- 170 - to communicate with the on-site and off-site emergency teams, whether local or national. ASN will thus require EDF to integrate the communication means vital for emergency management in the "hard core" of reinforced material and organisational provisions. These means will include the means for alerting the public authorities and the population alert systems if the off-site emergency plan is triggered in the reflex response phase. They will also have to be made resistant to the extreme situations studied for the CSAs. 6.1.3 Identification of factors that can hinder accident management and the resulting constraints In the CSA specifications, ASN asked EDF to evaluate the envisaged accident management measures considering the situation such as it could occur on the site: extensive destruction of infrastructures around the facility, including the means of communication (making technical support and personnel reinforcement from outside the site more difficult); the disruption of work efficiency (including the impact on the accessibility and habitability of the main and secondary control rooms, the premises used by the emergency teams and any area required to be accessible for accident management) caused by high dose rates in the rooms, by radioactive contamination and the destruction of certain facilities on the site; the feasibility and efficiency of the accident management measures in case of external hazards (earthquakes, flooding); electrical power supply outage; potential failure of the instrumentation; the impact of the other neighbouring facilities on the site. Extensive destruction of infrastructures around the facility: With regard to the envisaged accident management measures in the event of extensive destruction of the infrastructures around the facility, EDF indicates in the CSA reports that its emergency organisation does not include a specific response structure for this situation, nor to clear the site. In the event of major damage to roads and civil engineering structures, EDF calls upon the public authorities who, in addition to the PPIs specific to the emergency situation, implement the provisions of the "ORSEC" national emergency response plan. The aim of these provisions is to facilitate site access for the duty teams. To cope with the extreme case of total defaulting of the duty personnel or failure of the communication means (particularly with the exterior) used during deployment of the emergency organisation, EDF indicates that it is currently conducting complementary studies on: reinforcing the skills of the operating team so that it can take the necessary minimum measures to prevent or delay core meltdown; reinforcing the communication links by having communication means with greater autonomy and which are earthquake- and flood-resistant; the creation of a Nuclear Rapid Intervention Force (FARN); taking into consideration the working conditions of the operating personnel, the on-call personnel and the FARN. They must be able to guarantee the health and safety of the workers. The psychological aspect is taken into account. In the CSA reports, EDF presents the broad lines of the requirements applicable to the FARN. EDF thus plans for the FARN to be able to: intervene within 24 hours, in continuity and replacement of the operating teams that will have fulfilled the emergency measures for the site concerned and whose access infrastructures may be partially destroyed;
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