The obligations of the licensee relative to the preparation for and management of emergency situations are defined in Title VII of the Order of 7 February 2012 setting the general rules for BNIs. The associated provisions were stipulated in ASN resolution 2017-DC-0592 of 13 June 2017 concerning the obligations of BNI licensees in terms of preparedness for and management of emergency situations and the content of the PUI, known as the “emergency” resolution, approved by the Order of 28 August 2017. 1.1.2 Response plans for radioactive substance transport accidents The transport of radioactive substances represents nearly a million packages carried in France every year. The dimensions, weight, radiological activity and corresponding safety implications can vary widely from one package to another. ASN examines and approves the management plans for events linked to the transport of radioactive substances drawn up by the stakeholders for the transport of such substances pursuant to the international regulations for the carriage of dangerous goods. These plans describe the steps to be taken, depending on the nature and scale of the foreseeable hazards, in order to avoid damage or, as necessary, mitigate the effects. The content of these plans is defined in ASN Guide No. 17. To deal with the possibility of a radio- active substances transport accident, each département Prefect must include in their implementation of the PNRANRM a part devoted to this type of accident, the Orsec- TMR (Transport of Radioactive Materials) plan. Faced with the diversity of possible types of transport operations, this part of the plan defines the criteria and simple measures enabling the first respondents (Departmental Fire and Emergency Service – SDIS – and law enforcement services in particular) to initiate the first reflex response measures to protect the general public and sound the alert, based on their findings on the site of the accident. 1.1.3 The response to other radiological emergency situations Apart from the incidents or accidents which could affect nuclear installations or radioactive substances transport operations, radiological emergency situations can also occur: ∙during performance of a nuclear activity for medical, research or industrial purposes; ∙in the event of intentional or inadvertent dispersal of radioactive substances into the environment; ∙if radioactive sources are discovered in places where they are not supposed to be. In such cases, intervention is necessary to limit the risk of human exposure to ionising radiation. Together with the Ministries and the parties concerned, ASN therefore drafted Circular DGSNR/DHOS/DDSC 2005/1390 of 23 December 2005 relative to the principles of intervention in the case of an event that could lead to a radiological emergency, other than situations covered by a contingency plan or an emergency response plan. This Circular supplements the provisions of the Interministerial Directive of 7 April 2005 on the action of the public authorities in the case of an event leading to a radiological emergency situation presented in point 1.3 and defines the methods for the organisation of the State services in these situations. Given the large number of potential originators of an alert and the corresponding alert circuits, all the alerts are centralised in a single location, which then distributes them to all the stakeholders: the centralising body is the fire brigade’s centralised alert processing centre CODISCTA (Département Operational Fire and Emergency Centre – Alert Processing Centre), that can be reached by calling 18 or 112. The management of accidents of malicious origin occurring outside BNIs is not covered by this Circular, but by the Government’s NRBC (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical) plan. 1.1.4 Controlling urban development around nuclear sites The aim of controlling urban development is to limit the consequences of an accident for the population and property. An approach of this type has been in place since 1987 around nonnuclear industrial facilities and was reinforced following the AZF plant accident in Toulouse in 2001. Act 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 concerning transparency and security on nuclear matters (TSN Act, now codified in Books I and V of the Environment Code), enables the public authorities to control urban development around BNIs, by implementing institutional controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the vicinity of these facilities. The actions to control urban development entail a division of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and the State: ∙The licensee is responsible for its activities and the related risks. ∙The mayor is responsible for producing the town planning documents and issuing building permits. ∙The Prefect informs the mayors of the existing risks, verifies the legality of the steps taken by the local authorities and may impose institutional controls as necessary. ASN supplies technical data in order to characterise the risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban development control process. The current approach to controlling activities around nuclear facilities exclusively concerns those subject to a PPI and primarily aims to preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans, in particular for sheltering and evacuation, while limiting the population numbers concerned as far as possible. It focuses on the PPI “reflex” zone, determined by the Circular of 10 March 2000 revising the PPIs for BNIs, the pertinence of which was confirmed by the instruction of 3 October 2016. In this “reflex” zone, immediate steps to protect the population are taken in the event of a rapidly developing accident (see point 1.1.1 b). A 17 February 2010 Circular from the Ministry responsible for the environment concerning the control of activities in the vicinity of BNIs liable to present dangers off the site asked the Prefects to exercise increased vigilance with regard to urban development in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. This Circular states that the greatest possible attention must be paid to projects that are sensitive owing to their size, their purpose, or the difficulties they could entail in terms of protection of the general public in the “reflex” zone. ASN is consulted on construction or urban development projects situated within this zone. The opinions issued are based on the principles explained in ASN Guide No. 15 on the control of activities around BNIs published in 2016. This Guide, drawn up by a pluralistic working group jointly overseen by ASN and the General Directorate for Risk Prevention (DGPR), comprising elected officials and the National Association of Local Information Committees and Commissions (Anccli), has the following basic objectives: ∙preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans; ∙give priority to regional development outside the “reflex” zone; ∙allow controlled development that meets the needs of the resident population. 1.2 The emergency situation stakeholders The response by the public authorities to a major nuclear or radiological accident is determined by a number of texts concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection, public order and civil protection, as well as by the emergency plans. Act 2004-811 of 13 August 2004 on the Modernisation of Civil Protection, makes provision for an updated inventory of risks, an overhaul of operational planning, performance of exercises involving the general public, information and training ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 175 01 02 03 Radiological emergency and post-accident situations 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 AP
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