the operations to reduce the radiological inventory stored in the BNIs – which have been in progress for several years now – continued in 2023. The decommissioning preparation operations and the decommissioning work are continuing for the BNIs concerned. Managing work progress and keeping to the associated schedules remain a major challenge for CEA Saclay. This area, which forms the subject of regular ASN inspections and meetings, must be improved, given the drifts observed over the years. ASN does however note the entry into application of the BNI 72 decommissioning decree in 2023 and the CEA’s decision to internalise management of the EPOC project (project to recover drums stored in BNI 72 using equipment specially produced for the purpose) further to the defaulting of the initially selected contractor. On another note, further to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident (Japan), ASN had ordered the creation on the Saclay site of new emergency management facilities capable of withstanding extreme conditions. After receiving a compliance notice from ASN in September 2019, the CEA submitted in December 2019 its file presenting and justifying the dimensioning of the future emergency management buildings. After discovering faults in the civil engineering reinforcements, the work site was suspended in mid-2021, preventing the CEA from meeting its commitment to have the premises commissioned before the end of 2021. The failure to deploy the new premises, which was contrary to a requirement of ASN resolution 2016-DC-0537 or 12 January 2016, was noted during an inspection conducted in 2022. A contradictory report was therefore drawn up in early 2023 to which the CEA replied. After examining the reply and on account of the reduction in the nuclear risk of the Saclay site following the shutdown of BNIs 40 and 101, the requirement in question was repealed and a new technical requirement now regulates finalising of the construction of robust emergency situation management premises, which are expected to be commissioned by the end of 2024. An inspection was carried out in 2023 to check that the construction work had resumed. With regard to the emergency organisation and resources, an update of the On-Site Emergency Plan (PUI) submitted by the CEA in late 2021 was discussed to clarify the chosen provisions. In May 2023, ASN authorised the modification of the PUI, retaining the provisions proposed by the CEA, with the exception of the new residual scenarios for BNIs 40 and 101, whose decommissioning files are currently being examined. In 2023, an exercise involving activation of the large-scale PPI was carried out, simulating the accidental crash of an aircraft into the centre, causing a fire and dispersion of radionuclides into the environment. This exercise was intended to evaluate the collaboration between the security actors, their coordination in managing the victims and securing the site, and decision-making between CEA Saclay, the Prefecture’s services, the CEA head office and the State authorities, including ASN. Areas for improvement in the CEA’s emergency organisation and in the exchanges of information with the other emergency management actors were identified. With regard to the environment, two ASN resolutions dating from 2009 and regulating all the discharges from the CEA’s BNIs were updated. This update enabled the extremely low carbon-14 emissions induced by some of the waste stored in BNI 72 to be taken into account, and to regulate the additional discharges of carbon-14 resulting from forthcoming works necessary for the continuation of the BNI 49 decommissioning operations. These modifications do not change the total maximum value of the carbon-14 discharges set for the Saclay site as a whole, while at the same time regulating continuation of the decommissioning operations. Lastly, ASN conducted several inspections on the Saclay site in 2023. One followed on from a significant event notified by BNI 50 and rated level 1, concerning the incorrect positioning of the emergency brakes on three lifting units. ASN thus conducted a specific inspection focusing on the maintenance of the lifting means and the monitoring of the associated outside contractors. This inspection confirmed the substantial work carried out by the CEA in bringing certain cranes into conformity following the discovery of asbestos in the linings and lagging, but it also revealed shortcomings in the application of the manufacturer’s instruction manuals when performing maintenance work on the Saclay site’s cranes. ASN will be attentive to the resolving of the deviations observed during this inspection. In addition, improvements were found in the monitoring of the Pressure Equipment (PE) and the electrical generator sets, even though further improvements are expected in each of the inspected BNIs on specific aspects observed during inspection. These improvements will be monitored on a case-by-case basis. The year 2023 was also marked by the notification of one significant event for safety rated level 1 on the INES scale. This event was reclassified further to a repeat finding of bags of nuclear waste in a conventional waste production zone within BNI 101. At the same time, ASN underlines a reduction in significant event notifications in 2023 compared with the previous year. ASSESSMENT OF THE CEA SACLAY SITE 66 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection • ÎLE-DE-FRANCE •
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=