a report. Only a request from a judicial authority could override this confidentiality, something which has never yet happened. It is however preferable for the person sending in the notification to leave their contact details so that ASN can: ∙acknowledge receipt of the notification; ∙contact them if clarification is required (this is frequently the case); ∙inform them if action has been taken following their alert. In 2024, 74 reports were sent to ASN: twothirds (46) via the whistle-blower portal, the others by alternative means of transmission, mainly (15 reports) by direct contact with the ASN division geographically competent or the technical department in charge of the subject. The reports received vary: ∙in the field concerned: about one third concern BNIs, one third the medical field; ∙in their content: they can report CFS in the manufacturing plants, deterioration in the organisation of the entity which could affect radiation protection, poorly performed work, etc. After a constant number of reports received in recent years, a significant rise was observed in 2024 (about +50%), despite a reduction in the reports outside the scope of ASN’s oversight competence. A rising number of reports led to one or more in-depth interviews with their author. With regard to reactors, this increase can be explained by: ∙the performance of supplier inspections, a programme which continued to expand (see point 6). During these inspections, the subject of whistle-blower reports is covered. The suppliers are thus made more aware of this possible means of informing ASN; ∙the June 2024 publication of the practical guide for the quality of equipment intended for nuclear installations, which includes a section on the whistle-blowing system; ∙ the 2024 ASN inspection campaign on CFS and human factors. The inspectors systematically ask the parties questioned whether they have access to a whistle- blowing system; ∙implementation of the EDF action plan for CFS prevention and processing, the deployment of which was accelerated in 2024. The fluctuation concerning the medical field cannot be explained by ASN’s actions. Two factors could be a part of the explanation: ∙the deployment of whistle-blowing arrangements by the health care professionals (doctors, nurses, dental surgeons, etc.) who are also designated by the above-mentioned Decree as competent to receive alerts and some of whom had deployed their own systems more belatedly than ASN. Whistle-blowing reports could have followed different paths between 2023 and 2024 (transmission to the Order of Physicians rather than to ASN for example); ∙the general publicity concerning the protection of whistle-blowers by the Defender of Whistle-blower Rights increased, notably with the publication of its first two-yearly report on whistle-blowers, to which ASN made a contribution. Some reports are forwarded by ASN to other administrations when it is not competent to deal with them. These could also be foreign safety regulators. Three reports were thus transferred to ASN’s foreign counterparts in 2024, as they involved installations in other countries. All reports are examined and dealt with. This can lead to an inspection, a technical analysis, a request for information from a party responsible for a nuclear activity, etc. It could for example concern information regarding the security of a BNI, which must be addressed by the High Defence and Security Official at the Ministry for Energy. Fifteen reports received in 2024 were verified during the course of inspections. The follow-up to these inspections is dealt with in the same framework as routine inspections. 6 Inspection of the nuclear installations supply chain The quality of manufacturing of the safety- important equipment for nuclear facilities is an essential factor in the safety of these facilities. The observed failures in compliance with the specified requirements for certain nuclear equipment, as well as the irregularities discovered in the industry, led ASN to reinforce its regulatory checks on the nuclear industry supply chain. In addition, at a time of considerable activity in the nuclear sector, controlling the supply chain is a particularly important challenge for the safety of the nuclear installations in service, as well as those being planned. These checks take the form of inspections and can concern a variety of fields such as forges, foundries, piping manufacturers, but also manufacturers of generators, diesels, sensors, PLCs, I&C, pumps, etc. These inspections, both in France and abroad, can target companies of varying sizes. The inspections are a means of ensuring the pertinence of the monitoring of the subcontractor supply chain put into place by the licensees and manufacturers and, more particularly for the NPE, of checking the quality of manufacturing at the regulated manufacturers and their subcontractors. On the specific page of its website, ASN publishes all the letters sent following up its inspections, and provides an annual summary (see close-up in chapter 10). ASN also holds regular discussions with the nuclear industry representatives in order to explain the regulations, to develop changes made to the technical baseline requirements of the ordering parties, and share best practices and the ways of improving safety. ASN in particular wishes to see improvements in supplier and subcontractor knowledge of the regulatory requirements and of the need for traceability of activities important for the manufacture of equipment important for the protection of interests. This traceability is notably based on improved computerisation of manufacturing monitoring, which is insufficiently developed among certain companies in the sector. These discussions were in particular held with representatives of the sector within the French Nuclear Energy Industry Players Group (GIFEN). In 2024, ASN published a practical guide in French and English, intended for the suppliers of equipment for nuclear facilities, and their subcontractors. The purpose of this practical guide is to make the regulations and their objectives more accessible. It explains the design and manufacturing requirements for safety-important equipment, as well as the industrial practices that ASN considers to be satisfactory. The principles described are illustrated by industrial examples, with a resolutely practical approach. To draft it, in-depth technical exchanges were held with the GIFEN. ASN is continuing with its international commitments regarding supplier oversight, within the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). This commitment entails active participation in the Working Group on Supply Chain (WGSUP) involving the nuclear safety regulators, chaired by ASN. Within this working group, ASN shares and facilitates the adoption of best inspection practices among regulators, draws the attention of the regulators, licensees and suppliers to the most high-risk areas, and takes part in joint inspections. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 167 01 Regulation of nuclear activities and exposure to ionising radiation 03 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 AP 02 04
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