This principle, referred to as the ALARA(1) principle, leads for example to reducing the quantities of radionuclides present in the radioactive effluents from nuclear installations allowed in the discharge licenses, to requiring monitoring of exposure in the workplaces in order to reduce it to the strict minimum and to ensuring that medical exposure as a result of diagnostic procedures remains close to the pre-determined reference levels. 1.1.7 The limitation principle The limitation principle, defined in Article L. 1333-2 of the Public Health Code states that “[…] exposure of a person to ionising radiation […] may not increase the sum of the doses received beyond the limits set by regulations, except when the individual is exposed for medical purposes or for the purposes of research as mentioned in 1° of Article L.1121-1”. » The exposure of the general public or of workers as a result of nuclear activities is subject to strict limits. These limits include significant safety margins to prevent deterministic effects from appearing, as well as aiming to reduce the appearance of probabilistic effects in the long term to the lowest level possible. Exceeding these limits leads to an abnormal situation and one which may give rise to administrative or criminal sanctions. 1. The ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle appeared for the first time in Publication 26 from the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 1977. It was the result of a process of reflection on the principle of optimising radiological protection. Over the past thirty years, the acceptance and implementation of the ALARA principle has developed significantly in Europe, with strong backing from the European Commission, leading in 1991 to the creation of a European ALARA network. In the case of medical exposure of patients, no dose limit is set, provided that this voluntary exposure is justified by the expected health benefits for the person exposed. 1.1.8 The prevention principle To anticipate any environmental damage, the prevention principle, defined in Article 3 of the Environment Charter, stipulates the implementation of rules and measures which must take account of “the best available technology at an economically acceptable cost”. In the nuclear field, this principle underpins the concept of “Defence in Depth”, presented below. 1.2 Some aspects of the safety approach The safety principles and approaches presented below were gradually implemented and incorporate the lessons learned from accidents. Absolute safety can never be guaranteed. Despite all the precautions taken in the design, construction and operation of nuclear facilities, an accident can never be completely ruled out. Willingness to move forward and to create a continuous improvement approach is thus essential if the risks are to be reduced. 1.2.1 Safety culture Safety culture is defined by the Interna- tional Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), an international consultative group for nuclear safety reporting to the Director General of the IAEA, as that complete range of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. Safety culture therefore determines the ways in which an organisation and individuals perform their duties and assume their responsibilities with respect to safety. It is one of the key fundamentals in maintaining and improving safety. It commits organisations and individuals to paying particular and appropriate attention to safety. The organisation must take steps (training, mentoring, preparation and planning of work, etc.) enabling the safety culture to be expressed at all levels of the organisation through a rigorous and prudent approach and a questioning attitude, allowing compliance with the rules to be shared and initiatives to be taken. In operational terms, the concept underpins daily decisions and actions relating to activities. System of interdependent fundamental principles, the three sub-culture aspects of ASN’s organisational system and the three regulation and oversight performance criteria System of fundamental principles Sub-culture aspects Performance of oversight Vigilance Reflexive practice Primacy of experience Mission commitment Hierarchy of issues Subsidiary Authority Structural stability Approach to oversight and regulation Relationship to time Robust decisions Efficient inspections Effective incentives ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 125 The principles of nuclear safety and radiation protection and the regulation and oversight stakeholders 02 01 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 AP
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