- 307 - 6. Severe accident management 6.1 Emergency management organisation and general provisions 6.1.1. CEA facilities (experimental reactors, Masurca et ATPu) Overall assessment ASN Decision 2011-DC-0224 of 5 May 2011 required the CEA to perform Complementary Safety Assessments (CSAs) of the following BNIs for 15 September 2011: JHR, Masurca, ATPu, Phénix and Osiris. As emergency management is a cross-organisation subject, the provisions specific to each BNI cannot be examined independently of the general provisions organised for the CEA centres of Cadarache, Marcoule and Saclay as a whole. This section relative to the CEA's management of severe accidents constitutes the ASN's intermediate appraisal based on the analysis of the CSA reports submitted in 2011. It will be supplemented by the analysis of the CSA reports for the Cadarache and Marcoule centres, due on 15 September 2012. ASN will moreover require the submittal of a report relative to emergency management at the Saclay centre in 2013. In spite of the Advisory Committees' recommendation No.5 of 6 July 2011 to "submit an initial assessment of the availability and accessibility of the resources common to the sites and of use to the facilities examined on 15 September 2011, which will be supplemented in the file due for submittal in September 2012", the CEA presents the general organisation and inventory of the resources common to the centres but without specifying their availability or accessibility. The assessment has, on the whole, been satisfactory for the Phénix and Osiris facilities. The robustness and availability of the organisation and material provisions specific to these BNIs, have been examined in accordance with the specifications. The assessment of the Cadarache BNIs (JHR, Masurca, ATPu) however, is incomplete, as the reports only mention the organisation and general resources of the centre. ASN will ask CEA to supplement the future studies, particularly for the Marcoule and Cadarache centres, by examining and detailing the robustness and availability of the organisation and material provisions: that are implemented in each of the centres, that are specific to each BNI, including those examined incompletely in 2011. ASN will issue requests in this respect for the report that will be required to be produced for the Saclay site in 2013. More generally, ASN points out that pursuant to article 20 of decree No. 2007-1557 of 2 November 2007, "the on-site emergency plan (PUI) defines, on the basis of the design study figuring in the safety report, the organisational measures, the methods of intervention and the necessary means implemented by the licensee in an emergency situation to protect the personnel, the public and the environment from ionising radiation, and to preserve or restore the safety of the facility". The PUI must therefore detail the provisions specific to each BNI. Consequently, even if the CEA has a PUI common to several of its BNIs, ASN will ask it to define the provisions specific to each BNI, in line with the presentations and justifications provided in the reports due in 2012 (Marcoule and Cadarache) and 2013 (Saclay). ASN also considers that insufficient attention has been devoted to coordination in the event of a severe accident affecting all or part of the BNIs of a given site simultaneously. ASN will therefore require the CEA licensees to reinforce their material and organisational provisions to take into account accident situations affecting all or part of the facilities of a given site simultaneously.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=