- 171 - work autonomously for several days on a partially destroyed site (non-seismic tertiary buildings, for example), whose environment could be radioactive, and - on some sites - possibly affected by chemical pollution; deploy heavy-duty protection or intervention means within a few days; ensure a permanent link with company management, site management and teams, and the local authorities in order to manage and coordinate the interventions; prepare for continuation of the intervention beyond the first days of autonomy in the event of a longlasting emergency. ASN considers that EDF has not finished analysing the weak spots in the organisation according to the scale of the external hazard that led to the emergency situation. Consequently, ASN will issue several requirements concerning: the defining of the human actions required for the management of the extreme situations analysed in the CSAs, including situations affecting several reactors and those that could have consequences on the accessibility and habitability of the emergency management rooms. EDF will verify that these actions can effectively be carried out, including for the FARN, given the intervention conditions likely to be encountered in such scenarios; the integration in the hard core of reinforced material and organisational provisions of the communication means that are vital for emergency management; the FARN. This will be capable of responding within 24 hours, with operations beginning on the site within 12 hours from the time of call-out. It will comprise specialised crews and equipment capable of taking over from the personnel on a site affected by an accident and of deploying additional emergency response resources, including in situations involving largescale releases. EDF will specify the organisation and size of these crews, in particular the activation criteria, their duties, the material and human resources at their disposal, the organisational arrangements made to guarantee the maintenance and the permanent operability and availability of these material resources, and finally their training and skills currency processes. Disruption of work efficiency caused by high local dose rates, radioactive contamination and destruction of certain facilities on the site: EDF presents the impact of this type of situation on the accessibility and habitability of the control rooms. In a severe accident situation, if the pressure in the reactor building rises, it may be necessary to depressurise the containment to maintain its integrity by using the U5 system filter. EDF states that in the light of the current preliminary studies on the habitability of the control room after opening the U5 system filter, the permanent presence of personnel in the control room is to be avoided in the period (24 hours) following opening of U5 system filter. In the CSA reports, EDF also presents the impact of these situations on the various rooms used by the emergency teams to manage the accident. The accessibility, habitability and operability of the Emergency Technical Rooms (LTC) are identical to those of the control rooms after opening the U5 system filter. EDF specifies in the CSA reports that the emergency rooms (security block (BDS), emergency equipment stores, etc.) were designed without a specific regulatory requirement relative to flooding and earthquake, yet pragmatically these places are required to remain operational in the event of external hazards. EDF's analysis of the earthquake resistance of the BDS shows that these building generally have structural resistance up to SSE (safe shutdown earthquake) level. The habitability of the BDS, however, is temporarily not ensured after opening the U5 system filter. On this latter point, EDF undertakes, further to the CSAs, to carry out a more comprehensive study on the scale of a site to assess the habitability of the control rooms and the BDS, and site accessibility after opening the U5 system filter on a reactor in a severe accident situation. EDF also includes among the future actions mentioned in the CSA reports, the performance of preliminary studies to improve the robustness of the BDS's to ensure they remain operational, particularly in the event of an
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=