- 248 - They are given in the table below: Risk Key Structures, Systems, Components Design requirement South North RECII South and North unit structures (including buffer yards) and REC II unit Design of structures and neighbouring equipment to SSE X X X Handling machines, UF6 container supports Design to SSE X X X AEL autoclave supporting structures Design to SSE X Needle valves of emission and extraction stations, cold trap isolation valves, circuit breakers and seismic cut-off system X X X Valves on manifold and pipes (liquid UF6 or high-pressure gas transfer circuit) Equipment isolation in event of SSE X Vent cold traps, including isolation valves X X X Earthquake Condensers, pipes, valves and instrumentation (sensor) of the liquid UF6 or high-pressure gas transfer circuit, PE cylinder drainage system (pipes and valves) Equipment sealing in event of SSE X The effective conformity of the key SSCs is verified from design through to entry into service. SET establishes a "Production conformity file" for this purpose. A technical verification is carried out to ensure that: the quality-related actions within the Activities Concerned by Quality (ACQ) have been carried out in accordance with the specified requirements; the result obtained meets the specified quality requirements; any necessary corrective and preventive actions have been taken. furthermore, verifications are made to ensure that: o the human and technical means are appropriate for the actions concerned by quality within the ACQs, o the technical inspections have been performed. The licensee indicates that any modification in the facility forms includes the subject of a modification assessment sheet and a modification authorisation file that identifies the risks and guarantees maintaining of the requirements defined at the design phase. The deviations detected before entry into servicecommissioning are analysed by ASN in application of the provisions of article 26 of the decree of 2 November 2007. Considering the scenario of an earthquake of higher intensity than the SSE, in which the enrichment units are in production, transfer is in progress on the unit transfer and decoupling lines, and the ten sampling autoclaves are heating when the seism takes place, the consequences would be: a leak at the UF6 pipes linking the condensers to the containers in the liquid reception autoclave; a malfunction of the automatic closure system of the containers needle valve in the autoclaves; a leak at the sampling manifold of the liquid sampling autoclaves; damage to the building. The licensee indicates that this would result in successive crossing of the three barriers with: a partial leakage of UF6 from the container into the autoclave; a partial leakage of UF6 from the autoclave into the building; a partial leakage of UF6 from the building to the exterior. The licensee considers that the dispersal of UF6 (crystallised or gaseous UF6) caused by a loss of containment on the sub-atmospheric part would be negligible.
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