- 309 - With regard to the Masurca facility, the CEA indicates that an earthquake of the DBE (design basis earthquake) intensity would lead to total or partial collapse of the Storage and Handling Building (BSM), which would lead to substantial dissemination of radioactive material in the environment, preventing human intervention. The licensee specifies that pending entry into service of a building that meets current earthquake design standards (RFS 2001-01), which is scheduled for 2017, it plans transferring the fissile material to the MAGENTA facility for interim storage, but without setting a date. ASN considers that the transfer of the fissile material currently stored in the BSM should be effectively carried out in the short term. ASN will issue a requirement on this subject to set the deadline. Measures envisaged to reinforce accident management capabilities As regards the Marcoule centre, the CEA undertakes in its CSA report to make the following reinforcements: construction of a new building housing the Marcoule centre's emergency management premises, outside floodable zones, built to the DBE and having an autonomy of 96h in the event of electrical power supply loss; parking of intervention vehicles and positioning of the mobile pumping and electrical power supply means in a place that will not be impacted by the effects of an earthquake; reinforcement of the Phénix facility's resources: means for limiting water ingress, preparation procedures for the mobile pumping equipment; study of the possible reinforcements for Phénix: inerting and extinguishing means on premises containing sodium, use of a buffer volume for storing potentially contaminated water. The Cadarache and Saclay centres do not envisage reinforcement measures at this stage of the study. The information presented by the CEA to date is incomplete and does not enable a conclusion to be drawn regarding the robustness of the material and organisational provisions in the JHR, Masurca, ATPu, Phénix and Osiris facilities in terms of emergency management. The CEA has decided to push back the assessment of the provisions specific to each BNI to the site reports due in 2012 and 2013. ASN will demand that the availability of the organisational and material provisions in the event of a severe accident, including the provisions specific to each BNI, be assessed in the reports submitted by the CEA centres in 2012 and 2013. Particular attention shall be paid to the following information: emergency management premises, means of intervention and communication, instrumentation, means of radiation protection, technical and environmental instrumentation. 6.1.2. The reactor operated by the ILL ASN considers that the ILL has carried out the CSA to its satisfaction, by proposing a complete appraisal of the availability and robustness of the means necessary for emergency management in the event of an earthquake, flooding, and the two events combined. Licensee's accident management organisation The organisation such as it is described in the on-site emergency plan (PUI) of the ILL Grenoble enables some 150 people to be mobilised by full-scale deployment, with a possible complement of 50 more people. As the personnel have multiple skills, details of their possible assignments to the different emergency teams are provided. ASN considers that the ILL's deployment capacity for a severe accident situation is adequate. Nevertheless, full-scale deployment of the emergency teams raises personnel management questions, notably the extra personnel present on site (potential exposure to risk, on-site sleeping capacities). During the review, the ILL undertook to examine the operability of the mode of alerting and deploying its emergency teams in the external hazard scenarios studied in the CSAs. ASN will examine the ILL's mobilisation capacity in its review of the ILL's on-site emergency plan (PUI).
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