- 247 - Measures to protect the facilities against the seismic risk / design-basis earthquakes Georges Besse I plant To date, no reinforcement has been scheduled as plant shutdown is planned for 2012. Comurhex To date, no reinforcement has been scheduled due to the forthcoming plant shutdown. Socatri The licensee has indicated that the seismic behaviour of the facility would be studied as part of the ongoing periodic safety review. Earthquake resistance reinforcements are already planned for the URS building. TU5 W The licensee has indicated that a project to replace the HF storage facilities of the W plant is currently being studied. Georges Besse II plant No reinforcement is considered necessary at present. Conformity of the facilities with the current frame of reference and assessment of the safety margins Georges Besse I plant For the robustness of the facilities beyond the SSE, AREVA indicates that a magnitude 6 earthquake would lead to rupture of the pipe bellows and major damage in several structures, notably annex U and the DRP building. Annex U and the DRP building were designed in accordance with paraseismic rules PS 67. The plants, however, were constructed and reinforced to take into account the DSN 75 spectra, which prefigured the content of RFS I.2c. The licensee has indicated that the weak spot in the cascade is situated at the Low Pressure (LP) and Medium Pressure (MP) connections with the manifolds due to the risk of deformation of the bellows. Comurhex Structure 200 (ICPE) Regarding the seismic behaviour of Comurhex structure 200, AREVA indicates that building 1 built in 1960 was not designed to earthquake design-basis, and building 2 was designed in accordance with the PS 69 rules. Regarding the robustness of this facility beyond the magnitude 5.5 SSE, AREVA indicates that a magnitude 6 earthquake would lead to major damage to the buildings and total loss of leak-tightness. Socatri The licensee's file does not include any information on the earthquake resistance of the key SSCs and the available margins. TU5 W The submitted report does not contain any detailed information on this subject. Georges Besse II plant The risks associated with the off-site hazards of natural origin were taken into account in the design of the GB II plant for the safety function "containment or radioactive or toxic substances". This safety function has been divided into sub-functions which can be considered as the required functions of the key SSCs.
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